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ABSTRACT
In this research we investigate what determines the
division of responsibilities between levels of government in
Tunisia. Tunisia has experienced the paradox of fifteen
years of an alleged decentralization policy and the
systematic centralization of local public services (LPSs).
We evaluate the content and outcome of the decentralization
policy, and we analyze what has motivated the centralization
of an LPSs, using the case of the sewerage service.
Throughout this analysis, we highlight the limited
achievements of the decentralization effort and the
constraints local governments still face in providing
services (i.e., an insufficient revenue base and cost-
recovery mechanisms, lack of clear authority, and lack of
adequate institutional arrangement for the provision of
services). We find that these institutional deficiencies,
which have motivated the centralization of some LPSs, are
still at the core of municipalities' incapacity to provide
their services efficiently. We also find that the division
of responsibilities between levels of governments in Tunisia
is determined by the desire to produce the service
effectively rather than by the search for economic efficiency
as suggested by the economic model of allocation of function,
known in the fiscal-federalism literature.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske
Title: Professor of Regional Political Economy
and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
A renewed interest in decentralization and the promotion
of local government responsibility for management of urban
development has emerged in the last decade from governments
of developing countries, international development agencies,
as well as scholars in the field. This comes as a result of
the growing pressure for more and better public services and
the failure of the centralized system to provide an adequate
level of service while meeting development objectives. The
increase in demand for public services is particularly acute
in the urban areas where there is a rapid population growth
due in large part to the rural urban migration. Central
governments have found themselves increasingly incapable of
responding to these growing demands through the traditional
centralized methods and consequently are looking for
alternative ways of providing and financing these services.
Decentralization of some of these responsibilities to local
governments is one of the most considered alternatives.
Many of the developing countries that have considered
more actively involving local governments in the provision of
public services have failed in their decentralization
initiatives. Despite decentralization reforms, local
governments in these countries remained often underdeveloped
institutions carrying many limitations in their provision of
services. Although a large body of decentralization
literature has emerged, which has improved the understanding
of the characteristics of local governments in developing
countries, analysts have produced no clear explanation of why
the decentralization policies have been so unsuccessful, nor
do they explain how central governments allocate
responsibilities to local governments. Our objective in this
research is to answer these questions of why governments in
developing countries often claim the desire to decentralize
and fail to achieve this objective and what is their rational
for the division of responsibilities between levels of
governments.
We will use a country case, Tunisia, and a public
service traditionally considered as local, the sewerage
service, as a basis for this research. Tunisia has
experienced the paradoxical situation of, on the one hand,
two decades of rhetoric about decentralization, and, on the
other hand, a gradual, but systematic, centralization of many
of the most important local public services. In the last
fifteen years, a series of reforms and efforts to strengthen
municipalities' operation were implemented, accompanied by an
alleged desire for greater participation of the local
government in the public life of the country. Municipalities
continue, however, to be the weak and underdeveloped
institutions that they have always been. During the same
period, and in spite of the alleged objective to increase the
role of the local government, two major local public services
(LPSs), the sewerage service and the urban rehabilitation
service, were taken away from local level responsibility and
given to newly created central institutions.
Our objective in this research is to explain this
paradox of a systematic centralization of local public
services during the general stated commitment to decentralize
in Tunisia. More specifically: Why did the decentralization
reform fail to transform local governments into active
participants in the public and economic life of the country?
Why was the sewerage sector centralized, while the
decentralization policy was being formulated and implemented?
What is the rational for the division of responsibilities
between central and local governments in Tunisia? We will
demonstrate that the central government's ambiguous
motivations towards the decentralization initiative combined
with a technocratic approach to public services explain the
paradox in Tunisia of an alleged decentralization policy and
a systematic centralization of services.
We will show that the central government's lack of a
clear commitment to decentralize--apparent in the hesitant
objectives and imprecisely motivated reform which fails to
incorporate the potential benefits of decentralization--has
produced an incomplete reform, which brings some improvements
to the local governments' operations, but which is far from
transforming them into institutions capable of providing
local public services efficiently and of participating
actively in the local public and economic life of the
country. We will also show that the central government's
strongly rooted technocratic approach to public services,
that is, its emphasis on the effective production and
delivery of services determines the rationale for allocation
of public services between levels of government in Tunisia.
We will conduct this analysis in two parts. First, by an
evaluation of the decentralization efforts, and second by an
analysis of the centralization process of one local public
service, the sewerage service.
We will begin the evaluation of the decentralization
efforts by an overview of the context in which the policy and
reform aimed at reinforcing local governments were generated
and by an identification of the motivation and level of
commitment of the central government to decentralize.
(Chapter 2.)
We will then approach the decentralization analysis from
two perspectives reflecting the two principal components of
the local government reform: First, in an institutional
analysis, we will review the new legislation governing
regional and local governments, and we will evaluate to what
extent this reformed legislation has modified the role and
structure of the regional and local governments and has
provided the local governments with the necessary legal
support for decentralization (Chapter 3). Second, in a
financial analysis, we will evaluate whether local government
finances reflect the decentralization objective set by the
reform (Chapters 4 and 5). We will analyze the evolution of
the budgetary volumes of municipalities since the beginning
5of the reform, and compare them to those of the central
government. We will also examine in detail the revenue and
expenditure structure of local governments in order to
evaluate the level of autonomy and authority the local
governments have over their financial activities.
We will conclude from this analysis of the
decentralization reform that not much decentralization has
occurred. Municipal responsibilities are ambiguously
defined, their revenues are still limited and their authority
over revenue sources is largely restricted. Moreover, no new
responsibilities have been transferred to them. We claim
that the reform was too restricted to be successful at
bringing local governments to a significantly higher level of
activity and that these restrictions are a reflection of the
lack of clear commitment of the government to decentralize.
We will start the second part of this research with an
analysis of the institutional structure for the provision of
local public services and identify the role and position of
municipalities amid this institutional structure. In this
analysis, we will confirm the limited, role of municipalities
in the provision of LPSs, but we will also demonstrate a
pattern in the institutional structure for provision of LPSs
characterized by a large number of centralized autonomous
authorities endowed with a high level of authority over their
sector of activity. (Chapter 6.)
We will then turn to the analysis of the process of
centralization of one LPS, the sewerage service (Chapter 7).
By understanding the reasons that have motivated
centralization, we will highlight: the deficiencies of
municipalities that have made them invalid candidates for the
provision of the service; the factors that made the
institutional development for the sewerage service at the
central level a successful one; the rationale for the
centralization of local public services. We will show that
the primary justification for the centralization of the
sewerage service and the creation of a new sewerage
institution was to achieve financial soundness and
institutional soundness for an efficient provision of the
service. Municipalities lacked the institutional structure
and legal base to achieve these objectives.
We conclude this analysis by explaining that the
centralization of the sewerage service was motivated by what
we define as "a priority objective for an effective
production and delivery of service" which undermines, from
the point of view of the central government, any potential
benefit that could be captured by a decentralized form of
provision of services.
CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
REVIEW OF APPROACHES
Before starting our analysis of the Tunisian
decentralization experience, we will review the different
approaches analysts have taken to define the role of the
local governments in developing countries and what different
analysts have tried in order to understand their
characteristics. This literature falls into two main
approaches. The first is a theoretical explanation of the
role of local government, based on the principles of
microeconomic, welfare economic, and public finance theories.
The economic explanation of the appropriate allocation of
functions between levels of government is explained in the
theory of fiscal federalism.
Second is the abundant literature on decentralization
that has recently emerged as a consequence of the renewed
interest in local governments in developing countries. This
literature consists of policy analyses with a multi-
disciplinary approach, which borrow heavily from the theory
of fiscal federalism for the economic analysis and which also
include analyses of the political, administrative, and
historical factors relevant for the understanding of local
governments systems. Many of these analyses are based on
field research and have provided relevant explanations of
local government systems and some interesting propositions
for improving their operations.
ECONOMIC THEORIES
Local public finance theory is based upon three other
economic theories. First, welfare economics which is
concerned with the efficient allocation of scarce resources
in a market system. Second, public economics or public
finance, which is also concerned with the efficient
allocation of scarce resources, but extends the analysis to
cases where market mechanisms cannot operate due to market
failures and where public intervention is required. Third,
fiscal federalism theory, which is concerned with the
appropriate role of local government and the appropriate
levels of fiscal decentralization.
Historical Development
The field of public finance has a long history. As early
as the 18th century in the Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam
Smith established three major categories of government
activity: defense, justice, and provision of public
institutions and public works that is not profitable to
supply privately. In the 19th century, English economists
(Ricardo, Mill, and Edgeworth among others) focused primarily
on the revenue aspects, as government activities were assumed
to be clear and usually escaped rigorous analysis.
The field has received its major contribution following
the important events of the 20th century, the Great
Depression and World War II. After the Great Depression of
the 1930s, thinking in public economics was directed
primarily to fiscal policy for the purpose of maintaining a
high level of employment. Keynes' work on the formulation of
government economic policies is one of the most significant
contributions. He revolutionized the orthodox understanding
of the role of the government. With the growth of the public
sector in the United States and other industrialized
countries, particularly after World War II, a wide range of
literature on the economics of the public sector appeared.
American economists (such as Howard Bowen, Richard Musgrave,
and Paul Samuelson) rediscovered the previous work of
European economists and integrated it into modern economic
theory. Today, the emphasis in the field is on three major
functions: stabilization, distribution, and allocation
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984, p. 6).
From the general theoretical foundations, analysts moved
to the analysis of the particular types of public programs.
One of the major themes that they have developed as a subset
of public economics was the issue of decentralization and the
role of local governments. Fiscal federalism theorists
question what is the optimal division of tax and expenditure
responsibilities between levels of governments and what is
the optimal size of local governments. Among the various
theorists in this field are Tiebout (1956), "A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures," who claims that individuals can indicate
their preferences concerning the combination of local public
services and taxes by moving across localities; Musgrave
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(1959), "The Theory of Public Finance," who conceptualized
the role of the public sector as a whole and developed some
preliminary observations on an economist's view of a federal
system; Mc Lure (1971), "Revenue Sharing: Alternative to
National Fiscal Federalism;" and Oates (1972), "Fiscal
Federalism." In this last work, Oates presented the economic
theory of public finance under a federal system of
government, analyzed what these theories imply about the
proper economic structure of the public sector, and explored
the extent to which such a theory can provide insights into
the actual operation of systems of multilevel finance (Oates,
1972, p. vi).
Fiscal Federalism
The basic pillars of fiscal federalism are the theories
of public goods and public choices. The theory of public
goods is concerned with the provision of commodities or
services that, because of some characteristics, cannot be
provided through the market. By definition, public goods are
characterized by nonrivalry in consumption and
nonexcludability, that is, if it is supplied to one person,
it can be made available to others at no extra cost. Private
suppliers are, in that case, replaced by the public sector.
The financing of these goods is achieved through taxation.
Aggregate demand is substituted by some form of collective
choice, as individual demand is concealed by an individual
free rider behavior and cannot be expressed through the
market mechanism. The community's choice is expressed by
some sort of political process, such as voting, or by a
representative government. We find the theoretical
background of the demand aspect in the theories of public
choice, which are concerned with the application of economics
to the analysis of nonmarket decision-making and the
allocation of resources to which they lead. Public finance
theorists set up circumstances under which public
intervention is justifiable, showing how the optimal
allocation of resources can be achieved outside the market
mechanism.
Once the government's function is clarified, we must
answer what is the appropriate division of responsibilities
between levels of governments. Fiscal federalism theorists
treat this question of division of taxation and public
expenditures between various levels of government. They
explain the division of functions to be performed by these
levels of government on the basis of the spatial economic
impacts of these activities. Although some public goods
confer benefits to the nation as a whole, the benefits of
some others are more limited in geographical incidence.
Activities that have primarily a national impact and
therefore must be conducted by the central government, are,
for example, stabilization policies, which can be established
on a national basis; redistribution activities, through
taxation and subsidies, which can rarely be applied by local
governments without driving the wealthier person or firms out
of their jurisdiction; and finally, the provision of public
goods that benefit the country as a whole, such as foreign
affairs and national defense. Left to the local governments
is the provision of public goods for which the area of
benefits is much smaller than the entire country. The
primary advantages of having local governments conduct these
activities are that they permit closer adaptation to local
needs and constraints. It is assumed that, by making
decisions concerning the provision and financing of local
public goods at the local level rather than by the national
government, the optimal level of provision is more likely to
be achieved. Thus, the system of multi-level finance is
justified in terms of allocation efficiency.
One of the recognized shortcomings of these theories is
the difficulty of establishing the perfect division of
government activities among several levels of government
because optimal size of production to attain full economies
of scale may vary from one service to another. Also,
activities might generate spill-overs outside the locality
and necessitate some control of these inter-jurisdictional
externalities. Finally, the geographical mobility from one
government unit to another might result in congestion in
certain areas. These difficulties, in turn, have led to the
formulation of a variety of solutions, some of which raise
new questions. This sets the bases for the economic theories
of fiscal decentralization as developed in industrialized
nations.
Relevance to Developing Countries
Many recent writers in the field agree that this theory
is of limited relevance to developing countries, primarily
because it cannot explain the actual intergovernmental
arrangements in developing countries, nor does it provide the
framework for solutions. Bird (1978) explains that the model
rooted in the economic theory provided a poor explanation for
how the responsibilities were allocated between levels of
governments in developing countries. In more recent
writings, in his proposition for an integrated political
economy framework for analyzing decentralization policies and
programs, Rondinelli (1989) also explains that the approach
based on the economic theory alone cannot offer a
.."comprehensive theoretical and methodological solutions to
determine how decentralization should be carried out" (p.
58). Smoke (1988, p. 80) indicates that .."some of the basic
assumptions of the model ... do not always apply in
underdeveloped countries..." He mentions several examples of
such assumptions, which we will discuss later.
Bird (1978) explains that the fundamental tenet of the
model fails to fit reality and consequently cannot explain
it. The model is founded on the principles of microeconomic
theory. The individual is the unit of analysis and the
optimum allocation of resources through the market mechanism
is the fundamental objective. The economics of the public
sector tries to replicate this context in cases of market
failures. The individual is replaced by the collectivity and
the market mechanism by the voting process.
The starting point is "...the individual and builds up,
or aggregates, through various levels of collectivities... to
satisfy individual demands in an efficient way" (Bird, 1978,
p. 21) From a deductive analysis, the model arrives at an
explanation of how governmental units are determined and
functions allocated. This is what Bird defines as the
aggregation model explaining the division of responsibilities
between levels of government. He adds that " the application
of the aggregate model results in a complex and overlapping
set of governmental units, though not necessarily (or even
likely to be) those that exist in the real world" (p. 22).
In contrast, he presents the traditional public
administration perspective whose "...central idea is that it
is not the individual who is the fundamental unit of
analysis, but rather the nation state which is in some sense
the fundamental organizational unit, so that all
decentralization below this level requires special
justifications" (p. 22). He adds that the devolution model
is the best at explaining how "intergovernmental fiscal
relations now work in developing countries and how most
planners and other officials seems to think they should work"
(p. 23).
Smoke (1988) provides several examples of assumptions of
the model that do not hold in developing countries, although
relevant to the industrialized countries in which the model
was developed. We can summarize these conditions into three
types: the political factors, the cultural factors, and the
factors related to the capacities of local governments.
Fully developed democratic systems are rare in developing
countries--for a variety of reasons ranging from the basic
fear of political rivalry to choices in development ideology-
- and very few substitutes for this political process exist
by which preferences are expressed. Cultural factors include
the limited relevance of individual preferences and the lack
of mobility, both essential assumptions of the theory. "In
many traditional societies in the third world, this
[individual preferences] is a culturally alien concept"
(Smoke, 1988, p. 89). Moreover "... for both cultural and
economic reasons, mobility in developing countries may be
restricted and permanent relocation away from the area of
origin may be much more limited than in the developed
countries" (Smoke, 1988, p. 98). Finally, the theory assumes
no deficiencies in the capacity of any unit of government to
provide services. Developing countries are severely
constrained by lack of resources and skills "Deficiencies in
managerial and technical capacity..." of local
authorities..."combined with the need to ensure that the use
of scarce resources supports national development priorities,
suggests..." a greater intervention of central government in
local activities (Smoke, 1988, p. 100).
Rondinelli supports the view that the theory alone is
insufficient to provide the necessary framework to understand
and implement successful decentralization. The main
limitations of the public choice theories are their overly
rationalistic assumptions and narrow prescriptions
(Oppenheimer, 1981, quoted in Rondinelli, 1989, p. 60).
The implication of this lack of direct relevance of the
model to developing countries is primarily a warning against
using it as a normative model, implicit to the theory, for
assessing intergovernmental fiscal relations. Bird explains
that "a more useful approach is to work within a positive
framework relevant to the particular country in question"
(1976, p. 25). This requires learning about the specifics of
the country, the context in which the policies are
formulated, the relevant policy objectives and the
institutional context. He adds that this is essential for a
more successful approach to the analysis and the formulation
of recommendations concerning local authorities in developing
countries.
Despite this important mismatch between the economic
model and the reality of developing countries, many of the
basic principles and tools of these models have been relevant
to the analysis of specific situations of the local
governments in these countries. Smoke points out that
although the "individual preferences" concept might not be as
relevant in developing countries, variation in conditions and
context (such as environmental conditions) make special
preferences for public goods more heterogeneous than in
developed countries. Most analysts have suggested an
integrated approach to the issues of decentralization; there
are numerous examples of such analysis. It is in the area of
financial analysis--related to central government transfers,
local taxation and other revenue generation issues-- in
particular, that analysts have relied heavily on the
principles of fiscal federalism theory. The public finance
concept of user charges for private goods, which share a
common foundation with public choice theory, is provided by
Rondinelli (1989, p. 62) as an example of such integration of
economic principles with the public administration approach.
LITERATURE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A proliferation of writing has recently emerged on the
issue of decentralization and local government performance in
developing countries. This came as a consequence of the
recent interest in seeing local governments take a larger
responsibility in the provision of public services, after it
became clear that the central government alone will never be
able to satisfy the increasing demands for public services.
Decentralization to subnational governments is one among
several of the possible alternatives that is considered.
Privatization as well as participation of private voluntary
organization are other options often cited to solve the same
problem. Nevertheless, local governments who are the more
natural providers of public services, have received most
attention in the literature.
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Field research has provided a large body of knowledge on
the characteristics of local government operations--more
often of their failure to operate adequately--in developing
countries. Multidisciplinary field work has failed to
provide a major theoretical explanation of the patterns of
decentralization. The reason, we believe, lies in the
diversity of factors that are relevant to the issue of
decentralization.
A few empirical studies, using cross-sectional data of
countries, have provided some generalizations about patterns
of decentralization. The relationship between
decentralization and stages of economic development was
investigated, for example, by Woo Sik Kee (1977) using 64
countries. He found "that the degree of fiscal
decentralization is greatly dependent on the ratio of
intergovernmental transfers,..., the level of per capita
income and the degree of urbanization." In a sample of
developing countries "the degree of openness of the economy
emerges as an important explanatory variable" (p. 79.)
Another study with reference to Latin America (Greytak and
Wasylenko, 1988) was conducted with the basic hypothesis that
certain historical facts condition the nature of government
decentralization. The analysis "establishes consistency
among countries with Spanish heritage" suggesting that "other
developing countries might reflect similar consistencies if
they were grouped according to their particular colonial
backgrounds" (pp. 16 and 17.) They found, that among Latin
American countries, the countries that are larger
geographically are more decentralized, while those with a
large public sector are more centralized. Income growth
appears to lead to greater decentralization of expenditures
but not of revenue raising. They did not find such a
systematic consistency in patterns of fiscal
decentralization, among other developing countries.
Extensive field research has provided a great deal of
knowledge about the characteristics of local government in
developing countries. Many studies have common findings,
despite the variety of experiences and types of government
and the difficulty of coming up with generalizable
conclusions. Some of the most important are summarized,
without being exhaustive, in the following points.
First, in developing countries, centralization is the
norm rather than the exception. It is so for political,
ideological, economic, and historical reasons. It was a
widely held belief among leaders of developing countries in
the 1950s and 1960s that centralization was necessary for a
country's first stage of development.
Second, in the last 20 years many countries have, at
least once and often several times, formulated the desire to
decentralize after recognizing the shortcomings of excessive
centralization. The reasons ranged from the dissatisfaction
with the results of the centralized planning and provision of
services to concerns about the inefficiency of the central
government. It was believed decentralization would reduce
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overload and congestion problems of the central government
and also "improve the government's responsiveness to the
public and increase the quantity and quality of the services
it provides." (Rondinelli, 1984, p. 5). Finding alternative
financing sources of these services--by delegating them to
other governmental or nongovernmental institutions--becomes
critical because of the central government's fiscal
constraint, the goals of achieving a more diffused and
equitable distribution of development, and extending services
to far away communities and reaching the poor. These all
became reasons for the previous and more recent interest in
decentralization (Davey, 1989; Rondinelli et al., 1984);
however, there is no clear evidence as to "which factors are
associated with government pressure to deconcentrate or
devolve planning and administrative responsibilities"
(Rondinelli, 1984, p. 7). All agree that "ultimately"
decentralization is primarily a political process.
"...Decentralization is a political decision, and its
implementation a reflection of a country's political
process." (Rondinelli et al., 1984, p. 9)
Third, analysts have unanimously found that
decentralization experiments in developing countries are
characterized by their limited success. Most experiments
have failed to attain their objectives, although many
benefited from these policies. Few evaluations of
decentralization programs explain the reason for their
failures.
Despite the poor success rate, decentralization
continues to be promoted, in part because it is believed that
it will bring some relief to the ineffective centralized
procedures and in part for political reasons.
Decentralization programs are frequently assessed by their
political effect (Rondinelli et al., 1984, p. 27).
A large part of the field research concentrates on local
government revenues, primarily because lack of revenues is
seen as the most critical obstacle to efficient local
government operation and a key factor in a successful
decentralization program. The most common problems
associated with local government revenue sources are that
local governments rely heavily on central government
transfers for their resources, that their tax structure is
insufficient and has limited growth potential, and that user
charges and fees are almost nonexistent. "Commonly, local
taxes have financed substantial shares of services that
should have been financed from user charges, and/or transfers
have been used to finance services which could have been
appropriately financed from local taxes or user charges"
(Bahl and Linn quoted in Mc Lure, 1983, p. 190).
Intergovernmental transfers are high on the list
analysts' concerns. Their concern is related to the size of
these transfers in both local and central governments'
budgets. They are also one of the primary policy tools in
the hands of the central government to influence local
governments' activities. "[Intergovernmental transfers
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are].. .expected to accomplish a long list of sometimes
conflicting objectives." Moreover, "...monetary transfers
constitute an extremely visible political instrument." It is
also expected that transfers will grow with decentralization
programs and with local government playing a more important
role in the provision of public service (Schroeder, 1988).
These analyses of central government transfers include
reviews of the size and trend of intergovernmental flows, of
the great variety of policy objectives that are formulated,
of the instrument used to achieve them (i.e., formula for
allocation or types of grants, etc.), and of the final
outcome of these policies. "Some studies have found that
distributions of funds can be equalizing and that grants can
be used to stimulate local fiscal efforts." Overall, very
few "hard data-based analyses" have been generated, however,
for strong conclusion on intergovernmental transfers in
developing countries. Even central governments rarely
undertake systematic analysis of the overall effect of the
grant system to evaluate its achievements. (Schroeder, 1988.)
In field research, the analysts' emphasis on revenues
contrasts with their limited interest in expenditures. This
revenue bias is not specific to developing countries,
however. Empirical research by analysts in developed
countries has also dealt much more extensively with revenues
than with expenditures. It is, in part, explained by a
revenue bias within economics, but it also reflects the
perceived importance of the revenue constraint to local
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governments in developing countries. The importance of
research on expenditures lies in finding ways of improving
resource utilization. Field research also has largely
overlooked the institutional aspect for the delivering of
services at the local level, particularly in evaluating
alternative forms of provision such as private firms and
voluntary organization (Rondinelli 1989, p. 62).
Finally, there is an abundant literature concerned with
how to strengthen and improve the performance of the local
governments, most of which was generated by international
lending institutions concerned with implementation. These
normative frameworks draw heavily on the conclusions of the
field research literature and also borrow concepts from
economic theory for financial aspects. This literature
recognized that decentralization was difficult and that
"improving public administration is usually an uphill task.
The experience tends to bequeath more Don't's than Do's."
(Davey, 1989, p. 68). The literature has produced,
nevertheless, a large number of useful recommendations for
designing and implementing programs to improve local
operations.
This literature has also been excellent at providing a
good understanding of how local government in developing
countries function and at identifying their drawbacks. It
provides also solid recommendations for what should be done
and how local governments should function, but it does not
identify what are the most significant elements of a
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successful policy. This partially comes from the variety of
situations and types of local government that exist, but it
also comes from a lack of clear identification of what leads
to successful decentralization policy. This is probably one
of the most important shortcomings, but also one of the most
difficult questions of analysts who deal with local
governments in developing countries.
Our objective in this thesis is to explore further what
are the factors that make a decentralization policy a failure
or a success by looking at what determines the division of
responsibilities between levels of governments. We will
confirm that the economic theory does not explain the
allocation of function between levels of governments. We
will provide an alternative explanation for the rational that
has determined this division of responsibilities, implicit in
the actions of the government.
Our evaluation of the decentralization reform will
confirm many of the findings on the shortcomings of local
governments in developing countries identified in the
literature. We will go further than the general assessment
of their deficiencies by focusing on the specific
shortcomings for the provision of one local public service:
sewerage service.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTEXT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
We will start the analysis of the decentralization
reform in this chapter by an overview of the context in which
the reform took place, by an analysis of the motivations and
objectives of the Government of Tunisia (GOT), and by a
presentation of the main component of the reform. We will
show that municipalities institutional development in Tunisia
evolved in a dynamic climate of reforms aimed at improving
living conditions in the regions, in which many policies and
programs were formulated and implemented. The 1975 reform of
municipalities was partly a response to a larger concern
about local underdevelopment and the lack of participation of
the people in the public life of the country. We will also
discuss how the Tunisian historical tradition of
centralization and the political choices made after
independence have resulted in a highly centralized form of
government. Finally, we will demonstrate that the
motivations and the objectives of the reform were not
forcefully defined. The GOT was only indirectly motivated by
the benefits of decentralization and was also hesitant and
fearful of excess decentralization. These factors have had
an important impact on the development and the outcome of the
reform.
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A CONTEXT OF REFORM
In the early 1970s, the Tunisian government started
giving particular attention to the issue of regional economic
development and institutional development of the local and
regional administrations. According to official documents,
the factors that have pushed the Tunisian government to give
so much attention to these issues were the growing economic
disparities between regions, the excessive centralization of
public functions and congestion of the central
administration, and the lack of citizen participation in the
public life at the local level.1 The GOT formulated and
implemented a regional development program and a reform of
local and regional governments aimed at fostering economic
development in the regions and institutional development of
the local and regional governments.
Although government officials recognized as early as
1956, the year of Tunisia's independence, the problems that
spawned these reforms at the regional and local level, it is
only in the early 1970s that they have started formulating
effective actions to correct them. The circumstances that
have fostered this series of reforms were the new form of
1 Various documents from the Ministry of planning, Government of
Tunisia: GOT (1980) Note d' Orientation pour la IIIeme Decennie de
Developpement et le VIeme Plan (pp. 10-17 and 111-117.) Ministry of
Planning, Tunis, Tunisia.
GOT (1982) VI me Plan de D6veloppement Economique et Social 1982-
1986,Tunisia (Juin), (pp. 229-273.) Ministry of Planning, Tunis,
Tunisia, and GOT (1987) VII eme Plan de D6veloppement Economique et
Social, 1987-1991, (pp. 235-253) Ministry of Planning, Tunis, Tunisia.
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liberalism that started with the government of Hedi Nouira, a
government that was responsible for many structural reforms
in Tunisia (Chaabane et al., 1980, p. 24), and the concern
among Tunisian officials that the people's perception of
increasing income disparities between regions and of neglect
and alienation from local public life could be a source of
political instability. Tunisian officials were also
concerned about the growing number of rural-urban migrants to
the large urban centers in the eastern coastal part of the
country, which increased the demand for jobs and services in
cities already suffering from high levels of unemployment and
inadequate provision of services. Tunisian officials saw
these new migrants as an additional threat to political
stability.
The concerns with regional disparity and political
instability started in the early 1970s and were revived after
each political crisis at the regional level, in 1980 and
1984.2 The regional development programs established at that
time were aimed at creating "...social peace and consolidate
unity," with the former president Bourguiba calling regional
development "a patriotic duty." (GOT, Note d' Orientation,
p.2, in Nellis, 1984, p. 6).
2 In January 1980 popular revolts, which were supported by external
sources, occurred in the economically depressed mining region of Gafsa.
In 1984, the increases in the price of bread and other basic commodities
were the cause of protest riots, which were first initiated in cities of
the deprived interior regions before spreading to the coastal cities
(Nellis, 1984, p.4).
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Today, local and regional institutional development and
regional economic development are still primary concerns of
the Tunisian government. Although the GOT recognizes that
the outcome of the programs and policies started in the early
1970s have not met expectations, the government continues to
stress aggressively its commitment to these objectives (see
VII Plan de Developpement Economique et Social, 1987, pp. 57
and 236). It recommends new approaches or new emphases and,
at times, proposes new programs in a continued effort to
correct their deficiencies and improve their outcome. The
overall formulation of the problem remains, however,
consistently the same. Why has the Tunisian government not
attained its objective after such a long time of rhetoric on
regional and institutional development?
Before answering these questions, we will first review
the historical context that have made local governments
underdeveloped institutions. We will then review the
objectives and the main components of the local and regional
institutional development efforts.
CENTRALIZATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF SUBNATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The underdevelopment of subnational governments in
Tunisia is the result of several historical factors: (i) the
legacy of the poorly organized and heavily centralized
administrative structure from the period of the Turkish
domination and the French protectorate, (ii) the influence of
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the French system of local government, and (iii) the
centralized model of development adopted after independence.
The period when Tunisia was dominated by foreign powers
was not favorable to the development of independent
subnational institutions. During the Turkish era, the
administrative system was highly centralized, exercising
totalitarian rule over weak and particularly disorganized
local administrations (Chabaane, et al., 1980, p. 22).
During the French protectorate, part of the previous
structure of local administration was kept, but these
institutions were deprived of their autonomy and were
subjected to the central colonial power. This policy was
successful at breaking the existing tribal structure and at
weakening the local social and political structure, but it
deprived the country of any reliable form of subnational
government. As with most colonized countries, the perceived
necessity to control the regions limited the chances of
developing local autonomous institutions.
Faced with the negative consequences of this poor
subnational institutional structure, the French colonial
government was pushed to enact reforms of the subnational
government on two occasions: 1922 and 1934. In the 1922
reform, they divided the country into Caldates or districts,
and in 1934, they created rural communes, but these reforms
were limited in extent. No autonomy was ever granted to the
local and regional governments.
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These reforms, however, were sufficient to model the
Tunisian administration structure on that of the French
highly centralized model of administration. The main
characteristics of this model are a strong central government
with a concentration of power in its executive part, the
tendency to centralize most public functions, the limited
level of autonomy awarded to the subnational government
particularly over revenue-raising authority, and, finally,
the tendency to place local and regional governments within a
vertical hierarchy of governmental institutions. Locally
elected assemblies have legislative power, but executive
responsibility is often exercised by administrators with dual
responsibilities to the people of their jurisdictions and to
the central government.
After independence, the desire to remedy this lack of
effective subnational administration led to a reform in 1956
of both regional and local governments. Although this reform
brought an improvement to the previous system, the level of
autonomy provided by the new legislation was highly inhibited
by the political choice of a centralized form of
administration. This option was commonly adopted by newly
independent states in the 1950s and 1960s as part of their
development strategy. The Tunisian government justified
this choice on two grounds: first, the desire to maintain
national unity and consolidate power of the newly independent
state--it was believed at that time that centralization was a
prerequisite to the development of the state at an early
stage of development; second, the necessity of concentrating
the limited human and financial resources of the country to
avoid spreading them too thinly over too large a number of
institutions across the country. As a result of this
political orientation in the period that followed
independence, the government structure came to be highly
centralized. The political power was concentrated into one
unique party: the Partie Socialist Destourien (PSD)
(Socialist destourian party); and one man: the president of
the republic. Most public functions continued to be carried
out at the central level, and further centralization of
services took place.
All of these factors converged to bring about the same
effect: a highly centralized system of government, with
underdeveloped subnational governments. They inhibited the
development of a "spirit" of subnational government where
local and regional governments are responsible for local
services and are accountable to their constituency, and where
the people participate in the local public life. The
traditionally weak regional and local governments continued a
decade after independence to operate in their long tradition
and practice of atrophic institutions. Their institutional
weakness meant that any attempt to transfer new
responsibilities to them would require the reinforcement of
their structure and capacities.
32
REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REFORM:
MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES
In the early 1970s, with the new liberalism of the
government of Hedi Nouira and the perceived mounting social
and political pressure in the regions, the need and desire to
reform local and regional governments were revived. The
political discourse at that time indicated a desire to
develop the regional and local administrations. The
government of Hedi Nouira called for a more rational division
of responsibilities among the central, regional, and local
authorities, as well as for provision of the means--financial
and human resources--required by regional and local
authorities to conduct integrated development of their
territory. It also called for a reduction of the excessive
central control imposed on them, which was recognized to play
an inhibitive role on subnational institutions. 3
The motivation for the reforms that took place at that
time was rooted in three concerns, all part of the overall
objective of creating better living conditions in the
regions: (i) the perception of excess centralization of the
central government, (ii) the desire to improve the
relationship between the population and the public
institutions providing public services, and (iii) the desire
to enhance citizen participation in the local public life.
The long period of centralization of the government
structure resulted not only in weak and underdeveloped
3 Discourse before the assembly of Hedi Nouira in 1974, (S. Chaabane,
et al., 1980, p. 24)
subnational government, but in a congested and therefore
inefficient central government. According to official
documents, the central government was overburdened with
responsibilities. 4 It was responsible for most public
functions that ranged from policy formulation to managerial
and implementation tasks in all regions of the national
territory. The central government and its institutions were
also perceived to be alienated from the people they were
serving. Public institutions in charge of public services
were said not to be responsive to the needs of the people and
incapable of coordinating with other actors at the regional
level. Finally, the long history of centralized government
structure and the lack of subnational government culture made
the citizens unconscious or uninformed about their rights and
duties vis-a-vis regional and local governments. This was
illustrated by their total lack of participation in the local
public life of the country.
The 1975 administrative reform was born out of these
concerns, which showed a need for both a deconcentration and
decentralization of activities. 5 The objective of improving
4 GOT (1980) Note d' Orientation pour la IIIeme Decennie de
Developpement et le VIeme Plan (pp. 10-17 and 111-117.) Ministry of
Planning, Tunis, Tunisia. GOT (1982) VIdme Plan de D6veloppement
Economique et Social 1982-1986,Tunisia (Juin), (pp. 229-273.) Ministry
of Planning, Tunis, Tunisia. GOT (1987) VII eme Plan de Ddveloppement
Economique et Social, 1987-1991, (pp. 235-253) Ministry of Planning,
Tunis, Tunisia.
5 We will differentiate between two forms of "decentralization" as it is
in the Tunisian and French structure of government: Deconcentration
consists of a delegation of activity with no decision-making authority.
Decentralization is a delegation of responsibilities which includes also
full autonomy over the decision-making.
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the operation of the central government by transferring
implementation and management tasks to the regional
governments while keeping decision-making authority at the
central level is a deconcentration policy objective. The
alleged objective of transforming the subnational governments
into important actors in the economic and social development
of their region, and to make them responsible for
coordinating all economic activities in their locality is a
decentralization policy objective. This was to be achieved,
in theory, by the decentralization of some decision-making
authority and the provision of a higher level of autonomy to
local governments. Although, in theory, both
decentralization and deconcentration objectives seem to be
equally important, in practice, the deconcentration efforts
appear to have taken a stronger hold.
We should point out two elements in the GOT's
formulation of the motivations and objectives of the reform
that demonstrate a lack of clear commitment to
decentralization and that are not favorable to a successful
decentralization policy. First, the potential benefits of
decentralization--such as greater accountability of local
governments to their constituency and better adaptation to
their needs in the provision of public services--have never
been mentioned as part of the GOT's motivations for the
reform. The GOT appears to be only indirectly interested in
these potential benefits. Decentralization is first mentioned
as a way of improving the life in the regions and achieving
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political stability. The concern for an overburdened central
government finds its answer in a deconcentration policy
rather than a decentralization policy. The desire to enhance
the participation at the local level and the desire to give
more responsibilities to the local governments, which are the
closest to a decentralization objective, remain vaguely
stated objectives and, as we will see later, were not
supported by any other action.
Second, despite this impetus for reform, the GOT
indicated serious reservations about decentralization.
During the same political discourse before the assembly in
1974, Hedi Nouira warned against excessive decentralization
and against transforming the country into a "mosaic of
autonomous republics" (Chaabane et al. , 1980, p. 24) . The
GOT determined that the authority over political choices and
orientations would remain in the hands of the central
government. This important limitation was a sign of
uneasiness on the part of the central government with
delegation of power, which can be explained by the political
tradition of the country of a one-party system.
MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE REFORM
Despite these limitations, the 1975 reform can be
qualified as the most ambitious of all the reforms in the
history of subnational governments in Tunisia. The creation
of a new legislation is certainly the most important action
of this reform. It aimed to redefine the role of both local
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and regional governments, to provide them with more authority
and responsibility, and to reinforce their finances with
greater revenues and better financial management.
The role of local governments or municipalities was to
be expanded by this new legislation. They were to assume the
authority for all activities--economic and social--in their
territory. The new legislation theoretically set the
groundwork for the municipalities to become a more active
partner in the economic and public life of their locality.
It includes a definition of the role of the Municipal Council
and of the mayor and a financial reform aimed at improving
access to and management of local governments' resources.
The reform provided new sources of revenues for
municipalities, restructured the existing ones, and increased
the volume of transfers from the central to the local
governments. The reform also provided municipalities with
new budgetary procedures aimed at improving their financial
management.
The regional governments and specifically the governor,
an official of the Ministry of Interior, was the focus of
deconcentration efforts. The governors were to take
responsibility for implementing and managing central
government activities. The central government would then
concentrate on policy development and control. The
governorates were mandated to serve as a direct manager of
all central government activities in the regions. All
ministries were required to deconcentrate some of their
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activities through the creation of regional services under
partial authority of the governor, the head of the
governorate. The role of the latter was increased by the
reform.
OUTCOME OF THE REFORM AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT
We will see in the following chapters that the 1975
reform did not produce the expected results. Little of what
the reform was intended to accomplish took place. Local
government remained far from the model institution
anticipated by the reform. Very few transfers of
responsibility to local and regional governments were
accomplished. The common perception in Tunisia, including
that of the government is that municipalities continue to be
weak, underdeveloped institutions. The GOT faced with these
insufficient results continues to stress the necessity of
reinforcing the subnational governments. Plan documents
systematically remind officials of the need to act more
aggressively to provide the subnational government with the
intended responsibilities and capacity. The motivations
remain the same: relief of the central government
administration, better provision of public services, and
increased participation of the people in the public life at
the local level. Thus, during the following years the
government of Tunisia made several amendments and additions
to the main reform of 1975 of a much smaller scope and in the
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same line as the original reform, but they did not bring the
intended transformations.
Recently, more actions have been taking place. The
government is implementing a reform of the governorate
council planned in 1989 and is currently preparing a
municipal development project through a World Bank loan. A
very important action is that the governorate council is
being replaced by a regional council, whose members are
representatives of ministries and local governments and other
government officials, with the ambitious mission of
controlling all public activities in their jurisdiction,
rather than just being responsible for implementing and
managing central governments activities. The municipalities'
development project is aimed at reinforcing the structure of
the institutions, by reforming its revenue structure,
restructuring its service portfolio, improving its operating
procedures, and training its personnel.
By creating this regional council, the government of
Tunisia is motivated by the same will to deconcentrate
activities to the regional level. The extent of the
projected deconcentration seems, however, much more
ambitious, perhaps even too ambitious to be acceptable to the
various ministries concerned. We will not evaluate the
outcome of this reform, which is still in the process of
implementation, nor will we analyze the planned municipal
development project which will be implemented in the next two
years. The recent actions only confirm the persevering, but
still unaccomplished, objective of the central government to
decentralize.
SUMMARY
From this presentation of the context in which the
reform took place and of the motivations of the government
for initiating this reform, we can summarize three factors
that had an important impact in the shape and the outcome of
the reform: First Tunisia has a strong tradition of a
centralized form of government, which has been reinforced by
several political choices made in its recent history.
Second, the GOT is only marginally concerned with the benefit
of decentralization as seen from the motivations and
objectives set to be achieved by the reform. Third, the GOT
was also hesitant as to how much decentralization was
beneficial to the country and clearly indicated its fear of
excessive decentralization.
We will see in the following analysis that these
ambiguities in the objectives of the reform are reflected in
its formulation. It appears in the lack of clarity of the
reformed legislation, which fails to define the role of local
governments, and in the restricted autonomy of local
governments in their financial activities.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
We will start assessing the decentralization efforts in
Tunisia with an analysis of the institutional structure and
the role and responsibilities of regional and local
(subnational) governments as defined by law. By examining
the legislation set in the 1975 reform under which
municipalities are still operating, we will show what was
achieved by the decentralization program. We analyze three
issues: (i) Have the objectives of the reform been met? (ii)
To what extent did the new legislation provide the local
governments with the support necessary for decentralization?
and (iii) What is the current status of both regional and
local governments, more than a decade after the reform?6
This analysis will demonstrate that the reformed
legislation of 1975 does not provide municipalities with the
legal base necessary to become the decentralized governments,
that are active participants in the public and economic life
of their region, set forth by the reform. Their role is
poorly and ambiguously defined, no new responsibilities have
been transferred to them, and a strong control of the
supervisory authorities is still in effect. This analysis
will also show that the reform of the regional governments
and the efforts to deconcentrate government activities at the
6 The field work for this research was done between 1986 and 1989. We
will refer to this period as current in the text.
regional level, although more specifically formulated, was
not much more successful.
Our evaluation will consist primarily of an analysis of
the legislation and regulations governing subnational
governments. For the local governments, or municipalities,
we will rely mainly on the Loi Organique des Communes, a
legal document defining the structure and the
responsibilities of municipalities, and the subsequent
legislation issued to supplement it. The Loi Organique des
Communes represents one of the most significant improvements
realized by the reform. For the regional governments, or
governorate, we will focus on the various laws and decrees
governing them that have been issued at different periods
between 1963 and 1985. The 1975 reform did not replace the
governorate legislation, but rather was a collection of
amendments to the existing legislation. We also review the
governorate institutional structure instituted by the 1975
reform, although it has been completely transformed by the
newest reform of 1989. It is still too early to comment on
the outcome of this latest reform, as it is only in its
preliminary implementation stage. In Annex 3-1, we will
discuss, instead, the reform plan of 1989 and compare the
intent of this plan with the reform of 1975.
The 1975 reform targeted both the regional governments
or Governorates and the local governments or Municipalities
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in Tunisia. 7 These two types of institutions roughly match
two of the decentralization categories defined by the theory:
the deconcentration model and the devolution model. 8
Deconcentration "is a shifting of the workload from centrally
located officials to staff or offices outside of the national
capital" (Rondinelli, 1984, p. 10) . With the deconcentration
of a workload or a function, only limited authority is
shifted to the subnational level. Deconcentration does not
involve the transfer of substantial decision-making
authority. The deconcentrated institution depends directly
on the central authority and is accountable to it for its
action.
Devolution, on the other hand, involves a transfer of
decision-making authority to an autonomous institution. The
devolved functions are under the full responsibility of this
institution, and "substantially outside the direct control of
the central government" (Rondinelli, 1984, p. 19). From
their structure, level of autonomy, and breadth of
activities, we contend that the regional governments or
governorates in Tunisia are closer to a "deconcentrated"
model of government--the governor represents the central
government at the regional level. The municipalities, on the
other hand, manifest many of the "devolution" model
7 Local governments are identified in Tunisia indifferently as
municipalities or communes. For consistency, we will be referring to
them as municipalities in the text.
8 A classification made by Rondinelli (1984) in Decentralization in
Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience in which he
summarizes the various forms of decentralization.
characteristics --they are politically autonomous units
representing the population at the local level.9 None of
them, however, are pure cases of devolution and
deconcentration. The governorate councils, for example, are
autonomous legal entities and the mayors have in many
occasion acted on behalf of the central government. Both are
shown in Figure 1. We will give a more detailed description
of these types of government in the following sections.
There are some exceptions to this clear theoretical
distinction in Tunisia, however. In their practice and in
their legal setting, we find that both institutions assume to
a certain extent a double role. We will review in this
chapter the details of this duality in roles. We will also
see that, in spite of these ambiguities, the
deconcentration/devolution distinction still holds as
Governorates have always been the focus of deconcentration
efforts, and the municipalities continue to carry the seeds
of decentralized institutions.
MUNICIPALITIES
Before beginning to evaluate the impact of the new
legislation on the municipalities, we will briefly review
their structure and their development.
9 We will continue to differentiate between deconcentration and
devolution. To maintain the terminology used in Tunisia we will use,
however, the term decentralization for what Rondinelli designates as
devolution, that is a transfer of decision making authority. We will
use the term deconcentration, as defined by Rondinelli, for a transfer
of workload or function with limited authority.
Figure 1. Local and Regional Governments and
their Relationship with the Central Government.
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Historical Development of Municipalities
Tunisia's first municipality was created as early as
1858, but, in fact, the country does not have a long-
established tradition of strong municipal government. The
extension of municipalities outside Tunis and other major
urban centers was very slow and never covered more than a
small share of the national territory. Only 60
municipalities existed at the time of independence in 1956.
Most importantly, for historical reasons, municipalities were
never given significant powers and responsibilities: The
colonization, the adoption of a French centralized model of
government during colonization, and the post-independence
tendency to preserve a centralized system of government for
political and ideological reasons have inhibited the
development of autonomous local government. A municipal
tradition has never had a chance to develop in Tunisia.
Despite some institutional developments since independence,
up until the 1975 reform, municipalities were merely
considered as a lower unit of an hierarchical administrative
structure of the central government.
The 1975 reform was intended to endow the municipalities
with the essential characteristics of an autonomous local
government. It was aimed at fundamentally transforming the
functions of municipalities from serving as the lowest
administrative unit of the central government, to regulating
and managing all local interests within their locality.
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The most important action taken under this reform was
the introduction of new legislation. The new law--the Loi
Organique des Communes (L.O.D.C. ) and the subsequent
amendments--called for a re-definition of the role and
structure of the municipalities, their revenue sources, and
their relation with the central authorities. The reform
aimed at providing municipalities with more autonomy by
lessening the extent of control imposed upon them by the
central government. In addition, more municipalities were
created to extend the municipal administration to the rest of
the national territory.
The largest increase in the number of municipalities
happened in the last 15 years. The number grew from the 60
municipalities at the time of independence in 1956 to 158 by
1975 and to 177 by 1983. Today, there are 246
municipalities.
In spite of this rapid increase in the number of
municipalities, the municipal structure does not cover the
total national territory. Only areas that are urbanized have
a municipal status. In 1989, 41% of the country's population
still had no municipal services. Note that municipalities
vary greatly in population. The majority of them are very
small. In the 1984 census, the largest municipality, Tunis,
had a population of 600,000 and the smallest one, Ouled
Meliz, 871. About 47% of the municipalities have fewer than
10,000 inhabitants, while only 12%, including Tunis, have a
population over 50,000.
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There are no rural communes in Tunisia. Local services
in rural areas, which are primarily administrative services,
are provided by the governorate. The delegues, heads of the
delegations, a subdivision of the Governorate, and the local
party cells also play an important role in these zones that
are not administered by a municipality. The governorate
council is responsible by law for providing the rural
population all the services that municipalities provide in
their territories, and for that purpose, in every governorate
there is an office specifically for these af fairs.1 0 We will
exclude this form of rural administration from most of the
reminder of our discussion. We will restrict our analysis to
urban communes or municipalities.
Municipal Structure and Organization
Municipalities play, for the most part, the role of a
decentralized local authority and are theoretically endowed
with autonomy and decision-making authority. They are
designated in Tunisia as Collectivites Publiques Locales,
local public authority, and endowed with financial autonomy
and constituted as legal entities (LODC, 1975, Article 1).
The municipalities are composed of a representative and an
executive body. The municipal council and its chairman
10 The governorate councils, however, are unable to provide the same
level of service that municipalities do in their territory, as each
governorate council has to cover a very large territory and a dispersed
population. Regional studies have revealed that the level of these
disparities were significant, and, for that reason, since the 1973-1976
national economic plan, several programs for rural development (PDR and
PDRI) were instituted, most of which are implemented at the governorate
level.
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constitute the representative segment of the institution.
The administration, supported by technical services and
headed by the mayor, forms the executive part.
The municipal council is a deliberative authority,
representing the people at the local level. Its members are
elected and, from among them, its chairman is elected.'1 The
people's ability to choose their councillors has been, up
until now, relatively limited. At the last elections in
1986, the municipalities' electorate chose their municipal
councillors from a list of candidates exclusively preselected
by officials of the single ruling party, the Party Socialist
Destourien (PSD). The candidates were often members of the
local party cells. Neither the electoral law nor the
municipal law prescribe how many lists of candidates can be
presented at the municipal elections. In practice, only one
list, that of the PSD, and one candidate per seat is
presented.12 The people vote for or against each candidate of
this single list, without really affecting the selection.
Eventually, the candidates proposed are "elected" by the
people. With the recent national political reform that
allows for a multi-party system at the national level, we
expect to see some changes for the future municipal election.
11 only the mayor of the municipality of Tunis is appointed by
presidential decree.
12 only in rare cases was more then one list presented. In 1957, the
opposition parties, independent of the PSD, presented their own list of
candidates in 16 of the 94 towns and villages where municipal councils
were elected: three of these lists were elected. In 1960, 1963, and
1966, isolated independent candidates also managed to win certain seats.
We do not possess similar information for later years.
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New legislation might also be developed to allow a multi-
party municipal election process.
The mayor's position is ambiguous. On the one hand, the
mayor is an elected representative of the local population
and the head of the municipal council, a decentralized
governmental unit; on the other hand, the mayor is considered
at times to be the agent of the state. In this latter role
the mayor is in charge of the implementation of laws and
regulations in municipal territory, of general security, and
of carrying out all special functions attributed to the mayor
by law (LODC, 1975, article 69).
The mayor is also the executive chief of the
municipality, being responsible for the implementation of the
decisions taken by the council. In addition, he prepares the
municipal budget--with the assistance of the relevant offices
or commissions within the municipality--submits it for
approval to the council, manages municipal properties, and
administers all municipal acts, financial or others. The
mayor is also responsible for the operation of municipal
services and is directly assisted by the general secretary of
the municipality.
The dual role of the mayor is a result of the fact
that, historically, municipalities have been denied the
position of decentralized autonomous institutions, and that,
for a long time, they have been perceived as an
administrative unit of the central government. The political
orientation of the one-party system, with a very centralized
model of government, has preserved this perception despite
the objectives of the reform.
Role of Municipalities
The objective of the 1975 reform and its new legislation
was to provide the municipalities with expanded
responsibilities and a new position in the institutional
structure of the country. What has the legislation done to
provide them with this new status? Have the autonomy, and
the authority of the municipalities been increased by the new
legislation? Through a review of the new role and
responsibilities assigned by law to the municipalities, we
will evaluate whether the new legislation provided
municipalities with the legal base necessary--but not
sufficient--to become the decentralized units of government,
that are endowed with decision-making authority, as set forth
by the objectives of the reform.
The new municipal legislation assigned two kinds of
essential responsibilities to the municipal councils. The
first is defined as a participatory role: The municipal
councils are expected to participate in the economic and
social development of their localities. The second is
defined as a management role: The municipal councils manage
municipal public interests (LODC, 1975, article 1).
The first article of the LODC provides the
municipalities with ambitious new responsibilities,
consistent with the objectives of decentralization. They
5 1
remain vaguely defined, however. The functions attributed to
the municipal council (LODC, 1975, Chapter VI) appear in five
provisions: the first two are related to the financial
management of the municipality--they set (i) the budget
review and approval procedures, and (ii) the maximum
municipal resources to be used for investment programs- -and
the last three are related to the overall development of the
locality--under these provisions, the municipal council (iii)
helps in the national development plan, (iv) gives advise on
all economic and social affairs, and (v) gives its opinion on
all projects implemented in the municipal territory.
Although the primary distinction made in the first article of
the LODC between the participatory role and the managerial
role is not clearly defined in this article, most functions
described do fall into one or the other category. We will
see that this distinction is an interesting one, because it
separates the functions of the municipalities into two types,
one that is primarily of an advisory role (participation),
and the other one that has a higher level of decision-making
authority (management). The functions that fall into the
latter category are enforceable, while the participatory
functions are by definition not enforceable. The
participatory activity relates to the economic development of
the locality, while the management functions involve the
direct administration of municipal financial resources as
well as a series of less-important functions.
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Participation in Economic Development: An Advisory
Role
We have seen that the first article of the LODC provides
the municipal council with an ambitious, but vaguely defined,
task of participation in the promotion of the economic,
social, and cultural life of their locality. Article 36 of
the same document provides more specific details on the newly
extended responsibilities. This latter article indicates
that the council is required to define actions it will take
to promote the development of their locality. The central
government and all other public institutions are required to
consult the council on all projects they are implementing
within the municipal territory. Finally, the council is
required to give its opinion on all affairs that are of local
interest whenever requested by a "superior administration."
These provisions, which appear to allow for comprehensive
action, provide the municipal council only with a
consultative or an advisory role. None of these provisions
have been broken down into specific functions, and none of
them have been accompanied by specific rights, laws, and
regulations, that give any enforceable authority to the
municipal council. Moreover, it is not very clear how often
in practice the councils have the opportunity to intervene
effectively in the economic development affairs of the
locality and affect their course of action.
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Management of Municipal Interests: An Enforceable
Authority
The second responsibility attributed to the council
under the first article of the LODC is the management of
municipal interests, but no definition of municipal interest
is provided. In Article 36 of the LODC previously cited,
which defines the deliberative functions of municipal
councils, two of the five provisions refer to municipal
financial management. They assign the municipal council with
responsibility for reviewing and approving the municipal
budget and investment programs. No further elaboration of
the municipal management responsibility of the council is
provided in this article, but Article 42 of the same chapter
lists the council resolutions that need the approval of
central government to be enforceable. These functions
concern the management of municipal finances. They involve
the municipal budget, decisions regarding loans, local taxes,
and other charges collected by municipalities, the management
of municipal properties, and decisions concerning important
financial transactions. Municipal councils are also
responsible for the management of streets and food markets,
one of the oldest and most important activities of the
municipalities. This management task consists of issuing and
enforcing all regulations concerning streets and public
spaces, such as names, classifications, etc.; and the
creation of markets and fairs. Finally, they refer to the
54
decisions concerning municipal financial participation in
industrial and commercial institutions involved in the
provision of local public services. Although this listing is
the most comprehensive description of municipal council
functions, it is clearly very limited.
Finally, Article 46 of the same document informs that
any other resolution of the council is enforceable if there
is no objection by the central government. This provision
appears to compensate for the lack of legal provision by
providing more authority for the municipal council. The
application of this provision, however, is constrained by two
restrictions. The first one subjects all municipal council
decisions to the approval of the central government. The
second one is more ambiguous. It limits the resolutions of
the council to matters broadly defined by law as "municipal
interests", which we have seen are very poorly defined.
The responsibilities attributed to the mayor provide
some additional information on what constitutes the domain of
intervention of municipalities. Under the supervision of the
central government, the mayor is in charge of municipal
regulation and of the implementation of decisions taken by
the central government. Municipal regulation concerns public
order and public health and hygiene, all of which relate to
the environmental quality of public spaces (LODC, article
74). Specific services include street cleaning, street
lighting, traffic regulation, public safety, environmental
control over public health and hazardous materials, garbage
collection, food control, pest control, cemeteries, building
permits, and so on. As can be seen, the scope of municipal
services is relatively limited.
Supervisory Authority
As part of the decentralization reform, the control
procedures of the supervisory authority over the functions of
municipalities were relaxed to provide the latter with a
greater level of autonomy. Nevertheless, municipalities are
still subject to strict central control. Almost all
resolutions of the council and all regulations set by the
president of the council are subject to supervision and
approval of a higher authority.1 3 Several institutions share
the supervisory authority over municipalities: the Ministry
of the Interior, which has the overall administrative
authority over them, the Ministry of Finance, other
ministries for functions related to ministerial jurisdiction,
and finally the Governorates.
With the decentralization reforms, the Ministry of the
Interior delegated part of the supervisory authority to the
governor heading the Governorate in which the municipality is
located. In Tunisia, this partial regionalization of the
supervisory authority is considered to be the cornerstone of
the decentralization strategy. It is, in fact, an act of
deconcentration of regulatory activities, as it is a
13 Resolutions of the municipal councils are transmitted within 8 days
to the supervisory authority, which has 15 days to approve them or
exercise its right of veto (LODC, 1975, Article 37.)
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delegation of functions to a representative of the central
government, the governor. In the legislation, it is defined
as a delegation of function from the Ministry of the Interior
to the governor (article 1, Decree No 81-1011 of August 10,
1981).
The expected benefit of such a transfer is to speed up
the control procedures by avoiding the overload at the
central level. The governors have authority over all
municipalities within their territory, which have a budget of
TD 350, 000 or less. The Ministry of the Interior retains
jurisdiction over municipalities with budgets exceeding this
amount. The Ministry of the Interior still oversees the
major decisions concerning the creation of municipalities or
any large financial transactions. It also retains the
overall jurisdiction over all subnational governments,
including the governorates. 14 The administrative jurisdiction
of the municipalities is primarily the responsibility of the
Ministry of the Interior. This jurisdiction is extensive,
and includes, for example, the supervision of all decisions
concerning management of staff (LODC, article, 114 to 119)
and public services (LODC, articles 148, 150, 151).
No financial decision can be implemented by a
municipality without a priori approval of the supervisory
14 The supervisory authority of the governorate council is the
secretaire d'etat a l'interieur (secretary of state to the Ministry of
the Interior). (Article 31, Titre vi, Textes specifiques aux conseil de
gouvernorats, in recueil des textes legislatifs et reglementaires
regissant les collectivites publiques locales et regionales, p. 44)
57
authority. The financial jurisdiction is the most extensive
and is shared between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry
of the Interior, and the governors. The governors control
the budget of the 206 municipalities whose budgets are below
TD 350,000. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for
the remaining 39 municipalities and for the supervision of
some financial matters of all municipalities including those
whose budgets are below the TD 350,000 threshold. The
Ministry of Finance exercises additional control on all
municipal budgets. Both Ministries take decisions concerning
the legislation and regulation governing municipal finances.
They also supervise all council decisions concerning
borrowing and budget deficits.
Jurisdiction over technical services is shared among
various interested ministries and institutions at the central
level. Most of this jurisdiction belongs to the Ministry of
Equipment, as an important part of municipalities activities
is of direct interest to this Ministry.
The supervisory authority still exercises a strong
control over the few functions that are directly assigned to
the municipalities. Therefore, we see that the autonomy of
the municipalities is severely restricted--a glaring
contradiction to the objective of the 1975 reform.
THE GOVERNORATES
The decentralization program of 1975 also targeted the
governorates. As with the municipalities case, the reform's
good intention did not translate into substantial changes at
the Governorates level. The governorates were to be
transformed from "a transmission station for central orders
to that of serving as directing manager of all government
activity in the province" (Nellis, 1984, p. 16). The
governorates were clearly the focus of deconcentration
efforts of the reform; that is, they were concerned with the
transfers of implementation and management responsibilities
to a lower unit of government for the purpose of lessening
the responsibilities of the central government.
The 1975 reform of the governorate consisted of a re-
definition of the role of the Governorate council, an
expansion of the role of the governor, and a division of the
national territory into a larger number of governorates. 15
Development of Governorates
Today the Tunisian national territory is divided into 23
Governorates or regional authorities, which are themselves
subdivided into 299 delegations and secteurs. The present
structure of the regional territorial administration replaced
an older structure, which consisted of a territorial
subdivision called circumscription, introduced during the
French protectorate, and an even more ancient subterritorial
division, the Caidates. The Governorates were set up at
independence in 1956 by a decree of the central government
15 The focus of our analysis is on the 1975 reform and the evolution of
the governorates up until 1989, although the structure of the
governorate has again been fundamentally transformed by the 1989 reform.
(decree of June 21, 1956) to replace the circumscription.
The former Caidates were reorganized to form the so-called
delegations.
The delegations represent the basic administrative units
at the Governorate level. They have no legal life with
assigned powers and directly exploitable sources of revenue.
They are headed by a delegue (herein deleguate), an officer
under the Ministry of the Interior, who is also an assistant
to the governor, and who insures within the delegation the
authority of the governor. One of the deleguates of the
governorate is designated as first deleguate. The first
deleguate is the first assistant to the governor, acts as the
representative when the governor is absent, coordinates the
activities of all the other deleguates, and is in charge of
the relationship with the other national organizations and
security services. Delegations are themselves divided into
sectors. The sectors are headed by the Imadas, local leaders
elected from the local cells and by the members of the
formally unique political party, the PSD. The Imadas assist
and report to the deleguates.
The impact of the reform on the regional territorial
organization has been a continuous increase in the number of
the Governorates, for a complete coverage of the national
territory by governorates administrations.
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Role of the Governorate Council
Before the 1989 reform, the Governorate structure
consisted of a representative body (the Governorate Council),
an executive body (the governor and the Governorate Technical
Services headed by the governor), and External Services to
the governorate, representing the various Ministries at the
regional level.
The Governorate Council was considered within the
Tunisian institutional framework as a decentralized
administrative unit, designated by law as the authority
responsible for the management of regional interests.
The Governorate Council members were not elected. They
were members of the committe recional de coordination
(regional committee for coordination) of the Parti Socialist
Destourien (PSD), representatives of various national
organizations (trade unions, and social and professional
organizations, such as the Union General des Travailleurs
Tunisiens, Unions National des Agriculteurs Tunisiens, Union
des Femmes de Tunisie, etc ... ) , and of the presidents of
syndicats of communes, (associations of municipalities) .
Although not elected, the Governorate Council members were
still considered to be representatives of the people of the
region.
The council was defined as a decentralized regional
institution, a collectivite publique regionale. By law, the
Governorate Council was endowed with legal status and
financial autonomy. The 1975 reform empowered it to manage
the interests of the Governorate. The new legislation
suggested that the Governorate Council had a general right of
authority over the territory of the Governorate, which
allowed it to decide on policies and programs as well as to
finance them.
Despite its autonomous structure and these apparent
important prerogatives, the role of the Governorate Council
has remained very limited. The Governorate Council has never
had real autonomy in decision making. Its authority was
limited to a consultative power. Its role consisted of
reviewing decisions taken by other public entities and
providing opinions about the regional interest. It was
responsible, for example, for reviewing the regional
development projects prepared in conjunction with national
plans. Unlike municipal councils, none of its resolutions
was enforceable.
The Governorate Council managed limited budgets under
the strict supervision of the Ministry of Interior and the
Ministry of Finance. These budgets were, however, very
small. The Governorates did not have any revenue-raising
capacity. Their revenues came from transfers from the
central government, and their expenditures were mainly
administrative and operational in nature. The financial
autonomy was therefore mostly theoretical.
In spite of the reform, the Governorates councils
remained endowed with a very limited role in the regional
public life. The fact that the councils possessed few
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resources and limited specified powers was criticized by many
government officials and analysts in Tunisia (Chaabane, 1980,
p. 78). Also criticized were the non-representative, non-
participative nature of these councils. Their role was
classified as ambiguous and limited to a consultative power.
Role of the Governor
Each governorate is headed by a governor, an official of
the Ministry of the Interior appointed by the president.
Until the 1989 reform, the governor held a double position of
being at the same time the representative of the central
government at the regional level and the head of the local
decentralized authority. The governor was the head of the
Governorate Council and was also the depository authority of
the State, that is the central government's chief executive
officer at the regional level. His role was highly
political, and his prime responsibility was to the central
government who appointed him. With the 1989 reform, the
governor continues to represent the central government in the
region and continues to head the new regional council.
It was as the regional representative of the central
government that the governor finds a raison d'etre. The
limited role and importance of the Governorate Council, its
lack of enforceable authority, and its limited budget made
the governor's role as a local representative comparatively
insignificant. As a regional representative, the governor
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headed the regional assembly, prepared the Governorate
budget, and managed funds appropriated under the budget.
As a representative of the central government, under the
authority of the Minister of Interior, the governor was (and
still is) responsible for implementing national development
policy at the regional level and was also entitled to suggest
to the government options for economic and social development
of his territory. Moreover, the governor acted as a deputy
to the Minister of the Interior for a series of
responsibilities, one of the most important being the
trusteeship and financial and administrative control of
municipalities. The governor was also responsible for the
execution of laws, regulations, and governmental decisions
and for the maintenance of public order.
Finally, the governor was responsible for the
administration of the Governorate and its seven services,
coordinating and controlling, under the authority of the
Ministries concerned, the regional services (also designated
as external services) which were deconcentrated technical
offices of the Ministries. Two officials of the Governorate,
the general secretary and the first delegue, assisted the
governor. The general secretary controlled and coordinated
actions concerning administrative, financial, and economic
matters and was also responsible for the administration of
the Governorate. The first delegue, a political figure, was
in charge of the political, cultural, social, and educational
affairs of the Governorate.
Theoretically, the governor has been the most important
beneficiary of the reform by being given increased authority
over a wide range of issues, particularly in relation to the
external services. Because of this increased authority, the
governor has become the most important official at the
subnational level. In practice, however, the limited
development of the external services diminishes the extent of
the authority that the governor has received through the
reform.
Regional Services
Parallel to the Governorate structure, the reform
introduced a law requiring all ministries and important
public institutions to create regional services, with the
purpose of deconcentrating some of their activities to the
regional level and of assuring regional coordination among
these activities by the governor. This had been the most
concrete prescription for the deconcentration efforts
initiated by the central government. It was, however, quite
unsuccessful and brought very little real deconcentration of
public activities.
There are four points worth mentioning about the
external services.
First, the external services had no decision-making
power. Most of them operated exclusively as regional
implementation offices for national programs. Issues
requiring decisions were systematically sent to the center.
Second, they were relatively independent from the
Governorates and directly related to the various ministries
that created them. In theory, the governors had some form of
authority over them, but, in practice, the legislation failed
to provide them with a meaningful authority. The external
services consulted with the governors on all actions
undertaken on their territory, but these services remained
entirely under the hierarchical authority of the respective
Ministries. Third, in many instances, the geographical
subdivision set by the ministries for their external services
did not match the Governorate's boundaries. One external
service might cover three Governorates, for example, making
the coordination with the regional governments more difficult
to establish. Finally, the ministries were creating these
services reluctantly, and after many years of consolidation,
most of the existing ones remained understaffed.
The creation of external services indicated the desire
to deconcentrate some of the ministries' activities to the
regional level, and, at the same time, it revealed the
willingness to keep these services relatively independent
from the regional government. The reluctance of the
ministries and other central institutions to deconcentrate
activities and personnel to the regional level meaningfully
also reflected a lack of consensus among the various
ministries on the level and form of the decentralization.
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CONCLUSION
From this analysis of the reformed legislation of 1975,
it is clear that the legal provisions are insufficient to
provide municipalities with the necessary structure to become
decentralized units of governments. First, their stated role
can be qualified as both very ambitious and totally
ineffective as a mechanism of decentralization. The reform
provides the councils with the overall responsibility over
economic and social development in their territory,
supporting the claim that the reform promotes
decentralization. These ambitious provisions are limited,
however, to an advisory role with no enforceable authority.
The other functions of the council, which are enforceable,
are few and imprecisely defined. Second, the control of the
supervisory authority, still in effect, is excessive and
greatly limits the level of autonomy of municipalities.
Finally, no effective transfer of responsibilities and
decision-making power has ever taken place.
The deficiencies in the legislation and in
municipalities' relationship with the central government are
now very apparent. They explain partially why the reform has
failed to reach its intended objectives. The reform did not
provide the municipalities with the legal base of
decentralized institutions. Neither did the reform clearly
enumerate the municipalities' functions or define the role of
the municipal council. Are they agencies whose primary
function is to counsel the central government and other
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institutions on actions to be undertaken within their
territory, or are they mainly decision-making authorities?
The new legislation was not without benefit, however.
Compared to the previous status of municipalities, it has
improved municipalities operation by providing a more precise
legal structure. Nevertheless, this improvement remain well
short of providing the municipalities with an effective local
authority position.
The fact that the council was provided these ambitious,
but vaguely defined, responsibilities, combined with the
failure to provide the municipalities with the legislation
necessary to enforce their authority on these functions,
reflects the hesitation of the GOT in this decentralization
objective and confirms its ambiguity about the role local
governments should have in the country. It appears as if the
legislature had purposely left these responsibilities
undefined, as if there was a fear of giving important
responsibilities to the municipalities. Many have speculated
why there is this apparent contradiction embodied in the 1975
reform. Analysts have argued that the legislators were
proponents of the view that decentralization is a gradual
process (Chaabane and Kherouf, 1977). General provisions
defining the optimal role of the municipal councils are set
in a first stage, which would constitute the legislative base
for the development of a more specific legislation that could
be developed over time. The facts refute, however, the
gradual decentralization explanation as no text to specify
the role of municipalities has ever been issued to supplement
the LODC since the reform, more than 15 years ago.
Also commonly stated as an obstacle to decentralization
in many similar experiences in developing countries, is the
reluctance of those who hold the power to decentralize
(Smoke, 1988, p. 8). This factor is certainly present in
Tunisia in view of the country's strong centralizing
tradition and the ideological influence of a one-party system
inclined to concentrate power. This was clearly indicated in
the address of the then Prime Minister, Hedy Nouira, in one
of the earliest formulations of the decentralization policy
objective (Chaabane, et al., 1980, p. 24).
The reform of the regional governments was not more
successful, despite the fact that some of the changes
introduced were more specific than that of the local
governments. The creation of the regional services and the
redefinition of the role of the governor to enhance the
transfers of the implementation of central functions at the
regional level has been the most concrete step of the reform
towards deconcentration. The reformers appeared to be much
less ambiguous about their objectives in this case. It is in
the implementation of this policy that problems arose, in
large part because the ministries were reluctant to comply
with this particular form of deconcentration. The external
services were never fully developed, however, and "the
governor never received from the different ministries the
mission of coordination and implementation of services. "
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(Nellis, 1984, p. 16). The reform of the Governorate
Councils did not provide them with much responsibilities.
They were limited by law to a consultative role and remained
a powerless institutions. Thus, we see that the efforts to
deconcentrate government activities to the regional
governments were not more successful than the reform of the
local governments.
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ANNEX 3-1
THE 1989 REFORM OF GOVERNORATES:
THE CREATION OF A REGIONAL COUNCIL
The failure of the 1975 reform has led to a new, more
ambitious reform in 1989 of the Governorates, which is
currently being implemented. The stated objectives of the
1989 reform are very similar to the ones stated in the early
1970s, on the eve of the 1975 reform, including enhancing
regional participation in the development of the region and
increasing the level of responsibility at the regional level.
This time, the reformers had in mind a somewhat more
ambitious and comprehensive decentralization program. They
spoke of integrated regional development conducted at the
governorate level as opposed to a sectoral form of
development. The governorate is to become a technical and
economic institution, rather than an administrative one,
where the geographical distribution is closer to the economic
needs of the region rather than an administrative
distribution.
The main transformation expected by this reform is the
substitution of the representative authority of the
Governorate, the Governorate Council, by a regional council
which would be a technical and economic body. The members of
the council will not be elected, but, rather, they would be
ministries' personnel, important local officials (such as the
presidents of municipalities, the local representatives of
the national assembly, and the president of the rural
councils) and other members designated by the governor. The
council is headed by the governor who remains an official of
the Ministry of the Interior.
According to the reform project, the role of the
regional council is to be extended to all economic activities
of the regions. It will prepare the regional plan and will
have an advisory role for all public projects with an
economic and social content. It will be in charge of
establishing economic and social priorities in the region and
of coordinating national projects. As in the previous
reforms, the formulation of these functions remains
relatively vague. However, the new councils are different
than the institutions they replace: the central government
resources for regional economic and social development are to
be transferred to the Governorate budget, and the regional
councils are to have the authority of allocating these funds
by sector and project types within their regions. Eight
sectoral commissions would be created to assist the council
in its task. The former external services, now called
technical services, will assist the councils and the
commissions.
This reform certainly appears to be another ambitious
endeavor. It has some characteristics of a decentralization
program rather than that of a deconcentration program. The
Governorates take a policy role, as opposed to their previous
implementation role, and the council is awarded the decision-
making authority over the functions transferred to them.
With this new arrangement, the governor, who is the head of
the Governorate Council, has extended power, becoming the
principal manager of the central government funds spent at
the regional level.
For some Tunisian officials, however, this reform does
not represent any change. " They claim that no new functions
were decentralized, that the 1975 reform attributed to the
governor all the functions that the 1989 reform plans to
transfer to the regions. How does this reform differ from
the previous one? Is this just a reformulation of a reform
that has never been effectively implemented? What are
chances of success of this new reform? There are, in fact,
many reasons to think that in spite of the apparent novelty,
this reform is not much different in content and has as
little chance as the previous one of succeeding.
The first innovation of the reform is the transformation
of the former Governorate Council into a "technical and
economic institution. " The regional council loses its status
of a deliberative institution and of a decentralized unit of
government. What appears in the formulation of this reform
is a desire to de-politicize the institution, reflecting the
belief that a technocratic institution is more efficient than
a political one. The council allegedly promoted to a
technical institution becomes a better candidate to manage
the various decentralized functions. What is not clear,
16 Personal interviews by author with several government officials in
Tunis in 1989.
however, is how the new council becomes a technical
institution, or what its exact status is. Most of its
members are local representatives and officials of the
Ministry of the Interior. How does this new council differ
from the previous one when its composition remains very
similar?
The second and most significant transformation planned
by the reform is the extensive decentralization of central
government functions to the regional councils, including a
large share of public funds connected to these functions.
The reform project, however, does not provide any precision
as to which functions are to be decentralized. Only a clear
definition of the tasks to be transferred to the regional
level will indicate the exact extent of the reform.
There are many reasons to think that the new reform has
limited chances of being a successful decentralization
policy. First, its lack of precision makes it impossible to
define in an operationally meaningful way. It is still at
the stage of a general statement of intent: it might never go
beyond it. Second, ministries have shown in the past a great
reluctance to deconcentrate their activities to the regional
level. The regions' insufficient capacity to handle
decentralized functions has been the reason given by the
Ministries for their reluctance to deconcentrate functions in
the past. According to a ministry official, most ministries
do intend to deconcentrate some functions, but they intend to
do it gradually, contingent upon the development of the
7 3
technical capacities at the subnational level. In other
words, they do have a deconcentration program of their own,
which may not conform to the decentralization program set by
the reform.
There are many similarities between the former and the
present reform, in the objectives, in the formulation, and in
its lack of clear definition. Because of these similarities,
it also has the same chances as the previous one of failing.
It does indicate, nonetheless, that the GOT recognizes the
need to decentralize, but lacks a clear commitment and
capacity to come up with an effective strategy for
decentralization.
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CHAPTER 4
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES PART I:
FINANCIAL AGGREGATES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
We now turn to the analysis of municipalities' finances.
In this chapter and the following one, the objective is to
evaluate the outcome of the financial reform by evaluating
the objectives and achievements of this reform and their
coherence with the decentralization objectives. We will
analyze the sources of revenues and expenditures of
municipalities and compare them to those of the central
government, and we will evaluate the level of autonomy and
authority the municipalities have over their finances.
The overall review of municipal finances in these two
chapters points to these conclusions. The financial reform
did bring important improvements to municipalities' revenue
sources and their financial management. The most important
of which can be summarized as follow: (i) new revenues
sources were created; (ii) central government transfers were
substantially increased and their allocation procedure
reformed and (iii) the budgeting and accounting system was
reformed and improved. The positive impact of the reform on
municipalities' finances was clearly illustrated by the sharp
increase in revenues in the first four years following the
reform. The reform contained several limitations, however.
First, the one-time increases in municipalities' revenues,
although very important, were insufficient to raise
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municipalities to a significantly higher level of activity,
compared to that of the central government. Also, the reform
concentrated on improving centrally managed revenue sources--
the transfers from the central government and the newly
created taxes are entirely managed by the central
government--increasing local governments dependency on
central governments funds. It has provided little
improvement to the local taxes, tariffs, and fees managed by
the local governments themselves and has provided
municipalities with very limited authority over revenue-
raising activities. Finally, the reform did not eliminate
the central government's strict control over all financial
activities of the local governments.
We will start our analysis in this chapter with an
overview of the main objectives of the 1975 financial reform.
We will then analyze municipal finances, their importance,
their evolution, and their structure. We will also compare
municipalities' financial aggregates to other macroeconomic
aggregates of the country to evaluate the distribution of the
national fiscal resources between levels of governments,
thereby comparing municipalities' level of involvement in the
public life of the country. We will turn to the analysis of
specific revenue sources by evaluating the intergovernmental
transfer system and its impact on local government revenues. 17
17 To conduct our analysis, we used statistics from the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of the Interior. For a description of these
statistics, see Annex 4-1.
In the next chapter, we will analyze municipalities' own
revenues, their borrowing system, and their expenditures.
OBJECTIVES OF THE FINANCIAL REFORM
The financial legislation established during the 1975
reform (and the subsequent additions) had two objectives: to
provide the municipalities with additional resources to cope
with their theoretically increased responsibilities
(discussed in the previous chapter) and to improve their
financial management.
Higher levels of revenues were to be achieved by
creating new revenue sources, by increasing the transfers
from the central government to local governments, and by
reforming and enhancing municipalities' borrowing system.
The improvement of financial management involved the
establishment of a new accounting system and budgeting
practices as well as the simplification of the procedures of
central government control over municipal budgets.
Increase Municipal Resources
Two new taxes--a hotel tax and a tax on institutions of
a professional, industrial, or commercial nature (hereafter
called "tax on establishments")--were created in 1975 to
provide the municipalities with sources of revenues based on
the economic activities of their localities. 18 These taxes
substituted for the property tax based on the rental value of
18 Laws, no. 75-34 and no. 75-39, May 14, 1975, respectively.
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the premises, which had been the only local tax levied on
these businesses. The base of the new taxes--gross
receipts--reflected the economic activities of these
establishments better than the rental value of their
premises, and it provided municipalities with increasing
resources necessary to face the specific expenditure
requirements created by these same establishments, which were
particularly important in the case of hotels in tourist areas
of the country.1 9 In 1976, the government also issued new
legislation to improve the revenues of selected indirect
taxes and fees.20 The decree modified rates, bases, and
procedures.
The rates were raised for the first time since 1958.
The procedures were simplified, in particular those related
to the collection of sale taxes and other food-market taxes.
In some cases, the tax base was also changed to facilitate
the evaluation and collection process. Fees that were
considered either redundant or socially inappropriate were
abolished. Among those fees considered as socially inadequate
were some that were useful to the municipalities. Admissions
fees to sport fields and sports activities, for example, were
the only source of revenues municipalities had to maintain
their sports infrastructure.
The most important financial reforms were to the central
government transfer of funds to the municipalities. First,
19 The rates are 1% for hotels, and 0.2% for other institutions.
20 Decree no. 76-826 of September 13, 1976.
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two former funds set for intergovernmental transfers that
existed before 1975--the former Common Fund for Local
Collectivities and Fund for Fuel and Tires--were consolidated
into one, the Fond Commun des Collectivit6s Locales (FCCL),
the Common Fund for Local Governments. Its revenue sources
were modified to provide the fund with more important
revenues and to increase the overall amount to be transferred
to municipalities. Second, the allocation procedure was
revised with the aim of achieving greater equity among
municipalities and of creating incentives for a more
efficient collection of the property tax.
The reform also revised the municipal borrowing system.
In 1975 municipalities were heavily indebted and were
defaulting on their loans. The first action was a moratorium
on all municipal debts. The overall debt was estimated at TD
6 Millions (current 1975 TD), which Tunisian officials
attributed to poor financial management of both
municipalities and the lending institution, the Caisse des
Pr6ts. The 1975 reform transformed this lending institution
to become the Caisse des Pr6ts et de Soutien des
Collectivit6s Locales, which was endowed with more capital
and a larger field of activity than the caisse des pr6ts.
The lending procedures were also reformed: The criteria for
allocation of loans were changed to take into account the
nature of the project and the financial viability of the
municipality. The broader objective set forth by the lending
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reform was to encourage municipalities to invest more
actively within their locality.
Improve Municipal Financial Management
On the financial management side, the only measure
taken, but which was also one of the most important aspects
of the 1975 reform, was the reorganization of the entire
municipal accounting system. Before 1975, municipal budgets
were established in two stages: An initial budget, the
equivalent of the present current budget, was approved six
months before the beginning of the budget year. A
supplemental budget, which was essentially a capital budget,
was approved much later in the middle of the budget year. The
resources for this capital budget came, in part, from
surpluses of the current budget of the same year, which were
treated as a form of saving for capital expenditures. The
surpluses could only be determined six months after the
beginning of the fiscal year, which explains why the capital
budget was established so late in the year. These pre-1975
budgetary practices are explained by the fact that municipal
investments were relatively rare. Capital expenditures were
titled extraordinary expenditures and were treated as such.
This practice had serious drawbacks. It "deprived the
budget of its significance as a forecasting tool" for two
reasons: (i) it prevented municipalities from considering all
the resources available to them in establishing their budget,
(ii) it also prevented them from substituting between
operating and capital expenditures (Prud'homme, 1975, p. 56).
The amount of receipts shown in the supplemental budget is
not a forecast but a
... confirmation of receipts, everything takes place as
though the capital budget were not an annual budget but
a current account, credited each year with the surpluses
of the operating budget, subsidies and loans, and
debited from day-to-day with the capital expenditures
made. (Prud'homme, 1975, p. 56.)
In the supplemental budget, capital expenditures were treated
as an exceptional act, financed on residuals of the current
budget.
The budgetary system needed important changes if
municipalities were to become active economic participants in
the public life of the country and to share the
responsibilities of capital formation with other public
institutions within their territory. The new 1975 regulation
required that the entire budget be completed at once prior to
the year to which it pertained, in two parts: a current and a
capital budget.
The same law required that the budgets be balanced (art.
16, Law 75-35 May 14, 1975, LODC). The objective was to
force municipalities to forecast a realistic level of
revenues, to develop more control over their expenditures,
and to avoid a day-to-day management of expenditures.21 The
transfers from the current budget to the capital budget now
21 According to Prud'homme (1975, p. 56), municipalities' revenue
forecasts were underestimated by as much as 40%.
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had to be planned in advance as municipalities' own revenues
to capital expenditures.
These measures have certainly introduced a great deal of
rationality to the financial management of municipalities.22
A new accounting system was devised to provide for the
changes related to the capital budget. The new nomenclature
of the accounting documents was also tailored more closely to
the financial operations undertaken by the municipalities.
Changes included the differentiating between interest and
capital payments for debt reimbursement, including them in
the current and capital expenditures, respectively.
Finally, the reform aimed at providing the
municipalities with a higher level of autonomy. The control
and approval of budget procedures and all financial
transactions were simplified. We have seen in the previous
chapter, however, that they remain very stringent. The
deconcentration of the control procedures of municipalities'
finances to the governor is considered by many in Tunisia to
be part of the decentralization efforts.
This summarizes the main aspects of the municipal
financial reform. The reforms proposed in this field appear
to be more precisely defined than those concerning the role
and responsibilities of the local governments, but are they
sufficient to bring municipalities to a level of activity set
22 Note, however, that the majority of municipalities continue until
today to display huge unintended surpluses at the end of their budget
year, a sign of still poor budgeting practices. It can be explained
either by an underestimation of revenues or by an overestimation of what
can be accomplished and spent, or both.
by the objectives of the reform? Have the new taxes and the
new transfer system provided municipalities with
substantially more revenues? If so, have the level of
services provided by the municipalities and their overall
activities increased consequently? What is the new position
of municipalities in the economy and the public life of the
country, as viewed by its revenue-raising activities and
public expenditures? We now turn to answer these questions.
ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPALITIES' FINANCIAL AGGREGATES
We will start this evaluation of the impact of the
reform on municipal finances with an analysis of the
evolution of aggregates of municipal budgets.23 Because most
municipal activities involve financial transactions, we can
take their financial aggregates as a good measure of their
level of activity. We will assess their evolution in
absolute and in relative terms, looking at trends since 1975.
We will evaluate their present situation and compare them to
other macroeconomic aggregates in order to estimate the
relative position of municipalities in the economic life of
the country.
Current Status and Recent Trends of Municipal
Financial Aggregates
As shown in Table 4-1, by 1988, 13 years after the
beginning of the financial reform, the aggregated volumes of
23 Aggregates refers to the sum of all financial operations achieved by
all municipalities.
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municipal finances remain very low. 24 Total effective
revenues and expenditures are equivalent to TD 145.9 ($182
million) and TD 137.1 ($174 million) respectively, which
amounts to the modest figures of TD 32.6 ($40) of per capita
revenues and TD 30.7 ($38) of per capita expenditures.
Table 4-1
Municipal Financial Aggregates and Per Capita Real Revenues
and Expenditures, 1988.
(in current TD)
Total Volumes Per Capita
(TD Million) (TD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total effective revenues 145.9 32.6
Total effective expenditures 137.1 30.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: There is a difference between budget figures presented later and
effective revenues and effective expenditures.
Budget figures include the various inter- and intra-budgetary
transfers. Effective revenues and effective expenditures are figures
corrected from these transfers. For a more detailed explanation of the
accounting system, see Annex 4-2.
Source: Ministry of Finance, GOT
Table 4-2
Average Annual Growth Rates of Aggregated Municipal Budgets:
1970-1987 .
(percent)
70-75 75-79 79-83 83-87 75-87
9.6 15.1 0.7 4.2 6.5
Notes: Average growth rates are calculated from data in constant TD of
1980.
Sources: Calculations based on aggregated figures of municipal budgets
from the Ministry of Finance, GOT.
These low figures occurred despite the relatively high
average growth rate of the budget since 1975 (6.5% between
24 Effective revenues and effective expenditures are figures corrected
from inter-budgetary transfers (see Annex 4-2). For a more detailed
explanation of the accounting system, see Diagram 4-1, in Annex 4-2.
1975 and 1987).25 Table 4-2 shows that the highest annual
growth rate (15%) occurred during the period following the
financial reform (1975-1979), an obvious consequence of the
changes introduced, but then dropped considerably in the
following years.
Comparison of Municipal Financial Aqgregates with
Other Macroeconomic Aqqregates
A comparison of the size and growth rates of municipal
financial aggregates with other macroeconomic aggregates
shows the relative position municipalities have acquired in
the economic life of the country. 26 From this analysis emerge
three important facts. First, the share of municipalities'
revenues and expenditures has remained constant during the
period of analysis: a low 4% of the total revenues and
expenditures of the central and local governments (see Table
4-3). This indicates not only that the share of
municipalities' activities relative to that of the central
government is very small, but also that it has not improved.
Second, the ratio of the growth rate of municipalities
revenues over the growth rate of central government revenues
25 We are referring to the total budgets, which are the total revenues
or the total expenditures--which are equal because municipalities are
required by law to keep a balanced budget--including inter- and intra-
budgetary transfers. See Annex 4-1 and Figure 4-1 for a more detailed
explanation of the structure of the municipal budget.
26 In this analysis we will use municipal financial figures corrected
from intra- and inter-budgetary transfers, that is, effective revenues
and effective expenditures. This explains some of the differences that
will appear with the budgetary volumes figures used in the previous
tables. Also, as these statistics are available only for the years 1981
to 1986, the following analysis will cover this period.
86
(1.1), in Table 4-4, shows that the municipalities' revenues
are growing at about the same rate as the central government
TABLE 4-3
Comparison of Municipalities and Central Government Revenues
and Expenditures, 1981-1986.
(percent)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Revenues:
Central Government* 96 96 96 96 96 96
Municipalities 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Expenditures:
Central Government* 96 96 96 96 96 96
Municipalities** 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: *Corrected for transfers to municipalities.
** Municipalities effective expenditures are corrected for the intra-
and inter-budgetary transfers.
Sources: Calculations based on statistics from: (i) Statistics annex to
the "Budget Economique 1986" economic budget, 1986, GOT. (ii) Ministry
of Finance, GOT.
TABLE 4-4
Annual Growth Rate of Municipalities' and Central
Revenues and Expenditures, 1981-1986.
Government
81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86
Revenues:
Growth rates
1 Central Government*
2 Municipalities**
Ratio 1/2
Expenditures:
Growth rates
3 Central Government*
4 Municipalities**
Ratio 3/4
1.8%
3.9%
2.2
1.8%
1.4%
0.8
8.4%
5.8%
0.7
8.4%
1.4%
0.2
11.4%
9.5%
0.8
11.4%
7.4%
0.6
1.9%
5.9%
3.2
1.9%
8.0%
4.3
-1.5%
-2.3%
1.5
-1.5%
-4.7%
3.0
Notes: * Central government figures
municipalities.
are corrected for transfers to
** Revenues and expenditures figures used in these calculations are
corrected for intra- and inter-budgetary transfers.
Sources: Calculation based on statistics from: (i) statistic annex to
the "Budget Economique 1986" GOT, and (ii) Ministry of Finance, GOT.
81-86
4.3%
4.5%
1.1
4.3%
2.6%
0.6
--------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
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revenues. On the expenditures side, however, a similar ratio
for the 1981-1986 period (0.6) indicates that
municipalities' expenditures are growing at a much slower
rate than those of the central government.
Third, similar findings appear from comparing municipal
revenues and expenditures to GDP, shown in Table 4-5. They
represent respectively a low of 1.5% to 1.7% of GDP. The
ratio of their growth rates for the 1981-1987 period, are
respectively 1.3 and 0.7, which indicates that the growth of
municipal revenues exceeds only slightly the economic growth
of the country. The level of municipal activities, however,
grows at a much slower rate than the overall economy.
TABLE 4-5
Municipalities Revenues and Expenditures as Percent of GDP,
1981-1987 .
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
As Percent of GDP:
Municipalities Revenues 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6%
Municipalities Expenditures 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5%
Ratio of Growth Rates of Municipalities Revenues and
Expenditures over Growth Rate of GDP, 1981-1987.
Municipalities Revenues/GDP 1.3
Municipalities Expenditures/GDP 0.7
Sources: (i) Country Reports, No. 2, 1989; Country profiles, 1986,
1987, 1988, and 1989. The Economic Intelligence Unit.
(ii) Ministry of Finance, GOT.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS
For our analysis, we have grouped revenue sources of
municipalities into three categories (see Table 4-6): central
government transfers, or subsidies to the current and capital
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budgets; municipalities own resources, that is local taxes,
fees for services, and charges for the use or sale of
municipal properties; and loans. These three items accounted
for 96% of effective revenues of municipalities in 1988.
The remaining 4% came from miscellaneous sources.
Table 4-6
Structure of Municipal Revenues: Transfers, Own Revenues and
Loans, 1988.
(% of the total)
1988
Transfers'
Own Revenues2
Loans
Others
Total Effective Revenues 3
Total Real Revenues
(TD millions current)
45%
43%
8%
4%
100%
145.9
Notes:
1 Transfers include all central government transfers and subsidies to
the current and capital budgets.
2 Own revenues include direct and indirect taxes, user fees, and income
from municipal property.
3 Total effective revenues are revenues corrected from the various
inter- and intra-budgetary flows of funds (see Diagram 4-1, in Annex 4-
2).
Source: Calculations based on statistics of the Ministry of Finance,
GOT.
One of the most important outcomes of the financial
reform has been the rapid growth of the central government
transfers to the municipalities. They have become the most
important revenue sources of municipalities. Revenues from
transfers to the current budget have had a much higher growth
rate (12.3%) on average between 1975 and 1985 than all
-----------------------------------------
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Table 4-7
Municipal Current Revenues: Share of Revenues from Transfers
and Municipalities' Own Resources 1965-1988), and Average
Annual Growth Rate 1975-1988.
(percent)
1965 1975 1985 1988 Average annual
growth rate
1975-1985
Own Revenues 1 65% 68% 50% 56% 4.1%
Transfers 2 35% 32% 50% 44% 12.3%
Total current revenues 100% 100% 100% 100% 7.3%
Total current revenues 6.86 19.52 85.60 112.00
(in current millions TD)
Notes:
Average annual growth rates are calculated with figures in constant TD.
1 Own revenues include direct and indirect taxes, user fees, and income
from municipal property.
2 Transfers include all central government transfers and subsidies to
the current budget only.
Source: Calculations based on statistics from municipal accounts,
Ministry of Finance, GOT.
Figure 4-1
Municipalities' Current Revenues
1970-1988
(In Millions of 1980 TD)
60
40
30
2.0MJ
Municipal own resources
0 Transfers
. Total Current Revenues
170 197';
I I I I I I I I I 1
1980 1985 1988
Note: Transfers include transfers to the current budget only. The
various transfers and subsidies to the capital budget--estimated at 25
to 30% of the transfers to the current budgets--are not included.
Millions
980 TD
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municipalities' own revenues combined (4.1%) (see Table 4-7
and Figure 4-1). After ten years of continuous growth of
central government transfers, municipalities' own revenues,
which accounted for 68% of current revenues in 1975,
represent only 55% of this total in 1985.27 Revenues from
loans have remained at their insignificantly low level
despite the various actions taken to stimulate
municipalities' borrowing activities.
Is the municipalities' reliance on central government
transfers for half of their revenues incompatible with the
objective of decentralization? Are municipalities developing
some form of dependency on central government transfers, or
should these changes be perceived as being one important
benefit of the reform? The answer to these questions will
depend largely on the form that these transfers take, how
they are allocated to the municipalities, and how they are
used.
Structure of the Transfer System
Most central government transfers to the municipalities
come from the Fonds Commun des Collectivites Locales (FCCL),
the common fund for local authorities, which are primarily
allocated to their current budget. Municipalities also
27 In Table 4-7, we are comparing current revenue structure instead of
total revenue structure as in Table 4-6, because figures are unavailable
for the years 1975 to 1981 to identify the amount of transfers to the
capital budget. Transfer figures presented in Table 4-7 include only
transfers to the current budget, thus do not include transfers to the
capital budget. All municipalities' own revenues are current revenues
and are therefore included in this table.
receive capital subsidies from various other sources. Most
of them are transferred from the Ministry of Equipment on the
request of municipalities. Others come from institutions,
such as the local governments' lending institution,28 the
municipal development fund, 2 9 and the national housing fund, 3 0
which provide capital subsidies to the municipalities on a
discretionary basis. Before examining each source of
transfers, we should note that transfers from the FCCL
account for 75% of all transfers. The following table
presents the amounts involved and the relative importance of
each source for the year 1984.
Table 4-8
Transfers Received by Municipalities, by Source: Volumes and
Relative Importance, 1984.
(millions of current TD)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Volumes Percentage
(Millions Distribution
TD, current) (Percent)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCCL
(transfers to current and capital budget) 40.91 74.7%
Other Capital Subsidies:
Subsidies from the Ministry of Equipment 8.69 15.9%
Subsidies from CPSCL 2 9  2.68 4.9%
Subsidies from FDM 3 0  1.46 2.7%
Subsidies from FNAH 31 1.00 1.8%
Total 54.74 100.0%
Sources: World Bank, 1987, p. 76. Estimates prepared from aggregated
municipal accounts for 1984, Ministry of Finance, GOT.
28 Caisse des Prats et de Soutien des Collectivites Locales.(CPSCL)
29 Fond de Developpement Municipal.(FDM)
30 Fond National d'Amelioration de l'Habitat.(FNAH)
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Three objectives were set forth by the 1975 reformers
concerning the transfer system: (i) increase the level of
revenues of municipalities, (ii) lessen regional disparities
in municipalities revenues, and (iii) create incentives for
better financial management and greater participation in
investment activities.
The outcome of the reform was positive on many accounts.
On the revenue side, the reformers allocated to FCCL new,
important, and rapidly growing revenue sources. They insured
stability in FCCL's revenues by indexing these revenues to
national taxes. On the allocation side, they insured
stability in revenues for each municipality by a systematic
allocation system based on a formula.
Rapidly Growing Revenue Sources
In the 1975 reform, two previous funds--namely the Fond
Communs des Carburants et pneumatiques, common fuel and tire
fund, and the former Fond Commun des Collectivite Locales
(FCCL) the common fund for local governments, were merged to
form the new FCCL. 3 1 The revenue sources of the restructured
fund were extended to include more buoyant ones, the most
important of which is the turnover tax (10% of the proceeds),
which provides more than 3/4 of the total revenues of this
fund (see Table 4-9). This new revenue source was one of the
most important innovations of the municipal revenue system.
Not only has it provided the FCCL, and consequently the
31 Law 75-36 of May 14, 1975.
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municipalities, with an important and stable source of
revenue, but also with a rapidly growing one. The average
growth rate of this revenue source between 1981 and 1984 was
24% per year, a faster growth rate than the central
government tax revenues of 17.5% (World Bank, 1987).
Out of eight revenue sources of the FCCL, only three--
including the turnover tax--provided meaningful revenue to
the fund, the sum of which amounted to 98% of all FCCL
revenues for 1984 (see Table 4-9). The five other sources of
revenue are relatively insignificant: two of them generate no
revenues, and their proceeds have a negative growth rate.
Some of these ill-structured revenue sources are residuals of
the previous funds that were maintained after the reform.
Table 4-9
Relative Share of the Sources of Revenues of the FCCL and
Average Annual Growth Rate, 1981-1984.
Relative Average Annual
Share Growth Rate
(Percent) 1981-1984
(Percent)
Turnover tax (10%) 77.6 23.6
Tax on petroleum products (3-9%) 12.8 11.0
Business license tax (7%) 8.2 1.5
Tax on noncommercial profits (7%) 0.7 na
Tax on olives (10%) 0.5 16.5
Agriculture tax (50% of proceeds) 0.2 13.4
Tax on grain and viticulture,10% of proceeds <0.1 -4.2
Tire duty (10% surcharge) <0.1 -68.2
Total 100.0
na= not available
Sources: World Bank, 1987, p. 79. Estimates prepared from the data
contained in "Pression Fiscale 1961-1985 et Tendance 1986," Institut
d'Economie Quantitative, 1985, Tunis Tunisia.
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Because these revenues were indexed to national taxes,
FCCL was guaranteed a stable volume of receipts, which did
not need to be discussed every year as a national budget item
by the political leadership. Indexing FCCL's revenue to
national taxes was practiced before the 1975 reform, and was
kept despite the fact that it breaks the unitary budget
principle of Tunisian public finance. Although not an
innovation of the 1975 reform, it did constitute an important
tenet of the municipalities revenue system and conformed with
the decentralization objective, because it provides
municipalities with growing revenues, thus increases their
capacity for action.
In 1986, however, changes were made to the system of
central government transfers that eliminated the indexing of
the fund resources. Several reasons explain these changes.
First, a fiscal reform at the national level eliminated the
agriculture tax, the tax on grain and viticulture. Second
and importantly, the turnover tax--which represents over
three-quarters of the fund's revenues--was replaced at the
national level by a value added tax (VAT), and the VAT was
excluded from the FCCL fund. Third, some Tunisian officials
perceived that the system in place, and particularly the
earmarking, was complex and difficult to manage. Finally,
and most importantly, the central government wanted to
decrease public spending because of the economic situation of
the country (Sides et al., 1989).
A Systematic Allocation Procedure
The central government transfers are distributed by a
systematic allocation process, based on a formula, which
insured stable and progressive revenues to the
municipalities. This systematic allocation process was not
introduced by the 1975 reform. It was maintained by the 1975
reform and was slightly modified to fit the new objectives.
Among other changes, a larger share of the total fund
resources was transferred to the municipalities.
The transformation brought to the system in 1986 did not
eliminate the systematic allocation process for allocating
transfers. The objectives to be accomplished by the system
remained identical. The total share of the funds resources
allocated to municipalities was once more increased.
Over two-thirds of the FCCL fund is allocated to the
municipalities (see Figure 4-1). These transfers are
essentially allocated unconditionally in their use to the
municipalities' current budget. Almost half of these
transfers allocated unconditionally to the municipalities
(which represent 27% before 1986 and 29% after 1986 of total
transfers) 3 2 are allocated on the basis of "need" to each
municipalities in proportion to their population. An equal
share is used as an incentive to improve the recovery by
municipalities of the property tax. That is, it is allocated
32 The first number in the parenthesis refers to the first period,
between 1975-1985, and the second number refers to the second period,
after 1986. This applies for all the numbers in parenthesis of this
section as well as in Figure 4-1.
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in proportion to municipalities average proceeds (over a
three-year period) from this tax. The remaining part (6%
before 1986 and 6.5% after 1986) is allocated in equal share
among municipalities, favoring the smallest municipalities
and therefore playing the role of an equalizing tool.
FIGURE 4-2: ALLOCATION SYSTEM OF THE FCCL FUNDS
FCCL
100%
FCCL QUOTA FCCL RESERVE FUND
Current resources Capital resources
75% 25%
Municipalities Governorates Municipalities Other
60%-64.5% 15%-10.5% 9%-7.7% Institutions
16%-17 .7%
6.0%-6.5% equal share 13.0%-8.9%by 3%-2.5%.Municipalities 8%-7%ONAS
27%-29% by population population which are capitals 6%-8.5% CPSCL
27%-29% by property 2%-1.6% equal share of Governorates 2%-1.7% District
tax proceeds 6%-5.2% Municipality of Tunis
of Tunis
Note: The first number refers to before 1986 and the second number to after 1986. The
share has not changed when there is only one number.
A smaller share of the FCCL funds (9% before 1986 and
7.7% after 1986) is allocated to the municipalities' capital
budget to promote investment expenditures. They benefit a
small group of municipalities, which are capitals of
governorates and which are considered for that reason to have
special needs. Tunis is the primary recipient of this share
(6% before 1986 and 5.2% after 1986). The rest (3% before
1986 and 2.25% after 1986) is distributed equally between the
few municipalities that are capitals of governorates. other
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municipalities get their capital subsidies from other
sources. Other capital subsidies are reviewed in the
following section.
About a third of the fund's resources, which is not used
for the municipalities, is allocated to the governorates for
their operations and as capital subsidies to other
institutions that are considered to have a local role. This
share, which was 31%, has decreased slightly after 1986 to
27.8% to compensate for the increase in the allocation to the
municipalities. The governorates have taken the largest
reductions, but all of the other institutions have also seen
their shares decrease, with the exception of the lending
institutions, the CPSCL. 3 3 The national sanitation
institution, ONAS, receives FCCL funds (8% before 1986 and 7%
after 1986) for projects they carry out theoretically on
behalf of local governments, and the planning office of the
metropolitan area of Tunis--the District of Tunis--operates
with 2% before 1986 and 1.8% after 1986 of the FCCL fund.
The lending institution to the municipalities, the CPSCL,
receives some FCCL resources, which are partially passed on
to the municipalities through a limited loan subsidy program.
Its share of the fund has increased slightly from 6% before
1986 to 8.5% after 1986, while other capital subsidies from
the FCCL to the municipalities have decreased (from 9% before
33 Caisse des Pr~ts et de Soutien des Collectivites Locales
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1986 to 7.7% after 1986), indicating the new emphasis of the
government for a more rational use of capital.
Because of the growing numbers of municipalities, the
larger share of transfers to municipalities' current budgets
has not resulted in an increase in the amount of transfers to
each individual municipality (Sides, 1989). This fact, along
with the drop in the capital subsidy, appears to result from
limited availability of resources and a more-constrained
allocation process, rather than from an explicit change in
government's transfers policy.
Other Capital Subsidies
Another objective of the central government was to
create incentives for the municipalities to invest. In the
1975 reform and during the subsequent years, some innovations
were put forward to help municipalities with limited
financial capacity to provide basic infrastructure and create
social facilities.
Unlike the FCCL allocation system, capital subsidies are
distributed in an unsystematic and piecemeal manner. The
most common form of awarding municipalities with capital
subsidies is upon the municipalities' own demand.
Municipalities are encouraged by the GOT to request subsidies
to the relevant ministries to finance their investment
projects. Decisions to grant the subsidies are taken by an
inter-ministry commission on the basis of the nature and the
importance of projects. The priority is generally given to
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small municipalities with limited resources. Other capital
subsidies of a more exceptional nature were institutionalized
during and after the reform, some of which were eliminated a
few years later.
With the reform of the loan-allocation system, the
lending institution, the CPSCL, was given the capacity to
grant subsidies to municipalities, not exceeding 50% of the
FCCL funds allocated to the CPSCL and only under very
specific circumstances. 3 4 We have seen that the share of the
fund allocated to the CPSCL has increased in the last
transformation of the allocation system, indicating a desire
to see the CPSCL play a more important role in the provision
of capital subsidies.
In 1983 a special treasury fund was established, called
the municipal development fund--Fond de developpement
Municipal (FDM)--to provide capital resources to the most
needy municipalities. This fund received a yearly
appropriation from the central government budget and from
other central contributions and was the second most important
source of capital subsidies to the municipalities. It was
eliminated in 1987 because it was perceived as being an
inefficient use of resources, due in part to the lack of a
rigorous allocation process. This particularly affected
34 The CPSCL can grant subsidies only to municipalities "subject to
special, necessary or unforeseeable constraints" or those facing a
particularly difficult financial situation (Law 75-37 of May 14, 1975).
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small municipalities which relied heavily on the fund for
their capital resources.
Another special treasury fund of lesser importance to
municipalities, the national fund for housing improvement--
Fond National de l 'Amelioration de 1 'Habitat (FNAH) -- provides
subsidies to municipalities, on their request, for housing
upgrading projects and other projects carried out in
conjunction with the national agency for urban renovation.
Implications of the Reform
The impact of these increases in transfers on the
municipalities' finances is remarkable, particularly between
1975 and 1985 as shown earlier in Figure 4-1. Municipalities
revenues from transfers have grown sharply after 1975 to the
point of becoming their primary source of revenue shown in
Table 4-7).
Transfers to municipalities' current budget from the
FCCL tripled in real terms between 1975 and 1988 (see Table
4-10), with an average growth rate of 8. 8% per year during
this period (see Table 4-11). The sharpest growth rate
follows the 1975 reform, with an average growth rate of about
20% per year between 1975 and 1979. The volume of transfers
continued to grow until 1985, but the elimination of the
indexing of the FCCL resources to national taxes created an
immediate drop in real terms in the value of transfers to the
municipalities.
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Table 4-10
Central Government Transfers to Municipalities, 1970-1987
(Millions of 1980 TD)
1970 1975 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1988
Transfers to
Current Budget 5.94 8.53 17.41 20.40 22.71 27.18 24.99 25.66
Transfers to
Capital Budget na na na 3.17 5.91 9.97 8.31 8.55
of which:
Capital Subsidies na na na 1.91 2.53 7.06 5.66 5.64
Transfers FCCL na na na 1.26 3.38 2.91 2.65 2.91
Total na na na 23.57 28.62 37.15 33.30 34.21
na = not available
Source:
Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance, GOT.
Table 4-11
Average Annual Growth Rate of Transfers, 1970-1988.
(Percent)
70-75 75-79 79-83 83-85 85-88 75-88
Transfers
To current Budget 7.5 19.5 6.9 9.4 -1.9 8.84
To Capital budget
Capital subsidies na na na 67.1 -7.2 na
Transfers FCCL na na na -7.2 -0.0 na
na = not available
Note: Calculated with figures in constant TD.
Source: Calculation based on statistics from municipal accounts,
Ministry of Finance, GOT.
The increase in capital subsidies starts much later, and
because they were originally very small, they grew at a much
higher rate than transfers to the current budget. The
average growth rate between 1983 and 1985 was 67% per year.
Their period of growth was, however, short. The recent
measures that eliminated the FDM have resulted in a drop of
capital subsidies after 1985. Despite their limited volumes,
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capital subsidies constitute for many municipalities the
major source of capital resources.
The impact on the central government budget is apparent
in the growing share of these transfers relative to total
government transfers and to their own budget volumes (see
Table 4-12).
Table 4-12
Comparison Between Central Government Transfers to
Municipalities and Other Transfers, 1981-1987.
(millions of current TD)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Central Government
Transfers & Subsidies
To municipalities 25.7 31.3 38.6 4 8.4
To other
institutions 207.2 200.7 229.6 235.0
Total 232.9 232.0 268.2 283.4
Central Government
Transfers & Subsidies
To municipalities 11% 13% 14% 17%
To other institutions 89% 87% 86% 83%
Total 100.% 100% 100% 100%
Transfers to Municipalities
as % of Central government
Budget 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%
na = not available
Sources: World Bank, 1987, Annex, p. 263.
Municipalities statistics: Ministry of Finance.
Central Government Statistics: Annexe Statistique au
Budget Economique 1986. GOT.
58.7
285.0
343.7
57.4
na
na
59.7
na
na
17%
83%
100%
2.1% 2.0%
Rapport sur le
Central government transfers to municipalities
represented 1.7% of the central government budget in 1981 and
over 2% in 1985. Their percentage share relative to all
central government transfers and subsidies, including those
103
to the municipalities, has increased from 11% to 17% during
the same period. This increase resulted from indexing of the
revenue sources of the FCCL to a fast growing national tax
revenues.
Compatibility of Transfers with Decentralization
How compatible is the reform of the transfer system with
the decentralization objective? From the point of view of
reaching a better division of national resources between the
levels of government, the development of the transfer system
is a step in the right direction. " [O]ne should expect
transfers to make a significant contribution to resolving the
fiscal problems of local authorities in developing countries
either on ground of principle or practice" (Bahl and Linn,
1983, p. 186. ). Transfers should not be treated, however, as
a substitute to local taxes. In Tunisia, it resulted in a
rapid increase in the revenues of municipalities. Although,
this increase was insufficient to change the share of local
revenues relative to national revenues, it does provide
municipalities with more resources in absolute terms and
enhances their capacity for action.
From the point of view of giving greater decision-making
authority and autonomy to the local governments, increased
transfers actually limit municipalities' autonomy over
resource mobilization as municipalities have no control over
revenue-raising activities. The choices over which taxes,
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bases, and rates to apply and how much money to raise, all
escape their authority.
There are, however, several theoretical and practical
reasons that make the transfer system a good alternative
mechanism to improve the division of national resources
between levels of government (Rosen, p. 526). Most of them
apply to the case of Tunisia. The most important one is the
compensation for horizontal fiscal imbalances or unequal
fiscal capacities between regions. Also, the use of
transfers are justified by the need to avoid the drawback of
a fragmented tax structure--such as higher administrative
costs due to the duplication of collection facilities or tax
competition between various local units--and the need to
avoid the inefficiencies of local government in tax
management, a common problem in developing countries,
including Tunisia. Finally, transfers are used to correct
inter-jurisdictional externalities--the spill-over effect of
local decisions on other localities--and as an incentive
mechanism for activities that the central government wants
the local government to accomplish.
In cases where transfers are viewed as being the most
efficient way of improving the division of resources between
levels of government, the level of autonomy left to the local
governments over the use of the transferred funds--that is,
in their choice of expenditures--then becomes the alternative
criteria to measure the level of decentralization. The level
of autonomy over the use of transferred funds depends on the
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form they take: whether they are unconditional in their use
or tied to some specific expenditures.
Depending on what they are set to achieve, these
transfers can take several forms. In most countries,
unconditional transfers are more often used for correction of
horizontal fiscal imbalances, while conditional transfers and
matching grants are used to correct intergovernmental
externalities, or to induce local governments to pursue some
activities that are perceived by the national government as
in the national interest (Rosen, p. 526).
We have seen that the majority of the transfers (65% of
all FCCL transfers), in Tunisia, are unconditional (see
Tables 4-10 and 4-11).35 They are allocated to the
municipalities' current budget and are combined with other
revenues to become undifferentiated municipal revenues in a
unitary budget. Local government officials have full
autonomy over the use of these funds, although, it is over
the limited set of functions that are under municipalities
responsibilities. Funds from the FCCL reserve funds and
funds from the former FDM (12% of all transfers in 1984) are
partially tied transfers. Local officials must use the funds
for capital expenditures but can choose the investment
projects. Less than one-fourth of all transfers (23% of all
transfers) are conditional. They are awarded to finance
35 One-third of the FCCL fund is allocated as a function of
municipalities' proceeds of the property tax, an incentive for a more
efficient management of the tax. We have chosen to classify it as
unconditional transfers because these transfers are totally
unconditional in their utilization.
106
specific capital expenditures or investment projects by their
specific institutions. (See table 4-13.)
Table 4-13
Relative Importance and Types of Transfers Received by
Municipalities, 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share Types of
of total allocation
In %
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unconditional 65%,
FCCL quota
(Transferred to current budget)
Partially Tied 12%
FCCL reserve Fund
(Transferred to capital budget)
Subsidies from FDM
Tied 23%
Subsidies from MEH
Subsidies from CPSCL
Subsidies from FNAH
Total
65% Unconditional
10% Capital expenditures
2 % Capital expenditures
16%
5%
2%
Tied to specific projects
Tied to specific projects
Tied to specific projects
100%
Source: Calculated from municipal accounts for 1984, Ministry of
Finance, GOT.
We can conclude that the high level of autonomy left to
the municipal councils over the use of transfers does reflect
in one sense the decentralization objective set by the
reform. Municipalities do have the full or a high level of
autonomy over the use of the majority of these funds. Less
than a quarter of all the fund transferred are conditional,
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and even in this case the degree of conditionality over the
allocation of the funds can vary greatly. We have seen that
projects are often suggested by the municipalities.
The municipalities autonomy in their use of transfers
notwithstanding, the new revenue structure did create more
overall dependency of municipalities on the central
government transfers for their revenues. Municipalities
depend on the central government for their revenues by the
simple fact that transfers represent such a large portion of
municipalities resources. This is particularly true for some
small municipalities which rely heavily on these transfers
for their revenues. 3 6 Have these transfers inhibited
municipalities' ability to raise their own revenues? our
aggregated data for all municipalities are not conclusive on
this issue. The drop in the share of municipalities' own
resources when transfers increased rapidly between 1975 and
1985, and their rise when transfers started declining after
1985, lends support to this interpretation (see Table 4-7 and
graph 4-1). We think, however, that they are insufficient
evidence. Municipalities own revenues have had a positive
growth rate during the 1975-1985 period--the structural
change was caused only by the increase in transfers. The
subsequent increase in the share of municipalities own
revenues can be explained in many ways; for example, it may
36 There are important differences between the revenue structure of the
municipalities. The figures presented in the tables are averages for
all municipalities
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be the result of several years of efforts to improve
municipalities' tax collection. It can also be a one-time
increase in revenues due to the recovery of arrears of the
property tax. We cannot conclude from any of these facts
either that the growth of central government transfers has
inhibited municipalities' capacity to raise their own
revenues and that municipalities, in the aggregate, have
developed some form of dependency on the central government
transfers for their revenues or that it has not affected
municipalities' autonomy.
CONCLUSION
From this first part of the analysis of the financial
reform, we can already conclude that the reform did have an
important impact on municipal finances, but not sufficient to
support decentralization. The analysis of municipal
financial aggregates indicated a sharp increase in municipal
revenues in the first four years following the reform.
Although very important, these increases were insufficient in
raising municipalities revenues to a significantly higher
level compared to that of the central governments and other
macroeconomic indicators. Moreover, this growth levelled off
immediately thereafter, in the early 1980s, to a rate just
capable of keeping up with municipal population growth.
The reform of the transfer system was positive on many
accounts and can be considered to be one of the best
institutions in the local government system. On the resource
109
side, the FCCL fund was provided with revenues indexed on
national taxes, the proceeds of which have been growing at a
faster rate than all other national taxes. This has insured
municipalities a stable and progressive revenue source. On
the distribution side, the systematic allocation process in
place insured further stability in revenues to the
municipalities. Finally, most transfers to the
municipalities (65%) are unconditional in their use,
providing a high level of autonomy to the local officials.
All of these facts conform with the decentralization
objective of providing local governments with increased
resources for increased activity at the local level, while
leaving them with a substantial level of autonomy in their
choice of expenditures.
Increased transfers, however, have changed the structure
of municipalities' revenues by making transfers a primary
source of revenues of municipalities. Although we do not
have strong evidence to support this fact, it is legitimate
to ask whether these changes might have created a dependency
of municipalities on central government resources, and
whether local officials rely more on transfers now than
before and are less interested in raising their own revenues
from local taxes. With transfers becoming their primary
revenues sources, local governments become less accountable
to their constituent, which results, from a theoretical point
of view, in a suboptimal allocation of resources.
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We will see in the second part of the analysis of the
municipal finances in the following chapter that other
municipalities' revenue sources received little attention
confirming the above argument that the reform has failed to
improve the level of autonomy and authority of local
governments in their revenue-raising activities by
concentrating primarily on improving central governments
transfers.
We should also point out that the recent (1986) changes
to the system which eliminated the indexing of the funds
resources on national taxes resulted in an immediate drop in
the amounts transferred to the municipalities. It is
unfortunate that the economic difficulties facing the
government have had the effect of partially undermining the
structure of the transfer system.
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ANNEX 4-1
DESCRIPTION OF THE STATISTICS USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF
MUNICIPALITIES' FINANCES
We used two sets of time-series data for our analysis.
The first one, which runs from 1965 to 1980, includes
aggregated figures of revenues and expenditures and a limited
breakdown of revenues. We constructed this time series with
statistics from unpublished reports from the Ministry of the
Interior. The second one, from 1981 to 1988 includes
aggregated figures of both municipalities' revenues and
expenditures, with a detailed breakdown by source.
For more detailed analysis, we relied on a data base
which consists of all the financial statistics for all
municipalities' budgets for the years 1984 and 1985. These
municipalities' budget statistics, along with the 1981-1985
aggregated figures, were collected on World Bank missions to
Tunisia by Ms. Franqoise Navarre and myself. I collected
statistics for 1986 and 1987 in a later survey trip to
Tunisia. Statistics for 1988 come from the latest report
written for the Ministry of the Interior by a consortiums of
consulting firms (Sides et al., 1989) working on a World
Bank-initiated municipal development project.
These statistics are very reliable. They come from the
Ministry of the Interior, where individual municipalities'
accounts--which are submitted at the end of their budget year
and which include all their financial operations, planned and
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realized--were verified and aggregated into summary tables.
For our analysis we have used accounts of realized financial
operations.
Municipal accounting in Tunisia uses some inappropriate
definitions of financial operations that do not lend
themselves to a precise financial analysis, the most
important of which leads to double counting. Whenever enough
information was available, we have modified this breakdown to
fit the objective of our analysis. The first time series,
whose statistics were compiled on different occasions and for
different purposes, have consequently different levels of
aggregation and presentation. These have been difficult to
correct. We will refer to the budget for uncorrected
financial aggregates and to effective revenues and effective
expenditures for corrected figures. A more detailed
explanation of these differences is provided in the review of
the structure of the budget in Annex 4-2.
I13
ANNEX 4-2
STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPALITIES' BUDGETS
Municipalities' budgets are divided into two parts: The
current budget records the financial transactions of
municipalities' operations; the capital budget, relates to
municipalities' investment activities (see Figure 4-2). Each
of these budgets is subdivided into revenues and
expenditures, and under these two headings, appear a series
of subheadings--chapters and articles--generally related to
the nature of the financial operation. The headings
presented in the diagram below correspond roughly to the
division in chapters of the budget. We have grouped some
items for the purpose of our analysis. The 1987 aggregated
budgets of all municipalities have been used in this diagram
to illustrate the relative importance of the various
components of the budget.
One characteristic of the budget deserves attention. An
important share of the budget (about 1/4) consists of intra
and interbudgetary transfers. They do not constitute
effective revenues or expenditures but are recorded as such
in the accounting documents. A sum is withdrawn from the
current budgets and is transferred to the capital budget. It
appears as current expenditures on the current budget and as
capital revenues on the capital budget (See Figure 4-2.)
This transaction is called the contribution of the first
title to the second title and is perceived as a form of
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saving from the current budget to finance capital
expenditures, reminiscent of the pre-1975 budgetary
practices. It is, in fact, a way of allocating revenues to
the capital budget from the current budget, as most
municipalities' revenues are current revenues. This transfer
is nothing more than an accounting entry that does not
correspond to any actual inflow or outflow of funds.
Another set of inter-budgetary transfers occurs when 80%
of the surpluses of any budget year is transferred to the
following year's budget as capital revenues, under the
heading of municipal reserve fund. The remaining 20% is kept
separately to cover shortfalls or contingencies arising
during the budget year. The reserve fund is not an actual
revenue item of any budget year. Like the transfers from the
current to the capital budgets cited above, it is an
accounting procedure and should not be considered as an
effective municipal resource.
In our financial analysis, we have corrected the
accounts from these intrabudgetary and interbudgetary
transfers, or double counting, whenever enough information
was available. We refer to "effective revenues" and
"effective expenditures" in the tables of Chapters 4 and 5
when accounts have been corrected from these transfers, and
we speak of "budgets" when the figures have not been
corrected. Note that for 1987, effective revenues and
effective expenditure account for 77% and for 73%,
respectively, of the budget.
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Figure 4-2: Structure Of Municipal Budget, 1987
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CHAPTER 5
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES PART II:
MUNICIPALITIES' OWN-REVENUES, BORROWING AND
EXPENDITURES
In this chapter, we assess the impact of the reform on
municipalities' own revenues by reviewing their structure,
their potential, and the level of autonomy municipalities
have on this revenue base. We also review what the reform
has achieved in the municipal borrowing system. Finally, we
analyze municipalities' expenditures, which inform us, not
only about their level of activity at the local level, but
also about the type of activity in which they are involved,
both key indicators of municipalities' importance and role.
From this analysis, we demonstrate that the reform did
not provide any substantial improvements to municipalities'
own revenues. Despite a revision of all local taxes and fees
in 1976, revenues from these sources remained low. The
reform failed to eliminate old and obsolete taxes and create
new more buoyant ones. It also failed to provide
municipalities with authority over revenue-raising
activities. A few good taxes--the rental-value tax, the
establishment tax, and market fees--generate most of
municipalities' own revenues (MOR). A series of small taxes
and fees, some generating insignificant revenues, continue to
form the majority of these revenues.
We also show that borrowing remained relatively
insignificant, despite the changes introduced in the system.
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Finally, the low level of municipal expenditures indicate
their limited involvement in the economic life of the
country.
MUNICIPALITIES' OWN-REVENUES
Municipalities' own-revenues are revenues that
municipalities generate themselves by levying taxes and fees
on assets or activities within their territory, and by
charging for the use of municipal properties. They include
all direct and indirect local taxes, which account for most
of these revenues (see Table 5-1), user fees, and income from
municipalities' properties. (In Annex 5-1: local taxes and
fees are described for all of these revenue sources.)
Table 5-1
Volume and Structure of Municipalities' Own Revenues (MOR),
1988.
(millions of current TD)
Income
Direct Indirect User from Total
taxes taxes fees Property MOR
TD Millions 26.72 18.92 6.94 10.53 63.11
Relative share 42.3% 30.0% 11.00% 16.7% 100.0%
Source: Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance,
GOT.
We have seen that municipalities' own revenues (MORs)
accounted for 45% of municipalities total revenues in 1988
(see Table 4-6). We have also seen earlier that their share
of current revenues has declined in the ten years following
the reform, due to a smaller growth rate than that for
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revenues from transfers (Figure 4-1 and Table 4-7). This is
not to say that MOR have not been affected by the 1975
reform. Like transfers, the period following the reform
marks clearly the beginning of a new pattern. From a low
2.7% annual growth rate between 1970 and 1975,
municipalities' own revenues increased at an average annual
growth rate of 11% between 1975 and 1979. Although this
pattern was not maintained for long, MORs have had an average
annual growth rate of 5% per year between 1975 and 1988.
Reform of Municipalities' Own Revenues
To improve MORs, reformers created two new taxes in 1975
and reformed a series of indirect-taxes and user-fees in
1976. Two new taxes, a hotel tax and a tax on commercial and
industrial establishment--hereafter referred to as "tax on
establishments"--, were created in 1975 to provide the
municipalities with sources of revenues based on economic
activities within their territory. 3 7 For both taxes, the base
used is the business turnover, and the rates are 0.2% and 1%
respectively for the tax on establishments and the hotel tax,
with a ceiling of TD 20,000 for the tax on establishment.
These new taxes are entirely under the authority of the
central government, from the definition of the base and rates
to the assessment and collection activities. Municipalities
have no role other than to receive the proceeds. The central
37 These taxes replaced a property tax applied to the same businesses,
which did not reflect the economic activities of these economic agents.
119
government re-allocates to each municipality the exact amount
that was levied by these taxes on their territory.
A series of indirect taxes and fees, most of which were
created at the beginning of this century, were reformed by a
decree in 1976. The changes consisted primarily of a
revision of the rates that had not been revised since 1958.
It included also the simplification of procedures; such as
assessing tax bases and the elimination of some of the fees
and taxes now considered to be irrelevant. This decree is
important in the context of the reform that started in 1975
because it was intended to provide municipalities with the
new revised revenue base necessary to accomplish their
responsibilities--responsibilities that were presumably
clarified and enlarged by the reform. This decree lists a
series of taxes, fees, and charges, their bases and rates, as
well as the maximum ceilings that municipalities are allowed
to levy in each case. This list constitutes the base of
revenue sources that municipalities have to generate the
necessary revenues for their activities.
The 1976 decree was the last major effort by the central
government to improve MOR. Municipalities have not received
any new revenue sources since then, and most rates, bases,
and maximums have not been updated since then.
Outcome of the Reform
The creation of the two new taxes and the revision of
some older ones have had an important impact on MORs. These
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changes have brought a sharp increase in revenues in the
period that followed the reforms. (Tables 5-2 and 5-3 and
Figure 5-1). It was, however, a one-time increase followed
by a period of stagnation and even decline in MORs.
Table 5-2
Municipalities' Own-Revenues, 1970-1988.
(Millions of 1980 TD)
1970 1975 1979 1983 1985 1988
15.86 18.16 27.49 28.43 27.03 33.12
Note: Municipalities' own-revenues include direct and indirect taxes,
user fees, and income from municipal properties.
Source: Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance,
GOT.
Table 5-3
Average Annual Growth Rate of Municipalities' Own Revenues,
1970-1988.
(percent)
70-75 75-79 79-83 83-85 85-88 75-88
Direct Taxes 0.5 5.6 2.2 -2.6 7.0 3.9
Indirect Taxes 3.6 16.1 4.6 -2.5 9.0 8.5
User fees 3.1 1.5 -8.5 1.4 11.7 5.5
Income from 13.2 29.5 -1.3 -4.2 1.5 8.2
Properties
Total MOR 2.6 10.9 0.9 -2.5 7.0 5.1
Notes : Average annual growth rates are calculated from figures in
constant TD.
Source: Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance
GOT.
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FIGURE 5-1
Municipalities' Own Revenues (MOR)
1970-1988
(in Millions of 1980 TD)
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The introduction of the tax on establishments and the
hotel tax, which together constitute over half of direct tax
revenues (see Table 5-4), have increased the annual growth
rate of direct tax revenues from less than 1% per year
between 1970 and 1975 to 5.6% during the period following the
fiscal innovations (see Table 5-3.)
Table 5-4
Composition of Direct-Taxes: Volumes and Relative Share, 1985
-(Millions of current TD)
Tax on Tax on Tax on Other
rental undeve- establish (hotel
value loped land -ments tax)' Total
TD Millions 8.3 0.2 7.9 1.8 18.2
Relative share 45.7% 1.4% 43.2% 9.7% 100%
Note: Hotel tax is the major item under the heading "other".
Source: Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance,
GOT.
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Similarly, the effect of the 1976 decree is felt in all
other MOR categories (see Table 5-3), as the decree touched
on a large number of fees and taxes. Indirect taxes and
income from the use of municipal properties have grown
respectively by 16% and 29% per year from 1975 to 1979.
Changes in rates of market levies and other related fees and
the simplification of procedures have been the primary
reasons for the increase in indirect taxes as they represent
the single most important source of revenues under this
budgetary heading (see Table 5-5).
Note that market taxes and fees are the only source of
revenue on which municipalities have some leverage. Although
maximum rates and bases are fixed by decree, municipalities
have some discretionary power over their assessment and
collection. They can choose to be more or less active in
this process. They can also promote market activities--for
example, through the construction of market facilities--to
generate more revenues. For their most recent Five-Year
Investment Plan, municipalities had planned to invest 11% of
their total investment in the construction of market
facilities. 3 8 The relatively significant size and fast growth
of income from markets and related activities are partially
due to the particular interest that municipalities give to
these activities.
38 Construction of market facilities are favorite municipal investments.
In the Five-Year Investment Plans (1987-1991), market facilities
accounted for 11% of total investments for all municipalities (World
Bank, 1988, p. 134).
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Table 5-5
Composition of Indirect Taxes 1985. (Millions of current TD)
Income from
Enter- Electri- Road Markets and
tainment city Taxes Taxes on
Taxes Surcharges Slaughter Houses Total
Values 0.18 0.82 1.03 10.15 12.18
Percent 1.5% 6.7% 8.5% 83.3% 100%
Note: Detailed breakdown for the various sources of revenues and
expenditures are available only for 1985 figures.
Source : Calculations based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance,
GOT
The elimination of some fees by the 1976 decree have
slowed the growth of revenues from user-fees to less than 2%
per year after the 1975 reform (see Table 5-3); however, the
slow down did not have much impact on the overall MORs as
user fees account for only 11% of their total. The reform
did pushed the MORs to a higher level of revenues, but this
was a one-time growth as it did not provide them with
increasing sources of revenues. Several reasons explain this
phenomena. First, obsolete tax bases that fail in many cases
to capture the growth of economic activities are common among
municipal taxes. This is particularly true for old taxes
whose base has not been modified by the reform. Another
source of limitation comes from ceilings--or the maximum
levies that municipalities are allowed to raise--that are
never updated for inflation. For example, a maximum of TD
2,000 (equivalent to $2,500) is charged to individual
businesses for the tax on establishments. The ceiling was
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set in 1975 and is still applied today. Finally, exemptions
exclude a large number of potential contributors to local
revenues. Businesses with a turnover of less than TD 10,000
are exempted from the tax on establishments; many small
businesses therefore avoid contributing to the tax by
reporting a lower turnover than they actually have (Sides et
al., 1989, Vol. 2, pp. 111, 112).
Since 1985, all MOR categories have had a sharp increase
in their growth rates (see Table 5-3) which is perhaps due to
the better tax management and better economic condition of
the country. It could also be due to the collection of
arrears whose amounts are important, in particular for the
rental value tax. It is not yet clear whether this
represents to another one-time growth in MOR or a trend.
Insufficient Reform
The majority of municipalities' taxes and fees have not
been affected by the reform. A large number of older sources
of revenues have never been reviewed or improved, and
continue to operate with outdated structures. Most municipal
revenue sources yield almost no revenues.
The reform has accentuated the already unbalanced
municipal revenue structure. In 1985, three sources of
revenues accounted for as much as 61% of MOR. They included
the newly created tax on establishments (18.5% of MOR) and
and the rental-value tax (19.8% of MOR)--a property tax,
which can be considered as the only locally collected tax
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with some significance. Both taxes account for most (89%)
direct taxes revenues. They also include the taxes on
markets and slaughter houses 3 9 (23.1% of MOR), which were the
primary beneficiary of the 1976 decree and which account for
most (83%) of indirect tax revenues. (See Tables 5-4 and 5-
5.)
The reform failed to evaluate the relevance of some of
these sources of revenue, continuing to include totally
outdated taxes. The reform also failed to update old and
more relevant taxes. It overlooked the potentials of more
new indirect taxes based on contemporary economic
activities.40
Municipalities' authority over indirect taxes is
relatively limited. All taxable items, bases, and rates are
defined by centralized regulatory instructions, with maximum
rates fixed by law. A slightly higher degree of flexibility
appears because of the larger number of items and rates to
choose from and because municipalities differ in their
choices over items to tax and rates to apply. Assessment and
collection are left to the local authorities, as in the case
of some direct taxes. Low user-fee revenues are a clear
indication that cost recovery for services rendered by
municipalities is not considered as an objective of the
39 A series of small levies on market activities that are closer to
fees but are classified under indirect taxes.
40 The most important taxes are based on agricultural products and food
market activities, which were the preponderant economic activities of
the past, at the time of the creation of these taxes.
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reform and is not perceived to be an important component of
municipalities' financial well-being.
LENDING SYSTEM
Municipalities are allowed to borrow for investment
spending only. By law, they cannot finance their current
expenditures or balance their budget through borrowing. 4' For
that, theoretically, they have access to several sources of
credit. They can borrow on the foreign capital market, from
the various Tunisian banks, and from a specialized lending
institution to local governments, the Caisse des Pr6ts et de
Soutien de Collectivit6s Locales (CPSCL). Most loans
contracted by the municipalities on their own initiative come
from the CPSCL. Borrowing on the foreign capital market is
relatively exceptional and is initiated and guaranteed by the
central government, often for urban rehabilitation or
development projects conducted by the Agence de Renovation et
de Rehabilitation Urbaine (ARRU), an agency for urban
renovation and rehabilitation. Borrowing from commercial
banks has been relatively rare.
The Reform: Objective and Outcome
The changes to the lending system under the 1975 reform
aimed to increase municipalities' capital resources in order
to promote investment activities by municipalities. The
41 Municipalities are, in fact, required by law to have a balanced
budget. Unintentional budget deficits can exceptionally--when
municipalities can attest to good financial management--be covered by
loans or subsidies from the CPSCL.
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existing lending institution to the local government, the
former Caisse des Pr~ts, a loan fund, was reorganized into
the Caisse des Prdts et de Soutien des Collectivit6s Locales
(CPSCL) with enlarged capacities and new procedures for
lending. Although the revenue sources of the former Caisse
des Prdts remained unchanged, the new CPSCL was to be
provided with expended revenues to increase its activities.
The majority of these resources come from subsidies from the
FCCL fund. Although the share of FCCL transferred to the
CPSCL was reduced by the reform--from 10% to 6%--the CPSCL
benefited from the rapid growth rate of the FCCL fund. The
volumes of subsidies transferred from the FCCL to the CPSCL
almost doubled in real terms in the decade between 1973 and
1983. (See Table 5-6.)
Table 5-6
Share of the FCCL Funds Transferred to the CPSCL for
1973 and 1983.
(current and constant TD)
1973 1983
Millions of Current TD 0.89 5.10
Millions of 1980 TD 1.41 2.68
A large share of the CPSCL revenues also comes directly
from central government subsidies (see Table 5-7).
Surprisingly, however, after such a reform, the CPSCL is able
to recover only a modest sum from loan repayments. This fact
reflects several characteristics and weakness of the present
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lending system, which are a legacy of the 1975 reform.
First, the CPSCL charges low interest rates--negative in real
terms--for its loans. 4 2 Second, the CPSCL also provides
direct subsidies to municipalities. Part of its resources are
therefore never recovered. The capacity of providing
subsidies was awarded to them by the reform as part of the
objective of promoting investment activities of
municipalities. Finally, municipalities have a tendency to
default partially or totally on their loans. This probably
accounts for most of the low volume of loan repayments. 43
Despite the efforts to improve the CPSCL revenues, they
remained relatively limited. The increase in the volume of
subsidies from the FCCL and the central government were
insufficient to provide the CPSCL with an appreciably higher
level of revenues. For the year 1984 the CPSCL resources
amounted to only TD 12.6 millions in current prices. (See
Table 5-7.)
42 Long-term loans (20 years) are at a 2% interest rate, and medium-
and short-term loans (10 and 5 years) are at a 4% interest rate. In
all cases, the CPSCL provides negative interest rates.
43 Although we do not have precise information on the amount of loans
in default, evidence indicates some irregularities in municipalities
debt-repayment practices. For example, in the year 1984, some
municipalities with amounts still outstanding in their loans did not
include any debt-service payment in their expenditures. Others have
never made any payment on some of their loans. Finally, other
discrepancies appear in the municipalities budget between the debt
service owed, the amounts budgeted, and the effective expenditures for
debt service. According to government officials, these cases are more
frequent in municipalities with medium-sized and small budgets which
are supervised at the governorate level (World Bank, 1987, p. 93).
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Table 5-7
CPSCL Revenues, by Source, 1984.
(millions of current TD)
CPSCL Revenues
Transferred from 1983 1.41
Central Government subsidies 4.00
FCCL quota 5.10
Loan Repayments 2 . 07
Total 12.58
Source: BDET.
As part of the institutional reform of the lending
system, the procedures were improved and simplified. The
complex chain of intermediaries involved in the loan approval
processes--set as a control mechanism and which involved
several ministries and institutions--was shortened but not
completely eliminated. Municipalities continue not to have
direct access to the CPSCL. Loans still need to be approved
by the Ministry of the Interior offices, which evaluate
projects and municipalities' capacity to contract loans.
Criteria for evaluating projects were improved, although no
economic or financial analyses of projects were introduced.
The evaluation is based on an established list of priority
sectors for projects and on insuring compatibility and
coordination in municipalities' investments as well as with
the regional and national plans. These evaluations are a
useful way of screening projects, but are insufficient for an
efficient credit system. Municipalities' capacity to borrow
for these projects is evaluated by a simple rule: The annual
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debt repayment of the municipality should not exceed 15% of
its current revenues. In reality this maximum is rarely
reached.
Finally, as part of their enlarged capacities, the CPSCL
was provided with the authority to provide capital subsidies
to the municipalities on an exceptional basis, in addition to
the subsidies in interest rates that they provide to all
their borrowers. 4 4 This measure appears especially useful in
view of the very limited resources of most municipalities and
of the objective to promote investment activities at the
local level. According to some analysts, it is a
responsibility that affects the position and the perception
of the CPSCL as a lending institution and that is detrimental
to its operation (Sides et al., 1989).
Through the 1975 reform, municipalities benefited from a
moratorium on all their debts. This came as a response to
the apparent inability of municipalities to repay their debt.
Arrears had built up through the years and in 1975, it was
estimated that the total municipal debt amounted to TD 6
Million in current prices at the time of the moratorium. 4 5
Despite this action, municipalities' tendency to default on
their loans survived the reform and is still present today,
44 These subsidies take several forms. They are: (i) subsidies for
investment projects considered as a priority in the national plan, (ii)
Interest rate subsidies for loans contracted at regular market rates by
municipalities in other financial institutions, and (ii) some rare cases
of direct subsidies to municipalities that have a budget deficit in
spite of proof of good financial management.
45 This figure was estimated (Nellis, 1984). This amount represents
close to 80% of the municipal debt contracted between 1965 and 1973.
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although to a lesser extent. It would be incorrect, however
to assume that limited municipal resources is the main source
of this repayment problem. Municipalities have developed a
tendency for laxity in debt repayment, which has its root in
municipal perceptions of government loans as some form of
grant, a view that is reinforced and encouraged by the poor
debt management of the CPSCL and lack of interest of the
Banque de Development Economique de Tunisie (BDET), an
economic development bank that administers the CPSCL. 4 6 The
BDET shows very limited interest in the CPSCL and in managing
the loans granted to local government. The CPSCL is highly
understaffed and is incapable of any actions to collect the
amounts due. No enforcement practices are in place. Sides
et al. (1989, p. 39) describes the CPSCL as an "abandoned"
institution, whose "board of directors did not hold any
meetings in the last three years", which has "no ef fective
accounting system in place", and which is totally negligent
in its loan recovery practices.
Evolution of Municipalities' Loan Revenues
No dramatic changes in municipal capital revenues have
been generated by the reform of the lending system according
to statistics on loans from municipalities budgets, which
show the amounts of loans disbursed to the municipalities.
Note that statistics from other sources differ considerably.
46 The BDET invests the sums deposited in the CPSL in interest-bearing
instruments and has the responsibility of evaluating the cost
effectiveness of project for which loans are requested.
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One possible explanation for this discrepancy would be the
time lag between the approval and the disbursement of the
loans. The following numbers from the Ministry of the
interior provide an example.
Table 5-8:
Municipal Borrowing 1979-1985.
(Millions of current TD)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Loan Disbursed 1.52 3.52 7.35 9.04 7.25 8.20 11.87
Loans Approved 2.86 4.01 10.70 3.24 na 6.04 na
na = not available
Sources: World Bank, 1987, p. 89.
Municipal budgets indicate that borrowing activities did
grow at a rate comparable to other revenue sources--a sharp
increase after the reform of 10% and an average growth rate
of 5% between 1975 and 1988 (see Table 5-10)--, but the
original volume of loans before the reform was so low that
this growth rate was insufficient to bring the lending
activity to a significant level (see Table 5-10). Aggregated
figures of disbursed loans amounted to only TD 12 Millions
current in 1988.
These aggregated figures hide important differences in
borrowing practices across municipalities. For example, a
study based on a sample of municipalities showed that the
amount of municipalities' revenues from loans varied from
zero to 93% of capital expenditures in 1985 (World Bank 1987,
p. 92). The municipalities with the larger budgets borrow
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the most in volumes--two municipalities were responsible for
36% of total borrowing in 1984. The medium sized
municipalities have larger debt per capita. Small
municipalities tend not to borrow (one-third of the total,
largely municipalities with fewer than 10 thousand
inhabitants, received no loans in 1984).
Sizeable variation occurs within this group, however
(World Bank, 1987, pp. 90-91).
Table 5-9
Revenues from Borrowing 1970-1987 Selected Years.
(Millions of 1980 TD)
1970 1975 1979 1983 1985 1988
0.93 3.22 4.78 5.18 7.47 6.29
Source:
Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance, GOT.
Table 5-10
Average Annual Growth Rate of Municipal Borrowing, Selected
Periods Between 1970-1987. (percent)
70-75 75-79 79-83 83-85 85-88 75-88
20.23% 10.39% 2.01% 20.09% -0.06% 5.74%
Notes : Average annual growth rate are calculated from figures in
constant TD.
Source: Calculation based on statistics from the Ministry of Finance
GOT.
The reasons for such discrepancies can be partially
explained by the criteria used to evaluate municipal capacity
to borrow--the 15% of current budget rule. It is not
surprising to see therefore that the volumes of loans are
proportional to the current revenues and therefore to the
budgets of municipalities. For some small municipalities,
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the lack of resources coupled with their inability to request
loans explains the limited borrowing activities.
EXPENDITURES
The analysis of expenditures is the last part of the
evaluation of the decentralization efforts through municipal
finances. While the analysis of revenues illustrated
municipal potentials for action, an analysis of expenditures
will give a sense of the level of involvement of the
municipalities in the economic life of the country and of the
importance of their role as providers of public services. By
reviewing the aggregated municipal expenditures and by
comparing them to those of the central government and to
other macroeconomic aggregates, we can quantify their level
of activity in absolute and relative terms.
In an earlier comparison of municipal expenditures with
those of the central government (see Table 4-3) for 1981 and
1987, we showed that the level of municipal spending is low
and has not increased relative to that of the central
government. Expenditures by municipalities not only
represent a small share of total public expenditures by the
central and local government, but this share has been stable
at 4% between 1981 and 1987, and the elasticity of municipal
expenditures with respect to the central government
expenditures is less than one (0.6), during the same period.
(See Table 4-4.) These are indications that the role of the
local government within total government operations is
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limited and is not increasing despite the decentralization
reform. A further indication of that trend is the small
share of municipal expenditures relative to the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), representing at most 1.6% between
1981 and 1987 (see Table 4-5), and the elasticity, which
remains under one for the same period (0.7).
Evolution of Municipalities' Expenditures
The following table provides statistics of aggregate
expenditures for selected years. In 1988, 13 years after the
reform, municipal expenditures at their peak amounted to TD
137.1Millions (equivalent to about US$171.4 Millions). (See
Table 5-11.)
Table 5-11
Current and Capital Expenditure,1976-1988.
(Millions of Current TD)
1976 1979 1981 1983 1985 1988
Current Expenditures 16.5 37.1 41.6 60.7 71.0 87.3
Capital Expenditures 9.7 19.5 25.5 26.0 43.5 49.8
Real Total Expenditure 26.2 56.6 67.1 86.7 114.5 137.1
Sources:
. For 1976: GOT, Ministry of Interior (1979), Communes en Chiffres, 5
eme Conference National des Communes, Tunis.
. For 1979: GOT, Ministry of Finances, Office of the budget, (1980),
Situations Financieres des Collectivit6s Locales au 31/12/1980. Tunis.
. For 1981 to 1988: Ministry of Finance, Tunisia. (1981-1987 data are
from the World Bank, 1987, and for 1988 they are from Sides et al.
1989).
The low level of aggregate municipal spending is more
apparent in per capita figures. The average municipal
spending is equivalent to $38 per capita for the year of
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1988, which represents an increase of about 50% in real terms
from the average municipal spending per capita in 1976. (See
Table 5-12).
Table 5-12
Average Municipal Expenditures per Capita, 1976 and 1988.
(current and constant TD)
Expenditures 1976 1988
Total expenditures per capita
IN TD
Current TD 9.64 30.68
Constant 1980 TD 10.84 16.10
IN US$
Current $ 12.06 38.35
Constant 1980 $ 13.56 20.13
Sources: Calculation based on statistics from:
. For 1988: (Sides, 1989)
. For 1976: GOT, Ministry of Interior (1979), Communes en Chiffres, 5
eMe Conference National des Communes, Tunis, Tunisia.
. TD 1 = US$ 1.25
It is not surprising to find many similarities in the
growth rate patterns of revenues and expenditures: The
average real growth rate of expenditures is 6.5% per year
between 1976 to 1988, which is comparable to that of
revenues. Also similar is the sharp growth rate in the years
following the 1975 reform and the considerable slowdown after
1979, which, in the case of expenditures, reached complete
stagnation between 1985 and 1988. (See Table 5-13.)
The negative growth rate of capital expenditures during
the 1985-1988 period reflects the fact that investment
expenditures were contracted in a period of financial
difficulties in order to maintain a stable level of current
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expenditures and a comparable level of service. Increase in
capital expenditures during the 1979 period is due to an
increase in capital subsidies during this period.
Table 5-13
Average Annual Growth Rates of Municipal Expenditures,
1976-1988.
(percentages)
Expenditures 76-79 79-85 85-88 76-88
Current Expenditures 35.9 2.2 0.9 6.6
CapitalExpenditures 28.9 4.7 -1.4 6.4
TotalExpenditures 33.4 3.1 0.4 6.5
Note: Growth rates calculated from figures in constant 1980 TD.
Sources: Calculation based on statistics from:
. For 1976: GOT, Ministry of Interior (1979), Communes en Chiffres, 5
eme Conference National des Communes, Tunis, Tunisia.
. For 1979: GOT, Ministry of Finances, Office of the budget, (1980),
Situations Financieres des Collectivit6s Locales au 31/12/1980. Tunis,
Tunisia.
. For 1981 to 1988: Ministry of Finance, Tunisia. (Data for 1981-1987
are from the World Bank 1987, and for 1988 they are from Sides et al.
1989).
Composition of Municipalities' Expenditures
Current expenditures are a direct expression of the
level of services rendered by municipalities. 4 7 Despite the
fact that current expenditures account for the bulk, more
than two-thirds, of total expenditures, the total amount
remains low. They amounted to TD 87.3 millions current 1988,
(US$ 109 Millions) equivalent to an average of US$19.5 per
capita, which illustrates the average level of services per
capita provided by municipalities. The main components of
47 Current expenditures corrected for interest payments and the various
transfers represent the expenses incurred to municipalities for the
provision of services.
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current expenditures are wages to personnel and maintenance
and management expenses (respectively about 37% and 17% of
total expenditures) .48 Investment expenditures represent
about 30% of total municipal spending on average. The
remaining share consists of debt service, and miscellaneous
expenditures. (See Table 5-14.)
The structure of expenditures reflects municipalities'
limited budgets: over a third of their revenues are spent on
wages to personnel. The small investment figures are also an
indication of the limited amounts municipalities are able to
save for their capital expenditures. Their restricted saving
and investment capacity would be even more apparent if
municipalities did not benefit from increased capital
subsidies from the central government. The rather restricted
role in investment makes municipalities appear to be more
involved in maintenance and management duties and in
providing services--despite the small amount of current
expenditures and the limited extent of the level of service.
The low investment figures indicate also that municipalities
do not extend those services that require investment and that
they are largely involved in administrative services that do
not require substantial investment.
48 Sectors and services in which municipalities engage most of their
activities cannot be identified by analyzing their current spending. A
sectoral distribution of current expenditure is not available in
municipalities' accounting.
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Table 5-14
Structure of Municipal Expenditures, 1981 and 1987.
(percent)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expenditures 1981 1987
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Expenditures 62% 66%
Capital Expenditures 38% 34%
Real Total Expenditures 100% 100%
(1) Wages to personnel 37% 37%
(2) Maintenance & Management 16% 20%
(3) Direct Investment 35% 28%
(4) Debt Service 2 % 5 %
(5) Other 10% 10%
Real Total Expenditures 100% 100%
Real Total Expenditure 67.2 121.5
Millions of current TD
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance,
Tunisia.
Despite their small volume, municipalities' investments
are made in a relatively large number of sectors. Table 5-15
provides an overview of the distribution by sector of direct
capital expenditures. Some key issues appear from this
analysis: Investments in municipal buildings, which include
investments in markets and slaughter houses, represent 30% of
capital expenditures. Municipalities' involvement in the area
of market and slaughter house is motivated by the fact that
such investments are directly productive. They generate
income for municipalities through indirect taxation and
increase their financial autonomy, while at the same time
promoting some form of local development. Investments in
roads and sidewalks are the second item in this list--23% of
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total investments. Combined with street lighting, which
accounts for 9% of the total, investment in this sector
represent 32% of total investments. This confirms the fact
that street and sidewalk construction and street lighting are
among the most important activities funded by municipalities.
Table 5-15
Sectoral Distribution of Average Direct Investment
Expenditures between 1981 and 1987.
(percent)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share of investment
Expenditures expenditures by type
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Municipal Buildings 30%
Road and Sidewalks 23%
Street Lighting 9 %
Housing 9%
Purchase Vehicles & Equipment 9 %
Environmental Sanitation 4 %
Sewerage 3 %
Purchase of Land 3%
Expropriation 2 %
Miscellaneous 8 %
Total 100%
Average Direct Investment
Millions of current TD 29
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Averages are calculated on the basis of yearly percentages, for
1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.
Sources: Calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance,
Tunisia.
Evaluating municipalities' activities through investment
expenditures is certainly biased against the services, which
do not require heavy investment. This is the case, for
example, of solid waste disposal, which can be considered to
be one of the most important services provided by
municipalities.
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CONCLUSION
Municipalities are still endowed with very few good
taxes and a large number of insignificant ones. With the
exception of the rental-value tax, the establishment tax, and
the market fees, most taxes generate low levels of revenues.
Even those that constitute municipalities main own revenue
sources still require some improvements. The reform has
touched only a limited number of them, and often the
transformations were not sufficient for these taxes to
generate significant revenues.
It becomes evident after the review of the transfer
system and of MOR that the 1975 reform of municipalities
revenues focused primarily on external sources of revenues to
the municipalities, that is, revenue sources under the
authority of the central government. Transfers account for
most of the increase in municipalities revenues, and the
newly created taxes on establishments and hotels are totally
managed by the central government. Only the 1976 decree aims
at improving those revenues which are under municipalities
authority, but the changes introduced by this decree were
insufficient to provide municipalities with significant
revenue sources.
There has been no serious analysis of the usefulness of
most municipal taxes, nor was the potential of alternative
taxes investigated. This limited focus on external sources
indicates a lack of understanding of the various aspects of
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the municipal revenue structure and unwillingness to get
deeper into the reform. The reform has provided
municipalities with additional resources but has failed to
develop municipalities' mechanisms for generating their own
revenues. Moreover, municipalities continue to have very
limited autonomy over local taxes. They have a very limited
role in fixing the bases and rates of all taxes and the user
fees.
Despite the improvement brought by the reform, many
deficiencies remain in the municipal lending system. The
CPSCL limited resources and poor management practices
preclude adequate lending activities. It is not surprising
to find, in view of this fact, that loan revenues remain
modest. The CPSCL still does not play the role of a
financial institution that promote efficient use of
resources.
More than revenues, expenditures express the limited
level of activities of the municipalities. By the size of
the current and capital budgets, we can conclude that
municipalities' primary role continues to be geared towards
the delivery of services. This is in spite of the various
efforts made by the central government to stimulate local
investments. Road construction and street lighting are the
primary areas of investments of local government.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION OF THE FINANCIAL REFORM
The analysis of the financial reform has clearly
demonstrated that despite substantial improvements in some
revenue sources and in the financial management of
municipalities, the reform contains many limitations and
failed to provide local governments with the necessary
financial structure to support the decentralization
objective.
The reform has been successful at providing
municipalities with a relatively well-functioning transfer
system with increasing revenues. It has created two new
taxes which also bring substantial revenues to local
governments and has improved municipal financial management
by reforming the budgeting and accounting system.
The reform failed to provide local officials with
significant authority over revenue-raising activities. It
provided little improvement to revenues sources managed by
municipalities themselves, such as local taxes, tariffs, and
fees, and has potentially increased municipalities dependency
over the central government, by concentrating on improving
centrally managed revenue sources that are transferred to
them. Finally, the central government keeps a strong control
over all financial decisions.
From these findings and the findings of the previous
chapter on the analysis of reformed legislation, we can
conclude that not much decentralization has occurred in
Tunisia. The reformed legislation did not provide
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municipalities with the legal base necessary to become the
decentralized unit of governments. Their role and
responsibilities are ambiguously defined, and no new function
has effectively been transferred to them by the reform.
Their financial structure, although substantially improved,
is far from that of a decentralized government unit.
The failure of the reform can be attributed to the
hesitation and lack of clear political commitment to
decentralization. It is a reform that has improved local
governments operations, but is far from meeting the goals it
set to achieve.
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ANNEX 5-1
LOCAL TAXES AND FEES
Property taxes have not been affected by the reform,
despite their importance and the need for their improvement.
There are two property taxes: The rental-value tax and the
unbuilt-land tax.
RENTAL-VALUE TAX
The rental-value tax (RVT) is one of the most important
sources of revenue in the hands of municipalities,
representing 45.7% of total direct taxes. Municipalities
generate close to 20% of their own revenues from this tax
alone.
Its importance comes also from the fact that it is the
closest to being purely a local tax. Local officials are
responsible for the assessment procedures, which gives them
some level of leverage and autonomy over the tax. It is also
a long-standing tax, well-known to the tax payers, and the
focus of a lot of public attention at the local level.
Assessments by the municipalities are often contested. This
creates one of the most important forums for contact between
local officials and local tax payers.
The RVT is a property tax applied to buildings. It is
based on the rental value of the property and is imposed on
the owner of the building. Attached to the rental value are
a series of less important taxes designated as taxes for
services rendered (which include a sanitation tax). They
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have the same base, and their proceeds are aggregated with
those of the RVT. The maximum rates--of the RVT and all the
assimilated taxes--are set by a national law and vary
according to the type and age of the building.
Municipalities are free to set any rate lower than the
maximum allowed. This is where part of their limited
authority over the tax lies. In practice, they always use
the maximum rates. The rates applied vary, however, between
14% and 44% of the rental value depending on the age of the
property and the type of building (Sides et al., 1988, p.
88).
Assessments of rental values are the responsibility of
the local governments. They are conducted every three years
by a commission composed of municipal agents from the office
of the tax collector. The collection is the responsibility
of the local tax collector, an official of the Ministry of
Finance. Despite the attention and time local officials
allocate administrating this tax, the RVT is, in fact,
underutilized and generates only a portion of the revenues it
could generate.
Sides et al. (1989) estimate that the average revenue
per capita of the RVT was TD 3 in 1989, is less than the
average cost of garbage-collection service per capita, which
is only one of the services that is supposed to be financed
by beneficiaries through the RVT. The yield of RVT revenues
appears high only because the other municipalities' revenue
sources are so insignificant.
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There are several reasons explaining the low yield of
the tax. Most of them were identified many years ago and
are mentioned in several analyses and reform proposals of the
RVT made in the last decade by or for the Ministry of the
Interior, 4 9 but not much effort has ever been directed at
resolving these problems. The District of Tunis' 1980s
reform proposal for the RVT mentions that the performance of
the tax was deteriorating instead of improving in the late
1970s: the assessed tax base had dropped by 11.6% between
1976 and 1978 due to assessment problems, the collection rate
fell to 65% in 1978 from 87% in 1976--if arrears are taken
into account, the collection rate had fallen to 40% by 1978.
It is estimated that the municipalities are owed several
million TD under this heading (GOT, 1980).
The primary reason for the low RVT yield is the
arbitrary differentiation made between the rates applied to
owner-occupied properties and the others (World Bank, 1987).
For some ideological reasons, not even supported by the
legislation, owner-occupied units are taxed at lower rates
than other properties. This practice is deeply rooted in
Tunisia. It is estimated that owner-occupied properties
account for 80% of all properties in Tunisia (Sides et al.,
1989, p. 93), and large amounts of potential revenues are
lost because of this. Significant improvements to the RVT
49 Among others are (i) District of Tunis (1980) La tax sur la
valeur locative. Proposition de reforme Ministry of the Interior,
Tunis, Tunisia. (ii) World Bank, 1987. (iii) Sides et al. , 1989.
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revenues could be made by just eliminating this arbitrary
differentiation. This is not, however, the only explanation
for the low yield of the RVT.
Most property owners contest the assessment of the base
and rates of properties made by the assessment commission,
and most valuation appeals are successful. There is a real
tradition of contesting, which generally results in a
revision downward of the assessment. Local officials
allocate a lot of time and effort to receiving individually
all the claims and deciding upon them.
Tax evasion is another reason for the low yield of the
RVT. The perceived inequities resulting from these
assessments and reassessment activities create many
unsatisfied property owners who refuse to pay. Arrears have
been building up over the years, and local officials have
difficulties enforcing payments.
Enforcement measures exist but have remained unused
(GOT, 1980). Tax evasion reflects also the well-known
understaffing of the tax-collection offices under the
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance.
Inadequate assessment practices is another problem of
the RVT management. In addition to the well-known
difficulties of assessing rental values of properties, the
assessors are faced with difficulties of old methods,
insufficient and low-skilled personnel, and a complex system
with too many cases and rates.
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The financial reform has completely ignored the RVT
despite its importance and despite the obvious need for
improvement, leaving one of the most important revenue
sources of municipalities under-utilized. We are uncertain
as to why such reforms were never implemented.
UNBUILT LAND TAX
The rental-value tax is applied to developed properties.
Undeveloped land, in Tunisia, is theoretically taxed by the
Unbuilt-Land Tax (ULT), which is a local tax. It is managed
at the local level by the municipalities and the local tax
offices for assessment and collection with base (land market
value) and rates (0.6% of that value maximum) being fixed by
the central government.
Despite its importance as a potential source of revenue,
the ULT generates almost no revenues for the municipalities.
Its proceeds were only 0.25 millions TD (current) in 1985,
which represents 1.4% of all the direct tax revenues for the
same year (see Table 5-4). Low yields are caused by the fact
that very few land transactions are recorded, due to high
transaction fees that land owners want to avoid, and that
many titles are frozen, thus making it impossible to impose
the tax and prosecute tax evaders. Improving the ULT would
necessitate a reform of the relevant legislation and updating
of the cadastre, solutions that are outside the municipal
system.
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Without underestimating the difficulties of improving a
property-tax structure, we think that there were different
actions possible that could have improved the management of
the existing property taxes and consequently increased their
yield. Such actions could have involved the improvement of
municipalities and local tax offices capacity to manage these
taxes for example, or a reform of the assessment practice,
etc. Despite the clear knowledge of the deficiencies of the
system, officials made no improvement at the time of the
reform. Only very recently, with the current reform project
by the Ministry of the Interior and the World Bank (which is
still in a draft form), did they begin a reform of these
taxes.
OTHER DIRECT TAXES
Other direct taxes include a series of insignificant
taxes, most of which are little used by the municipalities
and generate few revenues. They represented less than 10% of
all direct tax revenues in 1985, or TD 1.77 Millions (see
Table 5-4). They consist of a tax on animal-drawn vehicles,
a license fee for retail beverage outlets, a tax on animal
hides, and a tax for administrative services. This listing
clearly illustrates the fact that half of these taxes are old
and obsolete taxes that have little significance today--the
tax on animal-drawn vehicles in particular.
Other taxes in this group--namely, the tax for
administrative services--are more relevant to municipalities
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revenues as they constitute fees for service rendered or
taxes for regulatory purposes. Their low yield is explained
mostly by the low rates imposed and, in some cases, the
complexity of their assessment and collection procedures.
It is interesting to see that these taxes, which clearly
require major reforms, were not dealt with in 1975 or in the
following years. Old and outdated taxes should have been
eliminated or replaced, and taxes or fees for services
rendered should have been reviewed and increased to reflect
the cost that these services incur to municipalities. It
indicates that the reformers did not have a comprehensive
approach towards municipal own revenues.
INDIRECT TAXES
Most indirect tax' revenues can be regrouped under the
rubric of taxes from markets and slaughter houses. These
fees and taxes are numerous and varied: They consist of a
series of taxes and fees on all activities that take place in
the market places. They include a range of miscellaneous
items--auction fees, vendors' licenses, fees for the use of
market facilities etc.--all related to market activities.
These taxes account for virtually all indirect tax revenues
(83% in 1985). Revenues from markets alone brought in almost
8 million TD in the same year, a receipt that is comparable
to the proceeds of the rental-value tax. It is more
important than the establishment tax. (See Tables 5-4 and 5-
5)
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All other indirect taxes provide insignificant revenue
sources to municipalities. Taxes under this heading are
often closer to user fees than taxes. They include taxes on
the use of public domain, electricity surcharges, and
entertainment taxes.
The taxes on the use of public domain are fees levied
for the use (occupation) of streets and public spaces for
private non-economic activities. 5 0 It is the second source of
revenue (1.03 TD Millions current in 1985, 8%) of indirect
taxes--although it is ten times less than the income from
markets and slaughter houses combined. Local officials are
given some authority over this tax. They set the regulation
for the use of streets and choose which item to tax and at
which rate from a fixed list established by the central
government. They submit their decisions for approval to the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Equipment.
Their authority is also restricted by maximum rates fixed by
law for all municipalities.
The electricity surcharge yields limited revenues to the
municipalities--TD 0.8 millions current in 1985, less than 7%
of indirect tax revenues. It consists of a surcharge on the
subscribers of the national authority for electricity (STEG)
above the charges for their own consumption. It is collected
by STEG. The proceeds of the surcharge are used first to
50 The fees consist of three parts: (i) a fee for the first time use of
space, (ii) a periodic fee, applicable through out the occupancy, and
(iii) a special fee for the use of machinery.
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finance the cost incurred by municipalities for their
electricity consumption. The surplus is paid theoretically
to the municipalities for their investment in electrification
work. In practice, the surcharge falls short of covering
these costs, indicating clearly the need for a review of the
rate or a reform of the municipalities electricity financing.
Entertainment taxes yield limited revenues (TD 0.2
Millions in 1985, (see Table 5-5). Their structure is also
often relatively outdated. Some of the taxable items date
from the colonial period--fees on public balls for example.
From this review we can conclude that the reform of
indirect taxation remains relatively superficial. The 1976
decree was limited to detailed changes in only some rates,
and the simplification of some procedures. They were the
first changes introduced to indirect taxation since 1958 and
did provoke a sudden rise in the level of revenues of
indirect taxes of municipalities. They did not involve,
however, any fundamental revision of this tax structure and
failed to reform a system that was deeply outdated and
unnecessarily complex.
Indirect taxes, including taxes on market activities and
slaughter houses continue to be governed by a large number of
complex regulations, scales, and rates that make them
difficult to administer (World Bank, 1987, p. 67). This
large number of legal provisions and their complexity also
led municipalities to different interpretations of their
legislation.
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USER FEES
User fees amount to only TD 5.8 millions in 1987, which
represents 10% of MOR. More important is the fact that it is
the only revenue source with a negative average growth rate
for the 1975-1987 period. In the first years following the
reform, user fee revenues dropped by about 40%. The average
growth rate, for the 1975-1979, was 1.5%. (See Table 5-3.)
There are about 10 different charges under this heading,
among which are: repayment and contribution for road and
sewerage construction and repair, fees from the issuance of
birth, marriage and death certificates, and income from
kindergartens.
User fees are also governed by complex, numerous, and
difficult to interpret regulations. The low volume of
receipts under this heading indicates that municipalities
earn little from the services they provide. The rates,
revised and increased in 1976, are still low and a number of
user fees were abolished by the 1976 decree, leaving
municipalities with no revenues to offset expenses of the
related services. This partially explains the negative
growth rate of aggregate user fees revenues just after the
reform. The restructuring of the remaining fees with
increases in rates was insufficient to compensate for the
loss of these revenue sources. The following period (1979-
1983) has been marked by an overall decline of this revenue
sources (-8.5% per year). User fees started increasing,
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first at a slow pace (1.4% per year between 1983-1985) when
most revenue sources were in decline, and then at a much
faster pace (11.3% 1983-1985), as part of the revival of
municipalities' own revenues. (See Table 5-3.)
INCOME FROM PROPERTY
Income from municipal properties was about TD 10.53
Millions in 1988, representing 17% of MOR. They consist of
revenues from either rent or sale of municipalities'
properties, each accounting for half of total revenues under
this heading in 1985.
From 1975 to 1987, income from municipal properties has
increased at a rapid rate of 7% per year on average. This
figure conceals the fact that this source of revenue has had
a very sharp growth rate between 1975 and 1979 (29.5% per
year on average) and since then has been declining at more
than 3% per year on average. (See Table 5-3.)
We assume that the sharp increase following the reform
was caused by sales rather than leasing properties.
Municipalities public and private assets are relatively
limited. Few municipalities buy land or build rental housing
that has not been proven financially beneficial in the past.
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CHAPTER 6
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN
TUNISIA
In the three preceding chapters, through the evaluation
of the decentralization efforts, we have seen the limited
involvement of municipalities in public activities and in the
provision of local public services of their locality. We
have also seen that only a few functions were given to
municipalities by law. The financial analysis confirmed the
minimal level of intervention of municipalities. Despite the
decentralization reform, no new functions were decentralized,
and their role remained unclearly defined by the legislation.
An alternative way of understanding the role of local
governments is to review their role relative to the overall
institutional framework for provision of local public
services.5 1 This review will clarify the position of
municipalities amid this institutional structure and the
rational for the allocation of local services to the various
institutions other than the municipalities. From this
analysis we will not only confirm the limited role of
municipalities in the provision of local public services
(LPS), but also reveal the government of Tunisia's (GOT)
actual tendency to centralize these services. We found that
there has been a general tendency for the local public
51 This analysis is based on interviews that we have conducted with
officials of the various institutions involved in the provision of local
public services, a review of their by-laws, and a review of various
documents and reports on these services.
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services to be placed under national public authorities for
provision. The centralization has occurred during and even
after the declaration by the central government of their
desire to decentralize, at the beginning of the 1975 reform.
We also found that, although the municipalities are left
with only a few responsibilities, many of those are still
handled by the central government and that the functions
fully provided by municipalities are limited to a handful,
largely related to the cleaning, maintenance, and management
of public space. This analysis indicates that the priority
of the central government is not to provide the local
governments with a more important role, and that no concrete
action is being taken to involve municipalities in the public
functions of the country.
Why? We will try to answer this question in our next
chapter by analyzing the reasons for the creation of one of
these public institutions and the process of centralization.
LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES
Our first task, in this chapter, is to define, briefly,
what is a local public service, using two types of
definition. First, we will give the definition of local
public services in economic theory, and second, the
definition that reflects practice, that is, generally what is
considered traditionally as a local public service. Neither
of these definitions will provide us with an exhaustive or
precise list of local functions. We have already mentioned
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the difficulty of classifying rigorously functions according
to the economic theory (into public and private functions,
and into local and national ones). Neither does world-wide
practice provide us with an agreed-upon picture. Countries
have different perceptions of what is a local public service
and different traditions in allocating functions among
various levels of governments. This review will give us,
however, a sense of what is a LPS and a base to start the
review of the Tunisian case.
The definition of LPS provided by economic theory starts
with the theory of public goods, which defines the role of
the government. By definition, public goods are
characterized by nonrivalry in consumption and
nonexcludability, which makes impossible their provision
through market mechanisms. Private suppliers are replaced by
the public sector, and the financing of these goods is
achieved through taxation. Aggregate demand is substituted
by some form of collective choice, expressed by a political
process, such as voting.
Fiscal federalism theorists provide the theory
concerning the division of responsibilities over the
provision of these public goods between central and local
governments. They define the appropriate allocation of
functions between levels of governments on the basis of the
geographical impact of these goods and services. Public
activities that have a national economic impact are those
activities that confer benefits to the nation as a whole and
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must be conducted at the national level. They typically
include stabilization policy, national defense,
redistribution activities and so on. Left to the local and
regional governments is the provision of public goods whose
impact, or whose area of benefits, is much smaller than the
entire country. The primary advantage to having subnational
governments conduct these activities is a closer adaptation
to the preferences of the community and, therefore, it is
argued, a more efficient allocation of resources than if
provided by the central government.
Among the recognized drawbacks of these theories is the
difficulty of classifying goods between public and private
ones because many of the so-called public goods have some
degree of "privateness." Moreover, it is also difficult to
define precisely the sphere of influence of these goods and
services. They can generate spill-over effects outside their
locality and may necessitate some control of these inter-
jurisdictional externalities. Also, the optimal size of
production may vary from one good to another and, as a
result, conflict with the boundary defined by another's zone
of influence. These difficulties in establishing the perfect
division of government activities among several levels of
government have led to the formulation of a variety of
solutions, such as shared responsibility between levels of
government and shared financing through intergovernmental
transfers.
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It is, therefore, not surprising to see that, in
practice, countries have different interpretations of what is
a local public good as well as the degree of their
"publicness" and "localness . " Functions under local
government's responsibility vary considerably across
countries "... the duties of municipalities vary enormously.
There are a few things which most municipalities do" (Davey,
1989, p. 15.) Among the services that are almost invariably
provided locally are garbage collection, street construction
and maintenance, maintenance of parks and recreational areas,
and cleaning and maintenance of all public spaces. The
allocation of other local functions varies considerably among
countries. In the case of social services, such as health
and education, primary education is typically the
responsibility of local governments, while secondary and
higher education are provided by the central government.
Primary health care is, at times, handled in local health
centers by the local government, while hospitals are almost
invariably under the central government responsibility. In
some cases, local governments are limited to the building and
maintenance of facilities for these services.
In the case of public utilities, the distribution part
of the service is theoretically a local service because the
impact of the service is very local. We find that the
distribution of water and sewerage services, more often than
electricity supply, are provided by local governments. For
electricity supply, when the production and transportation
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parts of the services are centralized and nationalized as a
strategic economic sector for the country then the central
government tends also to take over the distribution of
electricity. Road infrastructure is usually divided between
different levels of government: municipalities are often
active participants in the provision of infrastructure.
Local governments also take responsibility for transportation
services, although they are more frequently provided by local
public authorities or are subcontracted to the private
sector.
Housing and land development are among the functions
often cited as part of local responsibility. The extent and
form of local government's involvement in these services vary
considerably across countries. Land regulation and the
control over urban development are more systematically the
responsibility of local governments.
This overview provides a list of functions that are
traditionally considered as local. Variations in country
parameters make international comparison of the allocation of
public services between levels of governments difficult.
THE TUNISIAN CASE
Let us now turn to the Tunisian case. In Figure 6-1, we
have summarized all the local functions, cited above,
according to their system of delivery in Tunisia. We have
chosen to limit the subdivisions in types of delivery system
to five particularly significant ones. At the central level,
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we differentiate between the delivery of services by
ministries and the delivery by national autonomous
institutions. At the local level, we differentiate between
services directly financed through local funds and services
provided by the municipalities on behalf of a central
authority and financed through central government grants.
The services provided by the municipalities with their own
funds are subdivided into two more categories: the services
provided in-house by municipalities--we call it on force
account (FA)--and those delegated to another institution or
subcontracted to the private sector (Subcont).
Note that having authority over a service does not
necessarily mean providing it, nor does providing a service
imply having authority over it. Central or local governments
that have authority over the service can provide it through
many different arrangements: they can provide it in-house by
their own services, they can delegate it or subcontract it to
another public or private institution, or they can regulate
it, depending on the level of public intervention and control
in the sector they choose to impose. The financing of the
service can also take many forms depending on the arrangement
chosen for the provision of the service.
In Table 6-1, we differentiate between the institutions
that have authority over the service (@) from those who
participate in its provision with various degrees of
involvement and under different arrangements (A).
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Figure 6-1
Allocation of Local Public Services Between Central and Local
Governments in Tunisia
Central Government Local Governments
Ministries Autonomous Financed through
Institutions Local Funds Tied-Grants
FA Subcont.
Education
School Maintenance A
Health
Electricity and Gaz
Water supply
Production/Distribution K
Water Points
Waste Water Disposal
Collection @
Treatment K
Solid Waste Disposal
Road Infrastructure
Primary Network @
Secondary/Tertiary Network A
Street construction and management
Traffic Control
Public Lighting
Construction and maintenance
Transportation
Urban Transportation @
Rail, Air Transport, Ports @9
Physical Planning
PDU
PAU A A
PAD A A
Housing and Urban Development
New @
Rehabilitation
Land Management
Building Permits and Urbanization Control
Control over use of public space
Public safety @
Recreational areas K
Cultural and sports facilities
Food and Wholesale Markets I
Police
Fire Fighting
Worship
Mosques construction A
Cemetery Maintenance A
Notes: (i) In this table, the list of services was chosen to highlight municipal involvement
in local public services and does not represent a balanced breakdown and subdivision of
services. Services under municipalities are described in more detail than others.
(ii) FA : Provided on Force Account, that is, by municipal services.
Subcont: Subcontracted.
K Authority over the service.
A Participation in the provision of the service.
Source: This table is based on our analysis of the Tunisian local public services.
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From this table, we can see that municipalities do
intervene in almost all sectors of activities at the local
level. However, a closer look at their activities reveals
that their level of involvement in most of these sectors is
restricted to some marginal functions. Municipalities
participate in many functions, but they have complete
authority over only a few. We will also see, in the
following analysis, that among those under their authority,
some are performed by the central government because
municipalities lack the necessary financial and human
resources to implement them. On the other hand,
municipalities do perform some functions that are not under
their authority, on behalf of the central government. These
activities remain, however, very restricted.
DECENTRALIZED LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES
We start by reviewing those functions that do fall under
the municipalities authority: the most important functions
are local road construction and maintenance, garbage
collection, control over food market activities, and
functions related to urban planning and to the control of
urban development. In parts of the country not serviced by
the national sewerage authority, municipalities provide some
form of sewerage service. Finally, municipalities are
responsible for a series of minor functions that can be
grouped under the general heading of "control over public
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spaces. " Their actions range from environmental control to
management of the use of public spaces.
Note that municipalities are not always capable of
independently performing all the functions attributed to them
by law. Some municipalities delegate functions under their
authority to the central government or to other centralized
institutions when they perceive themselves as incapable of
providing them. We will define these functions as local
functions under partial control of the central government.
Municipal Functions Under Partial Control of the
Central Government
These functions include road infrastructure service and
urban planning, two of the most significant municipal
functions.
Road and Street Infrastructure
The municipalities are responsible for the secondary and
tertiary road networks, which include intra-regional road-
networks and urban road-networks (article 123 chapter II of
the LODC)5 2 . They are also responsible for all street-related
arrangements, i.e., park and recreational areas, street
lighting and, traffic regulations (see Annex 6-1). The
Ministry of Equipment and Housing (MEH) is responsible for
financing construction and maintenance of the primary road-
52 Article 121, Chapter II of the LODC defines the municipal domain. It
includes: (i) all open urban spaces, such as streets, squares, gardens,
urban road networks and secondary road networks; and, (ii) all land
supporting public-utilities' networks.
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network, that is, all inter-regional roads also called
national roads. The primary road-network is financed by
national taxes, and the MEH receives an annual budget from
the central government budget for road construction and
maintenance.
By law, the secondary network is financed by municipal
funds and the municipalities do the construction (Article
129, Chapter III of the LODC) . Also, by law, the tertiary
network is built and maintained by the municipalities, and
its cost is recovered from the beneficiaries, the owner of
the lots bordering the tertiary network (Article 132).
In practice, however, the division of responsibilities
between the central, the regional, and the local government
is not so clear. Municipalities are rarely able to recover
their cost when they fund the investment of the tertiary
network themselves. This creates a serious constraint on
their ability to provide the infrastructure. Consequently,
private or public developers often fund the construction of
the tertiary network, which they then deliver to the
municipalities for management and maintenance. In these
cases, the developers recover their cost from the
beneficiaries at the time of the sale of the lot or the unit.
Many municipalities also delegate their responsibility
over secondary road networks. When they feel that they do
not have the necessary financial resources, and the technical
expertise to assume their function, they call upon the MEH.
The assistance that the MEH provides to the municipalities
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varies from grants, technical assistance, and equipment, to a
combination of all three. Typically, the regional services
of the MEH agree upon an arrangement; for example, the
municipality takes the financial responsibility for the
construction material, and the MEH for all other costs, while
the external services of the governorate undertakes the
construction work. 53 Generally, both parties are constrained
financially, and negotiations take place before the
agreement.
The MEH assistance is provided without affecting the
classification of the road. By law, the secondary road
network remains the property of the municipalities,
independently of who provided it. By that fact, the
responsibility for its maintenance remains also under the
municipalities, but municipalities often have many
difficulties paying for even the maintenance.
This partial centralization of the service is a useful
solution to the lack of municipal resources and expertise.
It provides a flexible arrangement, which insures the
provision of the service when municipalities find themselves
unable to do so, but without reducing their authority: The
service is only temporarily transferred to the central
government, while remaining under full local control. The
danger remains, however, that this partial centralization
could be the first step to a full centralization of the
53 For a detailed description of the external services to the
governorate, see chapter 3.
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service if it is not accompanied with sufficient efforts to
improve municipal resources and expertise.
Planning Functions
A similar situation to that of the road infrastructure
exists with regards to the urban-planning functions.
Municipalities are provided with some authority over the
urban-development process, but they are often incapable of
assuming these responsibilities. Tunisia has an extensive
planning process, which ranges from national economic plans
to local spatial plans. The central government undertakes
all national economic planning and regional planning.
Municipalities share, with the other levels of government,
the tasks of urban planning, which give them some control
over the urbanization process.
Urban planning and land use is governed by the urban
code, a statute-book defining the legislation for urban
development established in 1979. The code distinguishes
three different urban planning levels: First, the Plan
Directeur d'Urbanisme (PUD), an urban master plan, gives the
overriding orientation to spatial urban development. It is
the responsibility of the MEH. Second, the Plan
d'Amenagement Urbain (PAU), the urban physical plan, fixes
the land-use regulation for the entire municipal territory
based on the PUD, and third, the Plan d'Amenagement de
Details (PAD) a detailed physical plan based on the PAU.
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Both the PAD and the PAU constitute the sole legal documents
for municipal land use.
Municipalities intervene only on the PAU and the PAD. 5 4
By law, both plans are under their responsibility. The PAU
is, however, established by the MEH on behalf of the
municipalities, with their collaboration and that of the
governorates, and is then submitted for comments and approval
to the municipal council. The MEH has overriding authority
over the PAU, however. He can disregard the comments of the
council. Once approved, the enforcement of the PAU becomes
the responsibility of the municipalities.
Municipalities do have more authority over the PAD than
over the PAU. They are responsible for its preparation.
They establish the plan themselves either in-house with their
own technical staff or by subcontracting it to a private
planning firm. They can also delegate the functions to the
central government while maintaining ultimate authority over
the plan. There are still many municipalities who lack both
the technical expertise and the resources to establish the
plan, and who delegate their responsibility to the central
government. To be enforceable the PAD needs the approval of
the supervisory authority, the Ministry of Equipment. Once
54 Note that the municipalities of the metropolitan area of Tunis have
transferred their responsibility over the planning functions to a
planning institution, District of Tunis, which was created in 1972 for
the coordination of all planning efforts of the area of Tunis. This
institution is under the jurisdiction of the governorate.
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approved, the PAD with the PAU form the legal base for land
use and urban development.
This institutional arrangement shows the intent of the
central government to make municipalities active participants
in the planning and urban-development process: the PAD is
under their responsibility, and the PAU is to be approved by
the municipal council. What could have been an effective
authority over the urban-development process is, however,
severely eroded by three factors: First, the ultimate
authority over the plans remains in the hands of the central
government. It is the MEH who has the final word. Second,
planning processes are almost entirely carried out at the
central and regional level, as many municipalities continue
to delegate their responsibility to the MEH. Through these
institutional arrangements, municipalities lose all
opportunities to define an urban-development policy for
themselves. Third, municipalities are left with the
responsibility of implementing the plans, a task of
management and coordination among the various actors in the
urban-development processes. The erosion of municipal
authority is even more evident in this case. Too often
municipalities find themselves unable to enforce the plans
and control the urban-development process.
There are many factors that explain the failure of the
municipalities to impose their authority over the urban-
development process. One of the most significant ones is the
lack of the funds required for land acquisition for public
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utilities, roads, and recreational areas provided by the
plan, for the provision of trunk infrastructure, such as
secondary roads, and for new urban development. The
legislation does not allow municipalities to recover the
costs of trunk infrastructure, nor does it allow them to
borrow for land purchases. These early investments have to
be financed by the available funds in the municipalities'
yearly budgets which, as we have seen, are limited. Also,
the municipalities' right to freeze development of the land
necessary for public use is contingent upon the availability
of the resources necessary to purchase them. By the time the
funds are available, the land is often already developed
illegally. As a result, the plans are rapidly outdated and
in most urban centers, municipalities are faced with the
difficult task--which remains often nonachieved--of keeping
them up-to-date.
The process defined by Enaifer (1986) as the
"sectorization" and "autonomization" of the urban-development
processes in Tunisia also reduces municipalities' authority
over the implementation of the plans and the control of
urbanization. These processes are characterized by a
multiplicity of centralized institutions, each awarded with a
high level of autonomy and important authority over their
sector (we will review these institutions in detail in the
second part of this chapter). Many of them have a monopoly
position in their sector, including in the elaboration of
their plans for extension of their infrastructure. Although
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by law the various institutions' own plans must be within the
bounds of the urban plans, it is not rare for these
institutions to consider the urban plans inappropriate to
their service and to act independently as a result.
Municipalities have complained repeatedly in the past that
institutions, central and others, act on their territory
without any prior consultation. 5 5
The different actors in the urban-development process
give insufficient attention to the urban plans and to the
coordinating role of the local governments. Enaifer
describes the Tunisian system as one in which centralized
institutions have a distorted perception of their position
and their role in the global system of urban development.
The role of the municipalities and the usefulness of their
planning tools are dismissed (Enaifer, 1986, p. 5. )56
Several examples illustrate this point. Ministries
follow their agenda and act according to their own policy
objectives; they launch programs and implement projects
without taking into account their implications for urban
development and their conformity with the planning documents.
Enaifer explains, for example, that the creation of
infrastructure and facilities have had a structural impact on
the country as a whole. The creation of a transportation
network influenced the rate and direction of the
urbanization. Rural-electrification programs, which are
55 From interviews of government officials conducted in January 1989.
56 La gestion des plans d'amnagement communaux.
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intended to improve rural living conditions, have encouraged
and accelerated illegal urban developments in rural areas.
It is estimated that rural electrification programs are the
primary cause for the importance of illegal construction in
some rural areas and the transformation of rural areas into
urban zones (Enaifer, 1986, pp. 6-7).
The land-development institutions have also transgressed
the urban plans. They were awarded tremendous power, which
allowed them to act totally independently. Faced with
increasing demand and having to search for cheap land, they
constituted important land reserves in areas outside the
urban perimeter, which they have developed. These land
reserves violate the plans and, eventually, led to more
uncontrolled urban growth (Enaifer, 1988, p. 7). Under the
current legislation, the land institutions are under the
jurisdiction of three different ministries, each with
different agendas and development policies.
Finally, utility companies--electricity, water, and
sewerage companies--have in the past established their own
extension plans which did not conform to the planning
documents. They claim the plans were insufficient or
outdated or that the coordination process was inefficient.
These acts were more frequent in the past than they are now.
Municipalities have continually reminded the utility
companies of the necessity to coordinate, which has
eventually led to a better planning coordination between
them.
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Functions Under the Full Authority of Municipalities
Only a few functions are left to the full responsibility
of the municipalities. The majority of them could be
classified under the general headings of control over public
space and environmental protection--the most important of
which is garbage collection. Another set of responsibilities
is the regulation and control of markets and slaughter
houses, which are among the oldest activities of
municipalities. Also, municipalities do provide traffic-
management services and street lighting as part of their
overall responsibility for street network and public safety.
Garbage Collection and Environmental Control
Garbage collection is the only public service to be
under the full responsibility of municipalities, despite the
fact that relevant legislation does not specify these
responsibilities for municipalities. Nevertheless, all
municipalities provide this service that they run in house,
on force account. The service is entirely financed by local
funds and each municipality has its own equipment and
personnel.
The municipal legislation, the LODC lists a series of
other functions concerned with environmental control over
public spaces that fall to the mayors. They consist,
essentially, of public-safety and public-hygiene
responsibilities. They range from the protection against
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dangerous materials in public spaces to the prevention
against disasters, such as fire, floods, and plagues.
Municipalities have also some responsibilities that fall
in the category of public health. They launch and finance
public-hygiene campaigns--such as pest eradication and rat
extermination--and are responsible for controlling the
potential spread of contagious diseases.
Markets and Slaughter Houses
Municipalities intervene for regulation and control
purposes in food-markets and for hygiene purposes in
slaughter-houses. Municipalities do have a strong interest
in fostering market activities, as they reap a substantial
amount of revenue. They levy indirect taxes and fees on
markets, which represent the second most important revenue
source of municipalities. It is the only activity that
provides municipalities with some power over economic
activities in their territory, which helps them generate
substantial amounts of revenues.
Activities Financed by Central Government Grants
Finally, municipalities assume a series of functions on
behalf of the central government that are not legally under
their responsibility. These functions are financed by some
form of tied-grants from the central government called
Crddits D6ldguds in the nomenclature of the municipal
budgets. These tied-grants originally financed exceptional
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activities and projects that the central government delegated
to the municipalities (see Annex 6-2). Today, it is
increasingly used by the municipalities themselves to
initiate their own projects in sectors that are both within
and outside their usual responsibilities. The tied-grant
system is becoming a way for municipalities to raise
additional resources by requesting grants from the central
government. It is also a way for them to complement the
central government activities at the local level by helping
in the provision of facilities in sectors that are under
central authority. Finally, it is a way of increasing their
involvement in the public services at the local level.
CENTRALIZED LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES
All other local public services are centralized in
Tunisia. Our analysis led us to differentiate between two
types of centralized services: Those functions that are
centralized because they are perceived to be contributing to
national interest, and those that are centralized in an
effort to provide services more efficiently. In Tunisia, the
latter are also provided by national public authorities.
Centralized Services Based on National Interests
We define as services centralized on the basis of
national interests those services that have some of the
characteristics of local goods but are treated by the
government as national goods because their benefits are
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perceived to affect the nation as a whole. Among these
services we include education and health services. Both are
considered to be a national priority in Tunisia and are
provided by their respective Ministries.
Education
In Tunisia, education is first considered to be a public
good as it is provided almost entirely by the government.
Second, it is perceived to be a national good. From an
ideological point of view, human-resources formation is
considered to be an important component of economic and
social development. The country's policy towards education
aims at providing education for all, equitably across income
groups and across regions. It is therefore under the full
responsibility of the central government. The Ministry of
Education is in charge of all aspects of the service, from
infrastructure building to program setting and staff
management. The service is entirely financed through
national taxes and is provided free of charge.
Education illustrates better than any other service the
case of a local public good treated as a national good
because of externalities. The national impact of its
provision is perceived to outweigh its local impact.
Health
To a lesser extent, health service has some of the same
characteristics. The benefits of the service, a healthier
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population, is perceived to be part of the national
development effort in Tunisia. Equity in access to the
service across income groups and across regions is also an
important objective in the provision of the service. The
difference lies in that it is not provided exclusively by the
public sector and that it is not provided free of charge,
although it is highly subsidized.5 7 For the part of the
service that is provided by the public sector, the Ministry
of Health is in charge of the service and the subsidies come
from the national budget. Note that both health and
education services have always been centralized in Tunisia.
Historical precedent and political tradition play also an
important role in determining the allocation of
responsibilities between levels of governments.
Local governments have a very minor involvement in these
two sectors in Tunisia, unlike some developing countries
which have the primary education and primary health care
services under municipalities' responsibility. In Tunisia,
municipalities participate marginally in school maintenance
activities on the behalf of the Ministry of Education. These
activities are financed with transferred funds or tied grants
from the Ministry. They have no involvement in health
services, except for some minor role in public health, such
57 This is an example of a service in Tunisia that falls into the grey
area between a public good and private good and for which the public
part of the service is perceived to be a national good as opposed to a
local good.
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as pest eradication and the control of the spread of
contagious diseases.
Centralized Services Based on Provision Efficiency
We have grouped in this second category all local public
services, in Tunisia, that have been recently transferred to
a newly created public authority for their provision. The
government's motivation for transferring services to public
authorities was invariably the desire to improve and extend
the service by improving the financial and institutional
conditions of its provision. The created public authorities
have a similar status. They are awarded substantial
authority over the provision of the service, an autonomous
institutional structure with complete financial and
managerial autonomy, and they are allowed to replicate
private-sector management practices. In Tunisia, this
institutional model grew rapidly in popularity since
independence and a large number of public services were given
to such authorities. They include all utilities (electricity
and gas, water supply, and sewerage services), urban public
transportation, as well as housing and land development
services, and urban rehabilitation.
The growth of this institutional form of public-service
provision is certainly not specific to Tunisia. It is common
in many countries. In the last forty years, developing
countries have been in the process of building and renovating
their institutions, and state-owned enterprises were
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considered to be an appropriate institutional form for
government participation in the provision of public services
as well as in commercial and industrial activities
(Rondinelli, 1984, pp. 15-18).
The uniqueness of the Tunisian case is the systematic
centralization of the services at the time of creation of a
public authority for their provision. Although the services
were not always under the responsibility of municipalities at
the time of the institutional transformation, they were often
shared by institutions operating at the local level. The
newly created public authorities were systematically national
institutions attached to the central government, under the
jurisdiction of the relevant ministry.
Electricity and Gas
The electricity and gas sectors were the first services
to be centralized. In 1962, both services became the
responsibility of the Societ6 Tunisienne de 1'Electricits et
du Gaz (STEG) a state-owned industrial and commercial
company. Before then, the services were provided by several
companies under franchises. The sectors were almost entirely
nationalized a few years after independence, as energy was
considered to be strategic for the economy. In the
nationalization process, the services were also centralized.
The production and transportation parts of the service fall
into the category of national services. Their centralization
is therefore justified. The distribution part of the
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service, however, has all the characteristics of a local
service, but was centralized too.
Although not a monopoly, STEG does have a predominant
role in both electricity and gas services and, in particular,
in electricity. STEG is a public authority. It is defined
by law as a public institution with financial and managerial
autonomy and with the capacity to operate as an industrial
private enterprise. It is headed by a board of directors
with eight members, which has authority over the policy
orientation of the institution as well as all decisions
concerning financial, managerial, and administrative issues.
Decisions of major importance have to be approved apriori by
the Ministry of Economy, the supervisory authority of STEG,
while all financial and technical decisions are subject to an
aposteriori control.
The service is largely self-financed, with a progressive
rate structure and cross-subsidies between the various types
of consumers; however, STEG does receive some subsidies from
the government budget. The municipalities' involvement in
the sector is limited to some minor assistance to STEG, such
as the donation or sale of land at a very low cost for the
installation of transformers. Also, as part of their
responsibility over streets, they must provide street
lighting.
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Water Supply
The water supply was the second service to be
centralized. In 1968, the Soci6td Nationale d'Exploitation
et de Distribution des Eaux (SONEDE) was established, an
independent national agency for the management and
distribution of water. Water-resources management--the
collection and storage of water, the construction and
maintenance of dams, channels, and reservoirs--is under the
responsibility of two ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture
and the Ministry of Equipment. Water-resources management
can be classified as a national good and its centralization
is clearly justified. The distribution part of the service,
which fits the theoretical definition of a local good, is
also centralized, however. SONEDE has the authority over the
distribution of potable water. It has a monopoly over the
supply of water for domestic and industrial use.
Like STEG, SONEDE is a public authority. It is an
autonomous public institution, which has managerial and
financial autonomy. It, too, is run according to business
principles. An eleven-person board of directors heads the
authority and takes all major decisions concerning the
management and finances of the service. Because water supply
is considered in Tunisia as a socially sensitive sector, and
because SONEDE is a monopoly, it is subject to a thorough
supervision from its supervisory authorities, the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of Equipment. All decisions of
the board of directors concerning the budget, debt, tariff
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rates, and user charges, need the approval of the supervisory
authority to be enforceable. The ministries impose also an
aposteriori control over technical and financial matters.
Although SONEDE's objective is to become completely self-
financing, it still receives substantial subsidies from the
central government for its operation.
Municipalities do not hold any significant role in the
water-supply service in regions where SONEDE operates. At
times, they act as intermediaries to facilitate the
installation of piped water connections to private homes or
to solve procedural problems. In areas not serviced by
SONEDE, generally remote rural areas, municipalities,
occasionally, provide some alternative forms of services such
as public water pumps and wheels. These tasks, however, are
usually carried out by the governorates in rural zones that
are not administered by municipalities.
According to government officials, the centralization
and consolidation of the authority over the service into a
single institution was motivated by the fact that the
existing institutional structure was weak, fragmented, and
incapable of delivering the increasing needs for water
supply. The former institutional actors in the sector,
including the principal water-supply agency, the Regies des
Eaux, a division of the Ministry of Agriculture, was
considered to be lacking the financial and managerial
resources necessary to meet the country's water-supply needs.
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The World Bank participated in the creation of SONEDE in
1968. Its involvement started with the need for funds for
investments and for technical assistance necessary to bring
the service to a more efficient level of operation. The
influence of the World Bank was crucial for the orientation
of the institutional development of the sector. It insisted
on sound finances and a sound institutional structure, which
ultimately led to the creation of the public authority. This
was not achieved without some reluctance from the government,
which wanted to have full control over the provision of the
service and over the rates applied. The new authority,
SONEDE, rapidly improved the provision of the service,
however. Soon after its creation, it was already perceived
to be a success, and it became a model for institutional
development in Tunisia. More than STEG, SONEDE's creation
and development has had an important impact on the
institutional development for the provision of urban public
services (UPSs) throughout Tunisia.
Sewerage Service
The sewerage service, which fits the theoretical
definition of local services, was directly influenced by the
successful development of SONEDE. SONEDE's creation not only
provided an institutional model for the new sewerage service
institution, but also its successful increase in the water
supply made the improvement of the sewerage service an
absolute necessity.
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In 1974 the GOT started taking action in this sector,
which was clearly lagging behind needs. The service was
centralized and a new national authority for sanitation was
created, the Office National de l' Assainissement (ONAS).
Like SONEDE, ONAS was given financial and managerial autonomy
as well as the monopoly over the service in areas under its
jurisdiction. ONAS is headed by a board of directors
composed of the various parties concerned with the services.
It takes decisions on all issues concerning the sanitation
service. ONAS enjoys a relatively high level of autonomy,
although, like SONEDE, some decisions--those concerning
tariffs, planning and extension of services, and personnel
policy--are reviewed and approved by the GOT.
ONAS does not operate in all regions of the country. In
some areas, the sewerage service remains under the authority
of the municipalities. ONAS was originally created to solve
the most urgent pollution problems of the Tunis area. At
that time, its operations were limited to the metropolitan
area of Tunis. It then gradually extended its service to all
urban centers of the country--first to serve the larger
cities who also started to have major sewerage requirements,
and then gradually to all the remaining urban centers of the
country as they became more densely populated. Presently,
all the major sewerage systems in the most densely populated
areas of the country are under the authority of ONAS. In the
remaining areas, the municipalities continue to be in charge
of the service. They generally do not operate a full
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sewerage system and they often consider their responsibility
over the service as a temporary one, a transitional situation
before ONAS takes it over.
There are many similarities between the SONEDE and ONAS
cases. Their institutional development was intrinsically
linked. Moreover, both institutions were formed under the
same circumstances. First, there was a growing need to
improve the provision of the service and the GOT's desire to
act upon it. Then, came the realization that the existing
institutional structure was weak and inadequate. With the
involvement and the influence of the World Bank, an
autonomous institutional structure was chosen for the
provision of both services and with it a simultaneous
centralization of the services. Because of the successful
example of SONEDE, ONAS's adoption of the autonomous
institutional model did not raise much controversy from the
central government.
What makes ONAS a surprising case--and one warranting
closer examination in the next chapter--is the fact that the
centralization of the service dispossessed the municipalities
of the service on the basis of their lack of efficiency.
This happened at the time when the decentralization programs
were being formulated and municipalities had been promised a
more important role in the public services of the country.
The sewerage service was one of the rare local services under
the responsibility of the municipalities, unlike other
services that were centralized. For example, the water-
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supply service was provided by various local institutions
before SONEDE's creation, including, but not exclusively, by
the municipalities.
Housing and Land Development
Housing and land development are also provided primarily
by centralized and autonomous institutions. The
institutional structure in the housing and land development
sector is relatively well developed with specialized agencies
for housing and land development whose creation started prior
to that of the utility authorities, but continued until the
early 1980s.
Housing and land-development functions are shared
between the private and the public sector, but the public
sector retains the dominant role. Two institutions hold the
main responsibilities in the sector; both are under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Housing and Infrastructure:
the Soci6t6 National Immobiliere de Tunisie (SNIT), the
national real estate company, and Agence Fonci6re
d'Habitation (AFH), the land-development agency.
SNIT is a national company, fully state-owned, with
managerial and financial autonomy. It was created just after
Tunisia's independence, in 1957, and until the early 1970s
was the principal authority for all government-sponsored
housing programs, including land-development programs and
slum-clearance programs. Following the creation of the land-
development agency (AFH) and the urban-rehabilitation agency
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in the 1970s, it limited its activities to the construction
of subsidized housing. First, it operated in a dual capacity
as a developer and builder, and since 1985, it has
concentrated solely on building activities; it buys serviced
land from AFH, the residential land development agencies.
Today, SNIT holds the most important role in the production
of subsidized housing in Tunisia. It has diversified its
housing programs to include rural housing, relocation
programs, and luxury housing. SNIT is also the manager of
the public housing stock.
Two public agencies share with AFH the land development
task: the Agence Fonciere Touristique (AFT), a land-
development agency for tourism, and the Agence Fonciere
Industrielle (AFI), a land-development agency for industrial
use. All three agencies were created in 1973 with the
objective of improving the delivery process of affordable
serviced land.
AFH, the residential land-development agency is the most
important of the three. It is under the administrative
authority of the Ministries of Housing and Equipment. It is
a national public authority, with a statutory body and
financial autonomy, and with private management practices.
It is a self-financed, nonprofit organization. Its statutory
role is to assemble, service, and sell land for housing and
commercial use.
Municipalities have had a very limited role in land
development in the past, which they totally relinquished when
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the national land agencies were created. Today, they still
do not have any active involvement in either housing or land
development. They have some authority over land development
through their responsibility for the urban-planning and the
urban-development process, which they have a lot of
difficulty enforcing. By law, SNIT and AFH operations must
conform to the various planning documents, some of which are
under the authority of the municipalities. All land-
development operations need an apriori approval from the
mayor. In practice, however, in search for lower land prices
these development agencies use land outside urban perimeters.
Municipalities appear to have no control over the activities
of the national development agencies. We have already
mentioned these issues later, with the review of the urban
planning functions.
Urban Rehabilitation
The institutional development in the urban-
rehabilitation sector represents also one of the most
interesting cases of centralization for the purpose of our
analysis. When the rehabilitation programs started in the
1970s with a new orientation in the Tunisian policy towards
low-income housing and squatter settlements, both
municipalities and the central government were responsible
for the sector. Programs to upgrade or rehabilitate
substandard urban areas replaced previous eradication and
relocation programs, and municipalities and the central
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government jointly implemented these rehabilitation projects.
The central government was in charge of allocating the funds
between the various urban areas because of the nature of
financing these projects. The programs required large
amounts of funds and were financed entirely by the central
government, in great part through external loans. The
central government also took the responsibility for the
project design. The municipalities were left with the
responsibility of selecting the beneficiaries and with the
implementation tasks.
Project implementation, however, experienced delays
under the authority of municipalities, and municipalities
were once again perceived as lacking the necessary managerial
capacity for the job. Consequently, a new institution,
Agence pour la Rehabilitation et la Renovation Urbaine
(ARRU), an agency for upgrading and urban renewal, was
created in 1981 to act on behalf of municipalities as an
implementing and coordinating agency for rehabilitation
operations, and the service was centralized. ARRU is also a
public authority endowed with financial and managerial
autonomy, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Equipment.
This time, however, the new institutional arrangement
did keep the municipalities as the overriding authority over
the rehabilitation programs. Municipalities theoretically
delegate the implementation tasks to ARRU, which is supposed
to act on their behalf. In practice, however, ARRU takes
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full control over all activities. ARRU manages the various
parts of the projects from the extension of the
infrastructure network and the improvement of existing
housing, to the regularization of ownership and occupancy
status. It also administers small loans for the residents of
the area under rehabilitation and subcontracts all
specialized tasks to the relevant institutions, such as
SONEDE, STEG, or ONAS.
The legal arrangement by which municipalities retain
authority over the service and by which ARRU receives its
authority through a delegation from them indicates some
concern over the risk of alienating further the
municipalities from responsibilities that are in essence
local. This simple-minded concern was not sufficient,
however, to insure that municipalities kept a predominant
role. The authority municipalities retain by law is merely
theoretical. ARRU controls all aspects of the service.
ARRU's creation is not much different from the previous
centralization experiences. It is another example of
separation of municipalities from responsibilities that are
logically theirs, motivated by their poor performance and the
GOT's desire to provide a service more efficiently. The
creation of an autonomous institution on the basic model of a
public authority was again accompanied simultaneously by the
centralization of the service.
What makes ARRU's case even more surprising is, first,
the fact that its creation happened six years after the
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beginning of the local government reforms aimed at improving
municipal operations and at enlarging their level and scope
of activity in their locality. Second, ARRU's task is
essentially a local one. Finally, the decision-makers at the
central government level were aware of the evidence that
ARRU's creation would further undermine municipalities'
position, as indicated by the institutional arrangement they
have chosen--by law the municipalities keep their authority
over the service and delegate the functions to ARRU.
Nevertheless, central government decision-makers still
perceived ARRU to be the only option for the adequate
provision of the service.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have reviewed the institutional
structure for the provision of LPS in Tunisia as well as the
process and motivation that led to this particular
institutional development. In the process, we highlighted
the position of municipalities in this institutional
structure, their roles, and their relationship with the other
actors in the local public life.
First, we confirmed that municipalities hold a very
limited role. The ambiguity and lack of precision of the
municipal legislation conceals the fact that the 1975 reform
did not provide municipalities with any additional functions.
Among the functions under their responsibility, the only one
that municipalities perform effectively themselves are the
193
traditional municipal functions (garbage collection and
control over markets), some of which are not even clearly
mentioned in the legislation.
Two of the most important functions that are under their
responsibility, urban planning and secondary and tertiary
road-network construction and maintenance, are largely
performed at the central level because many municipalities
still lack the financial and human resources to do them in
house. This confirms the fact that the reform did not
provide municipalities with the necessary capacity to provide
the most important of their functions.
The domain of intervention of municipalities is reduced
to streets and urban public spaces. Their activities are
limited to the maintenance, cleaning, and public safety of
these areas: the most ambitious of these activities are
traffic management, garbage collection, and some
environmental control responsibilities. This is the only
domain of intervention that fully belongs to the
municipalities: it is a very confined one, particularly in
comparison with the ambitious, but vaguely defined, roles
proposed by the 1975 reform.
Second, we showed that the most important public
services are centralized. Some have historically been
centralized, and their delivery by the central government
justified by the fact that the services are perceived to be
national goods. This is the case for education and health
services. Water supply, sewerage services, provision of
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electricity, housing, land-development and urban-
rehabilitation services, which constitute the majority of
other services, have been centralized under similar
circumstances and institutional arrangements. Their
centralization was motivated by an attempt to increase
efficiency in the service provision. They have been awarded
an institutional structure that calls for autonomy in
management and finance. The outcome has been, without any
doubt, a more efficient provision of each individual service.
It has led, however, to the fragmentation and the
sectorization of the institutional structure.
Third, we demonstrated how the GOT, in its search for
efficient provision of services, has created a fragmented and
sectorized institutional structure formed by a series of
powerful national autonomous authorities for the provision of
LPSs. Enaifer (1986) claims that this institutional
structure, which he considers to be abdication of the central
government to assume its coordinating role, is the cause for
major drawbacks in the urban-development process. By
creating these numerous powerful and single-minded
institutions, the central government has delegated its
responsibility to individual entities and has not maintained
any coordinating authority at the state level. We argue
further that this role belongs to the municipalities because
it is at the local level that this coordination can best be
achieved. Both the sectorization and the centralization of
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LPSs have caused the municipalities to lose their
opportunities to act at the local level.
Moreover, the systematic centralization of the service
with the creation of these public authorities and the
dispossession of municipalities from their functions occurred
in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when the decentralization
reform was formulated and implemented to improve municipal
capacities and increase their responsibilities. This trend
for centralization is a paradox in view of the central
government's own decentralization policy reforms, which it
has supposedly been following for the past fifteen years.
What is the explanation of this paradox? Our next
chapter is an attempt to answer this question. For that, we
will focus on the process of centralization of a LPS, the
sewerage service. By analyzing the reasons that have led to
its centralization, we hope to understand what are the
deficiencies of municipalities that make them inappropriate
candidates for LPS and how and why the reforms fall short of
providing the necessary capacity to the municipalities.
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ANNEX 6-1
MUNICIPALITIES' RESPONSIBILITIES OVER STREET LIGHTING,
TRAFFIC REGULATION, AND PARKS AND RECREATIONAL AREAS.
Street lighting is provided exclusively by
municipalities. It is presented as part of their overall
responsibility over the construction, management, and
maintenance of street networks and urban public spaces. They
are responsible for all aspects of the service, from
investment to operation. The financing is done through an
arrangement with STEG. STEG levies a "surcharge" for street
lighting on its customers, which it transfers to the
municipalities after deducting municipalities' consumption of
electricity. The surplus is, in principle, used to cover the
cost of investments. In most cases, however, no surpluses
are generated and municipalities have to finance the
investment cost from other revenue sources which is always
difficult.
Municipalities are also responsible for traffic
regulation as part of the mayors responsibility over public
safety (article 75, LODC). It is a function that all
municipalities assume fully in-house by the municipal
department of roads, which exists in most municipalities,
even the smallest ones.
As part of their responsibility over street
construction and maintenance, municipalities are responsible
for the creation and maintenance of recreational areas in
urban environments, such as parks, public gardens, and all
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other green areas (Article 129, Chapter III of the LODC.)
They are also responsible for the cleaning of these areas and
for insuring public safety in all recreational areas,
including natural ones, such as beaches (Article 74, Chapter
II, LODC.)
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ANNEX 6-2
MUNICIPAL ACTIVITIES FINANCED BY THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
Activities that municipalities undertake with tied-grant
financing are generally limited to investments in social
facilities, such as stadiums and other sport facilities,
cultural and youth centers, and mosques. They also include
the upgrading and maintenance of education facilities.
Municipalities have in the past also done urgent repairs in
schools or painted a classroom. They have also, on rare
occasions, purchased school equipment, and, on even rarer
occasions, have helped in the construction of a school, by
donating land or building a classroom or a sports field.
Municipalities increasing use of tied-grants to finance
their own projects is well illustrated by the Plan de
Developpement Municipal (PDM), a five-year investment plan
whose purpose is to make municipalities identify and rank a
list of priority investment projects and propose a viable
financing scheme. In the financing plans proposed,
municipalities have widely used requests for tied grants from
the relevant institutions. Our analysis of the PDMs
established in 1986-1991 reveals that municipalities are
requesting grants from various ministries for over one-third
of their total investments.
The central government sees the municipalities' requests
for grants, that they submit to the PDM as a way of finding
out the needs for investment at the local level. Although
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the municipalities' ranking of projects is not based on any
financial or economic analysis, it is, nevertheless, a way
for the ministries to use municipalities' knowledge of their
locality. The ministries, however, retain the final say over
the projects.
200
ANNEX 6-3
URBAN TRANSPORTATION
The level of fragmentation of the urban transportation
service contrasts sharply with the consolidated institutional
structure that characterizes the other public services in
Tunisia. Despite its fragmentation, and the fact that the
companies operate locally, the service is centralized under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation. The
service is shared between the public and private sectors.
The public part of the service is supplied by several
independent companies offering different types of services
and operating in only three major urban centers of Tunisia--
Tunis, Sfax, and Sousse. Five publicly owned companies share
the responsibility for public transportation. Three of them
are concentrated in the Tunis metropolitan area: the Socist6
National des Transport (SNT) is a national agency for public
transportation which operates a fleet of street buses over an
extensive network; the Soci6td du Metro Leger de Tunis (SMLT)
which operates a suburban light rail system that runs from
Tunis to La Marsa, a northern suburb; and the Societe
Nationale des Chemins de Fer Tunisian (SNCFT), the national
railway company which operates a suburban railway service.
Two regional multipurpose companies, the Societd Regional des
Transports de Sfax (SORETRAS) in Sfax, and the Socidt6 du
Transport du Sahel (STS) in Sousse, provide urban and
suburban transport, as well as freight services.
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Municipalities have a very minor role in public
transportation services. Their responsibility is limited to
authorizing private operations on the basis of the running
condition of the vehicles.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CENTRALIZATION OF A LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE:
THE SEWERAGE SERVICE
In the previous chapters, we have demonstrated the
limited achievements of the municipal reform. We have seen
that decentralization has not taken place since the
formulation of the reform in 1975. We have also seen that
during this period some local services were gradually
centralized. They have been taken away from municipalities'
responsibilities on the basis of their incapacity to provide
the service. What is the explanation of this paradox? Why
are institutions other than local governments are still
preferred for the provision of local public services at a
time when the GOT allegedly engages in a decentralization
policy that should provide local governments with increased
responsibilities and that should reinforce municipalities'
capacities? What are the fundamental deficiencies that make
municipalities unfit for these services in Tunisia? In this
chapter, we intend to highlight these precise deficiencies of
municipalities by analyzing the process of centralization of
one of the services: the sewerage service.
What makes the sewerage service an interesting case is
the fact that the service was under the municipal authority
at the time of its centralization, but also the fact that it
has all the characteristics of a local good from a
theoretical point of view as well as from a practical point
of view. World-wide practice shows that the form of
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provision of sewerage service may vary tremendously from
autonomous regional agencies to the provision by the local
governments themselves, but that the sewerage service is in
most cases provided at the regional or local level.
Kalbermatten et al. (1980) in their study of the
appropriate technology for water and sanitation presented a
"1... generalized example of the various agencies and
accompanying functions likely to be involved in water and
sanitation program planning and execution..." (p. 94) which
indicates that all levels of government might have some
involvement in the sector, but that national government
involvement is generally restricted to functions such as
establishing the sector's legislation, long-term sectoral
planning, financial policy, and monitoring of quality and
standards. Regional governments are generally involved in
the implementation of the national policies, and in the
detailed planning and allocation of the state resources.
They also share some of the local responsibilities of design
construction and operation of the service. Local governments
are typically involved in the design and construction, and in
the operation and maintenance of the service.
According to professionals in the water and sanitation
sector of the World Bank with experience in a large number of
developing countries, there exist many forms of institutional
arrangements for the provision of the sewerage service
involving central, regional and local governments. It is
relatively typical to find that large metropolitan areas are
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serviced by local or metropolitan institutions, while small
urban centers and rural areas are serviced by regional or
state institutions. It is also common to find national
institutions servicing these rural and small urban areas.
Peru and Mexico are examples of this type of arrangement. In
Mexico City, the service is provided by local and state
institutions, while outside Mexico city the service is under
the authority of a national institution.
There are cases where different parts of the service are
provided by different levels of government. Typically,
sewage collection is handled by local authorities, while
discharge control, water treatment and other aspects of the
service that have an impact on a wider area are handled at
the regional level. This is the case, for example, of
Washington DC, where the treatment plant is handled at the
regional level because of rigorous standard requirements. In
the case of Mexico City, for example, each municipality has
its own water and sewerage service. The drainage system to
evacuate all waters from the valley, and flood control are
handled by the state. There are cases where the service is
entirely under local-government institutions, such as in
Morocco, and cases where the service is mostly provided at
the state level, such as in Brazil. It is exceptionally rare
to find countries that have an entirely centralized system.58
58 Interviews with sanitation engineers at the World Bank.
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Tunisia's fully centralized form of provision of sewerage
service represents an exception in this respect.
From the analysis of the GOT's motivation to create a
new sewerage institution (the Office National de
l'Assainissement, ONAS) and centralize the service, we expect
to understand and highlight municipalities' deficiencies in
Tunisia that made them inappropriate candidates for the
provision of the service. We expect also to understand the
factors that have made the creation of a new centralized
institution a more attractive option and the elements that
have made the sector's development a success.
This analysis of the centralization process of one local
public service is not an evaluation of the centralized versus
decentralized form of provision of sewerage service in
Tunisia. We are not arguing that the service should have
been kept at the local level, nor are we justifying the
centralization. Rather, our objective is to use this case to
understand the motivations of the reformers and to highlight
what they have considered as important elements in the areas
of management and institutional structure necessary for the
development of the sector. For that we will rely on the
reformers' objectives stated at the time of ONAS' creation,
as well as the subsequent development of the institution and
the sector during the following decade. We will develop a
list of these elements or factors that have determined the
development of ONAS and the sector. We will then compare the
identified key elements to municipal institutional structures
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to highlight the deficiencies that have made them
inappropriate candidates for the provision of the service.
We should note that ONAS' development has been a success
story on all accounts. At present, no government official in
Tunisia would conceive of decentralizing the service as ONAS
has brought remarkable improvements in the provision of the
service since its creation. On the other hand, many rural
areas of the country receive little or no sewerage services.
ONAS is reluctant to extend its full service to these remote
areas for cost reasons. It is also reluctant to diversify
its approaches to the service to include alternative
technologies. ONAS has developed an efficient approach for a
full sewerage service with a network system and treatment
plants and cannot adapt to the specificities of demands of
specific conditions of remote areas of the country.
Moreover, ONAS faces a growing demand for extension in more
densely populated areas of the country, which it cannot meet
because of budget limitations
We will begin with an analysis of ONAS' creation and
development. We will review: the problems that have
motivated the GOT's intervention in the sector, the process
of centralization and creation of a new national sewerage
authority, and the achievements of ONAS. Through this
analysis we will identify the key elements of ONAS'
institutional development. We will then conduct a
comparative analysis of these key elements within the
municipalities' institutional setting.
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From this analysis, we will show that municipalities
lacked the capacity to provide the service before 1975, and
also that the reform was insufficient to provide them with
the necessary structure to handle such a task. We will show
that municipalities' deficiencies are structural and that
there has been a great difference in approach in the
institutional development of municipalities and ONAS. ONAS
was provided with all the necessary conditions and elements
to succeed in its tasks while the municipalities' reform was
very limited.
ONAS' DEVELOPMENT: THE PROBLEM
In the early 1970s, the sewerage service was highly
underdeveloped and was operating under very poor conditions.59
The densely populated areas of the country were already
feeling the negative impacts on the environment and on the
standard of living, raising awareness about the state of the
sewerage sector and calling for intervention. We present the
problem of the sector that mobilized the GOT officials to
intervene in the following sections.
Insufficient Level of Sewerage Service
In 1974, only 20 municipalities (out of 150) had some
form of sewerage system, most of them rudimentary. In many
59 The following presentation of the state of the sewerage sector
before 1974 is based on several reports of the World Bank written in
relation to the World Bank's sewerage project in Tunisia, and other
evaluation reports. All of them are internal documents of the World
Bank.
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municipalities outside large urban centers, sewerage waters
were originally separated from other household waters and
were discharged into cesspools. Household waters were
carried through open ditches and were discharged with no
treatment in water courses, in the sea, or in fields where
they would eventually dry up. As population density and
water consumption increased, open ditches were gradually
closed and replaced by pipes. These pipes started eventually
to be used for all types of used waters, household and
sewerage waters, as well as rainfall waters. The
increasingly abundant discharge of untreated waters in the
same area created concentrated pollution points near the
densely populated urban areas of the country. Moreover,
these systems were rapidly saturated and were subject to
flooding at each heavy rainfall.
The situation was not much better in cities with older
and more developed sewerage systems. In the city of Tunis,
cases of sewerage overflows were frequent during the rainy
winter months, and the overflow would pollute the streets and
stagnate in the low central areas of the city. New urban
migrants settled in the oldest part of the city, resulting in
overcrowding and in volumes of waste waters in excess of
capacity of the sewerage system built at the beginning of the
century. In squatters' areas sewerage systems were in most
cases nonexistent, even in cities where the systems were
relatively developed. Only eight municipalities had some
form of treatment plant for at least part of their sewerage.
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All of them, however, were overloaded and malfunctioning.
Over half of the sewage collected in Tunis--and all sewages
in some other cities--was discharged with little or no
treatment.
A World Bank team in 1974 valued the total replacement
of the sewerage system at US$ 77.5 million. The same
estimates were made for the water supply system and amounted
to US$ 190.0 million. Most of the existing systems,
including the new ones built during the 1960s and early
1970s, had planning and design defects that hampered the
normal collection and evacuation system. In some cases the
gravity connection between parts of the system was not
possible. In other cases, the slopes of the system were too
flat, creating regular blockage in the system. At times, the
pavements for two adjacent streets were built at different
levels, preventing the normal drainage of rainfall water.
Experts attributed these planning and design drawbacks
to municipalities' lack of technical skills in sanitation.
Sewerage systems were also poorly maintained, in large part
because municipalities lacked the appropriate material and
equipment and financial resources to acquire them. More than
half of the sewer accessories, such as manholes, and grit-
traps, were out of service. Out of 27 lift-stations that
were visited by a World Bank team in 1974, only 5 were
functioning. Only large municipalities had some form of
equipment, although it too was poor and malfunctioning.
Tunis and Sfax each had only one mechanical sewer-cleaning
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device, providing only a fraction of the capacity required.
Sewer cleaning was undertaken only when problems occurred.
Deteriorating Environmental Conditions
The lack of appropriate sewerage service was already
having serious negative impacts on the environment by the
early seventies. Some of them were serious enough to
mobilize attention and create strong incentives for actions.
The most serious environmental problem created by sewage
effluent was found in the greater Tunis area and in the Lake
of Tunis. Sewers were discharged with little or no
treatment into the Lake of Tunis. The lake had reached such
a severe degree of pollution that an eutrophy condition was
created beyond the capacity of restoration by self
purification. The lake is shallow salt water, one meter deep
on average, with seven kilometers in diameter, very close to
the gulf of Tunis on the Mediterranean. Although the lake
had openings to the sea, these were not sufficient to provide
water flushing in the lake to carry the waste to the sea, or
even to provide enough oxygen to prevent putrefaction. Foul
odors emanated from the Lake of Tunis, in particular during
the summer months, which permeated at times over all of the
city. The lake was rapidly filling up with carbonaceous
material and septic solids. The visual appearance of the
lake was also unpleasant, with dark waters and floating
solids including dead fishes. The recreational use of the
lake has been totally lost.
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The problem of water pollution of the Lake of Tunis was
not a new one. Neither was the recognition that actions
needed to be taken to improve its condition. From 1962 to
1974, nine studies were conducted by various consulting firms
and individual experts for the GOT, on the condition of the
lake and on the means to restore it to a healthy state. None
of them, however, resulted in definite actions.
The GOT was also greatly concerned about environmental
pollution on sea shores and beaches in tourist areas, which
were often far from urban centers and had no sewerage system;
however, because tourism was an important source of foreign
exchange, investment for infrastructure in these areas was
easily mobilized. By 1974 the only action that the GOT had
taken to improve sewerage service was in these areas, as part
of the overall tourism infrastructure developed during that
time.
The impact on public health strongly motivated the GOT
to improve the sewerage service. Despite the progress in the
standard of living during the 1960s and 1970s, infectious and
parasitic diseases still ranked third in the causes of death
in 1972 Tunisia. The incidence of these diseases was in the
order of 100 times that of developed countries.60l The
breakout of some cases of cholera in the early 1970s produced
60 The national average of typhoid and paratyphoid cases in 1969 was
30/100,000 population. In Canada, the incidence of these diseases were
0.3/ 100,000 in 1970. (World Bank figures)
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an increased awareness of this issue and was a decisive
factor for action.
Rapid Development of Water Supply
The need to catch up with the water-supply sector also
motivated intervention in the sewerage sector. The existing
discrepancy between the two sectors was continuously worsened
by improvements in water supply. The GOT had made the water
sector a national priority in the late 1950s. In Tunisia,
water is a scarce resource, which necessitates careful
management and optimal development. In 1956, the government
started devoting considerable efforts to the provision of
piped water. Since 1968, with the creation of a national
water authority (SONEDE) and the rehabilitation of the sector
infrastructure, actions became even more significant, with
large amounts of investments made. Increase in water
consumption and hence increase in waste waters furthered the
need for better sewerage facilities. In the early 1970s,
reducing the imbalance between the two sectors became a
priority objective.
Weak and Fragmented Institutional Structure
Before 1974, the institutional structure of the sewerage
service was a reflection of the poor overall state of
development of the sector. Municipalities had the nominal
authority over the service, from investment to operation.
2 13
Their incapacity to provide sufficient levels of service
motivated many other public institutions to intervene.
Three government agencies and three ministries had some
responsibilities over the sector. Some of those institutions
had clearly distinct roles in the service, but others had
overlapping functions. The National Tourism Authority
(Office National du Tourisme, ONTT), which was responsible
for all infrastructure in tourist areas, took the
responsibility of financing the construction of sewerage
systems in their jurisdictions. The water-supply authority,
SONEDE, then received (by decree) the responsibility of
operating and maintaining these sewerage facilities in
tourist areas.61 The District of Tunis had the overall
authority for infrastructure planning in the 13
municipalities of the greater Tunis area. The Department of
Hydraulics of the Ministry of Equipment contributed to the
financing of the construction of sewerage systems62 and was
also responsible for coordinating the needs of various
municipalities. The Ministry of Public Health was
responsible for the control of effluent from sewage treatment
plants as part of its public hygiene responsibility. The
Ministry of the Interior controlled and authorized all
expenditures by municipalities for sewerage service work as
61 SONEDE was however unwilling to accept this responsibility because
it did not have the personnel nor the budget to undertake the
rehabilitation of inoperable plants.
62 Under the decree of March 10, 1960, 42% of the costs of sewers
construction was to come from the central government--the Ministry of
Equipment--the remaining part was born by municipalities 42%, and the
beneficiaries, 16%.
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part of their control over municipalities' finances.
Finally, all municipalities had authority over the sector in
their territory. None, however, were very effective in
service provision.
Too many institutions were involved in the provision of
the service with no clear structure of authority. Some of
them were occasional actors, intervening independently. This
resulted in a severe lack of coordination and effective
planning. On the other hand, when left on their own,
municipalities did not have the necessary financial and human
resources to provide services effectively. Sewerage service
was one of the many responsibilities they had to face with
their limited budgetary and human resources.
CREATION OF ONAS
The growing problems just described motivated the
centralization of the sewerage service. Centralization began
in 1974 with the creation of a national sewerage institution,
Office National de l'Assainissement (ONAS) and the initiation
of large investment projects for the rehabilitation and
extension of the service. The focus was primarily on the
Tunis metropolitan area, which had the highest population
density and the most severe sewage-pollution problem. The
Lake of Tunis in particular mobilized attention.
Municipalities were totally marginalized in the process
of reform of the sector. Reformers perceived them as
incapable of facing the challenge of reconstruction and
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rehabilitation. Indeed, the state of the service, as
outlined above, was a strong enough indication of
municipalities' incapacity to handle the tasks. No sector
study was done. Municipalities' potentials were never
formally evaluated, nor was any investigation of the reasons
for their failure in the sector or their capacity for
improvement ever conducted. Municipalities were,
nevertheless, eliminated as potential actors in the new
service and in the program of rehabilitation. The alleged
reasons were that they lacked the financial and human
resources to achieve the required objective.
Determinant Environment
Three factors influenced the decisions and shaped the
institutional structure adopted by the GOT for the sector.
First was the need for external financing. To be
upgraded, the sector required large infrastructure
investments that could only be mobilized by the central
government. Although this fact does not by itself explain
the centralization of the service, it did influence the
institutional structure of the service by creating the need
for a system that would allow for the control over the use of
funds and for their reimbursement.
Second was the involvement of the World Bank in the
financing of the program and its influence on the
institutional development of the sector. The World Bank
imposed its principles for intervention, standard to the
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utility sector. It required that the GOT takes a coherent
and realistic sectoral strategy that included: commitment by
the GOT and the sector agency to the strategy; cooperation
between the government and the agency, use of innovative and
appropriate technology; stable and autonomous institutions
that are able to meet growing responsibilities; a personnel
policy that retains trained staff, and finally, a tariff
policy that promotes efficiency, equity, and sound finances.
The third factor to influence the institutional reform
of the sector was the newly reformed water-supply sector. In
many ways the reform of the sewerage sector replicates the
experience in the water sector six years earlier. The World
Bank's cooperation with the GOT on the water-supply sector
began in 1967 and 1968 when an autonomous national water
authority (SONEDE) was created. It was followed in the
period 1968 to 1973 by a national water program to improve
water supply in areas of high population density and to
introduce a realistic tariff system. Long negotiations took
place between the GOT and the World Bank to insure SONEDE's
managerial autonomy. The GOT was inclined to maintain some
level of control over the supply and the tariffs of such a
socially sensitive sector.
Six years later at the time when the GOT decided to act
in the sewerage sector, SONEDE was already a success story.
It became a model for the transformation of the sewerage
sector. The similarity in situations between the two sectors
(i.e., the need for restructuring the sector, the need for
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large investments and external funding, and the World Bank
involvement) led naturally to a similar answer: the creation
of a new national sewerage authority. Despite the World
Bank's obvious influence, there appears to have been
considerable unanimity of view between the World Bank and the
GOT on what needed to be done to reorganize the sector
resulting in productive cooperation.
Institutional Development of the Sewerage Sector
The reform of the sector was led by an extensive
institutional development, that went well beyond the one-time
creation of a new institution. 6 3 It was a continuous effort
of several years to shape and reinforce the structure of ONAS
until it was made capable of providing the service
efficiently.
This was done with large amounts of inputs and guidance
from external sources. The World Bank--in addition to the
set of convenants it imposes on the sector as prerequisites
for loans--had had an advisory role throughout the formative
years of ONAS through the implementation and monitoring of
several sewerage projects. Also, a large number of
international experts involved in the sector's development
63 The objectives of the reform for the sewerage sector are evaluated
by looking at the early documents related to the first sewerage project
of the World Bank and the legal document for ONAS' creation. We also
used later evaluation reports by the World Bank on the sector's
achievements and our own review of the present characteristics of the
sector.
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provided ONAS with valuable technical assistance during that
time.
We will review the reorganization of the sector under
two broad categories of interventions. First, the
institutional development objective was to provide the sector
with a strong, stable, and viable institutional structure.
We will refer to this objective as institutional soundness.
Second, the financial development and resource mobilization
objectives consisted of providing a revenue base for the
sector and good financial management. We will refer to this
objective as sound finances. From this review, we have
identified four key elements that constituted ONAS'
institutional development. These key elements will serve as
a basis for analysis of municipalities deficiencies in the
second part of this chapter.
Institutional Soundness
Reformers understood institutional soundness to mean
reinforcing and concentrating the authority over the sector
into one institution; providing the institution with
autonomous management, and conducting a personnel policy
which attracts, keeps, and reinforces skills in the sector.
Regaining control over the service was one of the first
objectives of the reform. This was translated into the
establishment of one centralized institution, which had full
authority over the service.
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ONAS was created in 1974 (Law no 74-73 of August 3,
1974) to take over the responsibility of the sewerage
service, first, in the Tunis metropolitan area, then to
extend gradually its service in all other major urban centers
of the country. ONAS was given a monopoly position over the
service in all areas it has taken under its jurisdiction. In
other parts of the country, municipalities continue to
operate their own system, some of which will eventually be
integrated into ONAS' operations. Today, ONAS holds a total
monopoly over the sewerage services in all major urban
centers of the country.
Its responsibilities include planning, implementation,
maintenance, and operation of all the sanitation
infrastructure. It supersedes all other urban development
actors in the planning and design of the network, as well as
the operation of the network. This applies when public or
private developers build secondary or tertiary networks.
ONAS supervises these investments, which will eventually be
integrated into its own network, and has the authority of
accepting or refusing them on the basis of their technical
viability. ONAS sets the standards.
ONAS was provided also with an autonomous form of
management. The primary reason was to keep the institution
far from the political influence of the government.
Autonomous management constitutes the first of the key
elements of ONAS' institutional development.
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Autonomous Management
Financial and managerial autonomy of the service was
part of the World Bank's prerequisite for lending in the
sector, as it was considered to be the only way to good
management. On SONEDE's model, a fair amount of autonomy was
awarded to ONAS' management. At the time of its creation,
ONAS was set by law as a national public authority, with
financial and managerial autonomy and with the capacity to
run with some of the principles of private business.
An autonomous board of directors of 15 members
representing the various institutions concerned with the
provision of the service run ONAS. 6 4 The Board of Directors
has authority over all of ONAS' responsibilities, from the
planning of extension and investments to the operation of the
service. The Ministries of Equipment and Finances have only
limited control over the implementation of the board's
decisions .65
As a public institution ONAS is audited a-posteriori for
most of its technical functions and its finances. Some of
64 ONAS' board of directors is composed of two representatives of the
Ministry of Equipment and one representative from each of the following
institutions: the Ministries of the Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and
Public Health, the District of Tunis, the Municipality of Tunis, and the
mayors of municipalities where ONAS operates, the National Agency for
Tourism, and SONEDE, the national water supply authority. It is headed
by one of the two representatives of the Ministry of Equipment, chosen
by the members of the board. This representative heads also the
technical, financial, and administrative departments of ONAS.
65 The control imposed by the government on ONAS consists of two
controllers--a technical controller designated by the Ministry of
Equipment, and a finance controller designated by the Ministry of
Finance--who attend the board's meetings with a consultative voice and
have authority to suspend any decision in their area of competence if
they consider it to be in the interest of either the government or ONAS
itself to do so.
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ONAS' decisions, however, require a-prior approval from the
GOT before implementation: decisions concerning tariffs, and
wages policies, two areas with socially sensitive
implications, and decisions on medium- and long-term loans,
which are under the GOT's warranty.
Appropriate Personnel Policy
Providing ONAS with appropriate skilled personnel and
with both wages and employment conditions to attract and
retain personnel constituted another key element of the
sector's institutional reform. This translated into a
vigorous training program to create a core of skilled
workers.
The World Bank was especially active in inducing and
monitoring these training programs. The severity of the
technical staff shortage led the Bank to require that an
effective training program be instituted as a loan condition.
Needs were assessed and a training plan was formulated in
1978. A training and professional development commission was
created in ONAS to establish priorities and time tables.
Many seminars were held (about 30 between 1976 and 1981),
some with the help of European universities, covering
administrative and technical topics. Visits to sewerage
authorities in foreign counties were organized as study
programs. An on-the-job training program was established, by
which every supervisor had the responsibility of training
subordinates. ONAS attaches a lot of importance to this
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program and believes that it has been an essential factor in
establishing an effective sewage treatment system.
Financial Soundness
The influence of the World Bank, through loan
requirements and technical assistance, was also determinant
in setting ONAS' financial structure. Although some of the
World Bank objectives have never been reached--such as the
objective of self-financing--both the GOT and the World bank
had reached complete agreements on these objectives.
The set up of financial principles was not a one-time
process. First, the World-Bank's standard principles for
utility projects were applied. Also, lessons learned through
the process of development of the water sector were applied
to the sewerage sector. Then, the financial principles were
extended and adapted to the particularity of ONAS' situation
as new problem areas emerged. It was a process of trial and
error, which required constant monitoring efforts by the
reformers.
The overall set of principles for financial soundness
finally applied to ONAS falls into two categories: (i)
appropriate tariff structure and financial viability, and
(ii) resource mobilization and appropriate financial
management. These are the two key elements identified as
constituting ONAS' institutional development.
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Appropriate Tariff Structure
and Financial Viability
Financial viability meant that ONAS was to earn a rate
of return on net fixed assets sufficient to provide a
reasonable margin for self-financing of capital expenditures.
This requirement was to be reached as rapidly as possible and
was part of the first project agreement with the World Bank.
This meant that ONAS had to have an appropriate tariff
structure and an efficient revenue-collection system.
The reformers provided ONAS with a complete cost-
recovery mechanism. Operating costs are to be recovered
through a surcharge on water consumption and collected by the
water-supply authority. Rates applied are based on the
operating costs of the service adjusted by a subsidy provided
by the GOT. 6 6 Investment costs of the networks are partially
recovered by a fee system based on the length of the frontage
of the property. Finally, individual connection costs are
entirely recovered from the beneficiaries through a flat fee
representing the costs of connection. The primary networks,
which include treatment plants and large axes are financed
entirely by the GOT.
The GOT continues to provide large subsidies to the
sector despite the objective of self-financing. For the
Government of Tunisia, the improvement of the sewerage
service brings about externalities that justify the partial
66 A subsidy of TD 0.04/m 3 of water consumed is provided by the GOT.
Also, different tariffs are applied to the various consumers; small
consumers are exempted.
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subsidy of the service. Indirect benefits are said to accrue
to all citizens through improvements in public health, in the
environment--which resulted in increased land value around
the Lake of Tunis for example--, and in tourism, and justify
the financing of part of the service by national taxes.
The GOT also insisted on providing subsidies to the
sector to soften the introduction of fees to a population
unaccustomed to collections for sewerage service. ONAS was
to move gradually towards a greater reliance on tariff
revenues. Every year, ONAS and the GOT negotiate the tariffs
that ONAS will apply and try to achieve several, and at times
conflicting, objectives. First is the objective set by the
national plans to extend the service, take over new systems
in other cities, and meet the growing demand. Other
objectives, encouraged by the World Bank, are to improve
revenues and decrease subsidies in order to come closer to a
self-financed service. At the same time, the GOT's social
considerations require it to insure affordability of the
service to the population. Despite fifteen years of tariff
practices, the GOT and ONAS have not been able to adjust the
tariff to the point of self financing. The service continues
to be subsidized.
Resource Mobilization and Good Financial Management
The resource mobilization component consisted of
insuring the sector access to resources for the much-needed
investments to rehabilitate and extend the service. The
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World Bank has been insisting on the need for resource
mobilization as one of the key elements for a successful
strategy in the sector. Its lending to the sector alone was
not sufficient to met the considerable needs for capital. In
addition to the required participation of the GOT in
investment in the sector, the World Bank encouraged and
helped the GOT to obtain other financing, both under a co-
financing arrangement and independently. The help of the
World Bank was very beneficial. Its involvement attracted
some grants to the sector and other independent lenders, some
of which relied on its appraisals. In 1980 about half of the
sector's outstanding debt was to lenders other than the World
Bank group.
In addition to financial viability, providing ONAS with
good financial management was also an important objective for
the sector, although it was not an explicit part of the
requirements for the Bank's lending activities. The
realization of the need for better management tools and
practices came out through the years, and important efforts
were deployed to develop them. Among others things, they
included better accounting systems, expertise in assets
inventories, and overall control of the financial system.
These improvements involved a several year process of
consultation, advice, and training of ONAS staff, with the
assistance of the World Bank.
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ONAS' ACHIEVEMENTS
The GOT and the World Bank agree that the development of
the sewerage sector has been successful on most accounts. The
World Bank, which has very close links with the sector,
considers its involvement in the Tunisian water supply and
waste disposal sector as one of its most successful
experience in this sector. The sector success has been
evident in both the levels of service and the institutional
development of the sector.
Improvement in the Level of Service
By 1988, ONAS had extended its service to most urban
centers of the country: Tunis, Sfax, and 27 other cities. It
was providing full sewerage service to a population of 1.9
million inhabitants--that is about 50% of the urban
population of Tunisia and 24% of the total population.
ONAS' achievements measured in terms of new connections
and increases in the level of service are sufficient to claim
the success of the sector's development. The original
objectives--to catch up with the water-supply sector and to
take over the sewerage service of all cities over 10,000
inhabitants--were very ambitious, and ONAS had to respond to
the rapidly growing urban population in the cities under its
control and to cope with the shortfall in the amounts of the
credits it was hoping to receive from the GOT.
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The improvement in the level of service and the
rehabilitation and extension of the system was achieved
through ambitious programs and large investments. The GOT
allocated increasing capital expenditures to the sewerage
service through the national development plans, demonstrating
the new commitment of the GOT to the service. From TD 8.9
million between 1969 and 1972, the national plans allocation
to the service increased to TD 93 million for the 1976-1981
plan and further increased to TD 120 million for the 1982-
1986 plan. These amounts are significant compared to the TD
19 million estimated value of sewerage sector assets in 1975.
Moreover, various sources contributed large amounts of
financial assistance: The World Bank, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
and the EEC. The World Bank has taken the lead in the sector
with three major projects, implemented between 1975 and 1990.
The total investment in the sector by the World Bank assisted
projects amounted to US$ 238.2 millions.
Institutional Development
The institutional development of the sector also was
considered to be successful by all. According to the World
Bank, although still slightly understaffed, ONAS operates
relatively well as a mature institution and has acquired
appropriate managerial tools and practices. It is staffed
almost exclusively with qualified Tunisian managers,
engineers, and technical workers.
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To the reformers, the institutional development of the
sector was as important as the extension of the service.
Much was engaged into ONAS' development. The process was
gradual. It took several years of readjustments and
reformulation of policies to arrive finally at this level of
development. Loan requirements were also important in
setting the objectives for the development of the
institution. The World Bank's close monitoring of ONAS has
helped identify problems and appropriate solutions as they
arose.
ONAS' development was carried out with much
international and local consulting and technical assistance,
particularly in the first years of its creation. They helped
set the appropriate managerial, financial, and technical
operating mechanisms, and transferred expertise to the local
staff. The number of consultants decreased gradually
throughout the years. Today only a few full-time consultants
remain in ONAS.
Training programs were one of the most significant
factors in ONAS' development. Before its creation the
sewerage sector was totally lacking personnel specialized in
sewerage service. The World Bank estimated that, within a
sample of 21 municipalities, 562 were employed in the
sewerage sector, of which 350 (62%) were employed by the
municipality of Tunis. Among the 562 employees only 25 had
some skills related to the sewerage service, and 20 of them
were attached to the municipality of Tunis. By 1987, ONAS
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accounted for 1869 personnel--115 were managers, 427 were
technical professionals and 1327 were workers. This was the
result of an extensive training program which started in
1978.67 It included formal, on-site, and on-job training.
Sound financial management was also an important focus
of ONAS' institutional development. By the end of 1988, ONAS
had a sound overall financial position, despite the fact that
some of the objectives were never attained. This was not
achieved easily. It also took several years of training and
effort for ONAS to acquire the desired financial management
practices. Two examples can be cited. ONAS' accounting had
serious deficiencies. By 1988 these deficiencies were
overcome, after an aggressive program to improve accounting
expertise set during the second sewerage project. Also,
ONAS' capacity to carry asset inventory took many years to
mature. Assistance to develop the necessary skills was
programmed as one component of a sewerage project.
Limitations of ONAS' Success
The widely recognized success of ONAS is based primarily
on ONAS' capacity to provide the sewerage service reasonably
well and resolve the serious environmental problem that had
originally motivated the intervention in the sector. Its
success is measured in terms of level and quality of service
provided and the number of people served. This restricted
evaluation of ONAS' success leaves out many other criteria
67 Between 1980 and 1987; 1,400 employees underwent training.
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that are of lesser priority to the GOT's most fundamental
concerns, but that are still worth mentioning as areas in
which ONAS might not have been as successful.
First is the equity criteria--a difficult one to
evaluate. ONAS' intervention strategy, which gives priority
to the large urban centers of the country, creates an obvious
imbalance in the allocation of the sector's resources between
the most and the least urbanized regions. ONAS rightly
claims, however, that the emphasis on the most densely
populated areas of the country is justified by the fact that
it is in these areas that the environmental hazards are the
highest and the needs for services most urgent. If, as ONAS
seems to suggest, we use environmental cleanliness as a bench
mark for equity rather than the amount of funds allocated to
a region, than the answer to this equity issue is not as
clear cut as in expenditures. Equity is even more difficult
to determine if sources of financing are taken into account.
There are, however, some inequities in access to the
service--in the level of service provided between large urban
centers and less densely populated areas of the country and
even between areas within cities under ONAS'
responsibilities. ONAS' limited resources combined with the
rapidly growing demand for the service in the urban areas has
made it incapable of extending its service to all urban areas
and to more remote areas of the country.68 In most of these
68 ONAS is largely dependent on central government subsidies for
extension of the service.
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poorly serviced areas, a full sewerage service is not always
necessary and is often more costly than alternative systems.
ONAS has been continuously reluctant to diversify its full
service approach to the service--which include networks and
treatment facilities.
It justifies its position by claiming that the level of
service provided is the minimum acceptable level of service
within these urban areas in view of their current density and
their level of water consumption. ONAS claims also that
since the demand for service in the large urban centers are
not entirely fulfilled, they cannot divert resources to areas
where the service is less urgently needed. These
justifications are to a large extent valid.
ONAS' urban bias and its refusal to adapt to other
alternative methods of providing the service, however, have
created some inequities in access to the sewerage service
between these areas which require full service and the
others. If ONAS was ready to consider alternative systems
for the service, this would have opened up the option of
servicing other areas that require alternative systems, and
that are for the time being deprived from any adequate
service. This could have also been done at lower cost and
therefore increased the access to the service for the same
amount of resources used. Should ONAS also have equitable
access to the service as an objective? Or does the task of
providing alternative sewerage disposal system belong to some
other institution? After all, ONAS' success has been in
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large part due to its capacity to master technically the full
sewerage service.
Second, there are many reasons to think that ONAS'
excessive centralization has been detrimental to its
efficiency. All questions, including those related to the
simplest implementation tasks, are sent to Tunis for decision
and approval, making work at the local level very slow. Such
extreme centralization presents some managerial drawbacks.
ONAS' managers have recognized this for many years, and a
deconcentration program--which includes staffing regional
offices with more capable people and providing them with more
authority--has been part of ONAS' planning for as long.
Excessive centralization also appears in ONAS' lack of
responsiveness to local governments and to local people. We
have discussed in the previous chapter the limited
coordination that existed between ONAS and the local
governments. ONAS, as well as the other national authorities
in charge of local services, tend to act at the local level
according to their own planning and at times overriding local
decisions and local plans. The situation has been improved
recently through more contacts between the various parties.
ONAS' accountability to the center, however, still determines
its actions.
MUNICIPALITIES' DEFICIENCIES
We now turn to the municipalities, the focus of our
analysis, to understand what the deficiencies are that have
made them inappropriate candidates for the provision of
sewerage services. We have previously mentioned that the
reformers rejected the option of keeping municipalities as
the authority responsible for the sector because
municipalities allegedly lacked the financial and managerial
capacity to handle the service. No evaluation of the
municipalities' potential for improvement or further
precision as to their deficiencies was made, however.
To arrive at a better understanding of these
deficiencies inherent to municipalities, we will use the same
four key elements that constitute ONAS' institutional
development and compare them to municipalities' institutional
structure and their potential for change. These identified
key elements of ONAS' development will appear under the
following headings: institutional autonomy, appropriate
personnel policy, self-financing, and resource mobilization
and appropriate financial management.
Institutional Autonomy
Autonomous management was the single most important
criteria set for ONAS' creation. It was achieved relatively
easily because of the successful example of the water-supply
institution, SONEDE, created a few years earlier. ONAS was
provided by law with an autonomous managerial and financial
structure.
This emphasis on autonomy is based on the widely
accepted view that a more efficient provision of public
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services is achieved through a specialized autonomous
institutional structure. In developing countries, in
particular, the development of public autonomous institutions
has been the most popular form of institutional development
for the provision of public as well as private goods and
services. For the State, it is a way to capture some of the
advantages of commercial forms of management of privately run
businesses while still keeping some control over the
provision of the services. Various forms of semi-public
autonomous institutions for the provision of public, as well
as private, goods and services abound all over the world.
At the local level, such examples of alternative
institutional arrangements for the provision of public
services are less common, in particular in developing
countries. 6 9 These alternative arrangements can take several
forms from delegation and subcontracting to privatization and
regulation. They consist of giving some form of autonomy
over any of the three basic functions involved in the
provision of the service--planning, production, and
financing--or part of them, to another institution.7() A
selection of functions remain under the control of the local
government.
69 Some local governments in the United States have exploited some of
these options. They remain, however, the exception rather than the
rule.
70 The three activities come from a topology of local public services
provision by Savers (1977).
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There is only one such example of an alternative form of
institutional arrangement for the provision of public
services in Tunisia: Some municipalities subcontract the
management of markets to private entrepreneurs for flat
yearly fees. It is an old practice that municipalities use
almost as tradition and which has remained an uncommon form
of arrangement for the provision of a service.
Municipalities have not been able to develop any modern
forms of alternative arrangements for their services, the
main reason being the incomplete legislation to support it.
It is also due to municipalities' inability to design such an
arrangement on their own. They have no experience in the
country upon which to draw for examples.
The 1975 municipal law (the Loi Organique des Communes,
LODC) provides municipalities with the basis for creating
alternative forms of management for the provision of their
services. According to this legislation, they are allowed to
create regies, which are old institutional forms of semi-
autonomous provision of services that have always existed in
the French model of municipal government, including Tunisia,
but which provide only a limited level of autonomy. Since
1975, they are also allowed in principle to create
financially autonomous institutions with the approval of the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior.71 The
creation of such institutions still requires, however, that
71 LODC, Chapter VII, Article 141 and 151.
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the GOT establishes a decree. Such a decree has never been
made in Tunisia--not one single case of such a financially
autonomous local institution for local public services has
ever been created.
As we can see, municipal legislation is indeed limited,
as is its application. In the late 1970s, the GOT held some
preliminary discussions with the World Bank on the potential
of an autonomous management for the provision of the garbage-
collection services in the municipality of Tunis. This was
to be an experimental case to be generalized to other
municipalities if successful, but it never materialized. The
GOT made no other attempt at creating an alternative form of
arrangement for the provision of local public services.
At the time of ONAS' creation, reformers never
considered the creation of a local autonomous institution for
the sewerage services either. Without any investigation into
the possible options, it appeared that the only form for
provision of services at the local level was by
municipalities themselves, that is, in a consolidated form of
institutional arrangement. For the reformers, this option
was not a viable one. Municipalities are still victims of
this perception that no other form of provision of the
services is possible at the local level except on-force
account, that is, in-house.72 Local provision of services is
always confused with provision in house by municipalities.
72 Interviews with government officials.
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Development of Skills and
Appropriate Personnel Policy
Municipalities have been deprived of their authority
over sewerage services on the basis of their lack of skills.
At the time of ONAS creation, municipalities had fewer than
30 people in total that had some skills related to the
provision of sewerage services.
This lack of expertise in the sector was not specific to
the municipalities, although it was one of the reformers'
justification for ONAS creation. The lack of expertise was a
national problem, as sewerage-related technical skills were
not available in the whole country. ONAS had to engage in
major training programs and received technical assistance for
several years to build the level of skills necessary for the
provision of the service.
On the one hand, we can argue that these training
efforts could have been conducted at the local level.
Municipalities would have benefited greatly from such
extensive training programs which would have improved their
technical and managerial capacities. Municipalities have
never received a comparable skills-formation effort. On the
other hand, training and skills development are more easily
achieved within a single institution for three reasons.
First are the reasons of economies of scale. One single
institution requires fewer skilled people than do several
institutions, where skills would need to be duplicated as
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many times as there were institutions. Therefore, fewer
resources are necessary for training. Second, concentration
is also beneficial for sharing knowledge. On-the-job
training was one of the components of ONAS' training
programs. Finally, concentration of effort into one
institution is also more efficient at building institutional
knowledge and a tradition of practice, as clearly
demonstrated by ONAS' institutional success.
Self-Financing
The goal of self-financing meant for ONAS a greater
reliance on tariff revenues and, therefore, a well-defined
cost-recovery mechanism. Although ONAS never reached its
self-financing objective, it has nevertheless developed a
complete tariff and user-fee system. ONAS' operating costs
are recovered through a surcharge on water consumption
managed by ONAS, and parts of its investment cost are
recovered by a fee system charged to the direct
beneficiaries. ONAS continues to receive substantial
subsidies from the GOT. Some are justified by the fact that
the sewerage service is partially a public good. Other
subsidies are provided to close the gap between the cost of
the service and the insufficient tariff and fee revenues.
In comparison, the municipalities' cost-recovery
mechanism for sewerage services was--and continues to be--
highly underdeveloped. Municipalities have no tradition of
cost recovery. We have previously examined (in Chapter 4)
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the municipalities' general user-fee system and have shown
that its structure was underdeveloped and its revenues
limited. When they do charge for services, municipalities
recover at best a very modest share of their costs. Our
analysis also revealed the potential ways for municipalities
to recover costs of sewerage services. None of them,
however, are specifically designed for sewerage services as
there are no sewerage-fees or sewerage-tariffs per se.
First, we will review municipalities' sources of
subsidies, because subsidies represent such an important
source of revenues for ONAS. Can the same reasons for
subsidizing ONAS be applied to the municipalities? After
all, the GOT provides such heavy subsidies because it feels
that some of the benefits of the service--such as the
environmental improvements--are national public goods and
also that it is necessary to avoid levying excessive sewerage
charges on the population.
The GOT has never provided subsidies to municipalities
to finance specifically the sewerage service. Transfers from
the Fond Commun des Collectivites Locales (FCCL) and other
investment subsidies are general subsidies allocated to
finance many other competing sources of expenditures.73 We
estimate that ONAS has received in subsidies at least one-
third of the total amount of subsidies received by all
municipalities during the 1981-1987 period for all their
73 The FCCL transfers amount to as much as 45% of municipalities'
revenues.
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expenses--the same amount of subsidies transferred to the
municipalities would have tremendously increased their
capacity finance the sewerage service.74 Furthermore, at the
time of ONAS' creation, a share of the FCCL fund (8%, reduced
to 7% in 1986)--perceived as representing the share of the
transfers to finance the sewerage service--was allocated to
ONAS. In the process of centralization of the service,
municipalities not only lost the function, but also some of
the revenues attached to it.
A traditional source of revenue to finance sewerage
services at the local level is the property tax. As
discussed in Chapter 5, Tunisian municipalities do have a
property tax based on the rental value of properties called
the Rental Value Tax (RVT). There is no indication, however,
that this tax was designed to finance in part sewerage
services. The RVT is composed of a sum of several taxes
assessed and levied as one tax with the same base and rate,
while serving different purposes. One of these subtaxes is a
maintenance and sanitation tax, designed originally (1920) to
cover the cost of providing garbage-collection services. It
was never formally extended by legislation to cover the cost
of sewerage services.
74 ONAS received TD 123 million in transfers from the GOT (FCCL funds
not included) in 1979-1987--an average of TD 15.4 million per year--for
both operating and investment expenditures which covered 70% of their
investment expenditures and 33% of their operating expenses.
Municipalities total transfers and subsidies varied between TD 25.7
millions and TD 59.7 millions between 1981 and 1987 for all their
expenses. (See Table 4-12.)
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If we assume that the RVT should also serve to finance
the sewerage sector--because a property tax captures part of
the increase in value of properties resulting from
improvements by the public sector through infrastructure
investment or any investment--the total yield of this tax (TD
8.32 million in 1985) does not represent more than a fraction
of ONAS' operating costs (TD 15.6 million in 1985).
Moreover, municipalities do not have the authority to modify
the rate and base of the tax to adjust their revenues to the
cost of their services.
Finally, municipalities do not have the necessary tools
or appropriate mechanism for direct cost recovery from
beneficiaries. Only two articles in the municipalities'
legislation refer to fees related to sewerage service. The
first one, Article 132, Chapter III, of the LODC, does
provide municipalities with the right to charge direct
beneficiaries--defined as the neighboring property owners--
for all the costs of construction or renovation of streets,
sewerage networks, and flood control infrastructure. The
legislation, however, is again short of providing them with
the necessary tools to implement this right. A decree
setting the condition by which municipalities can recover
their expenses in infrastructure investment is required by
the legislation. Such a decree as never been promulgated.
Municipalities make up for these deficiencies by
referring to an older decree, dating to 1887, and the
modifications and complements that were added to it during
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the first part of this century. 7 5 They provided
municipalities with the legislation to charge direct
beneficiaries--defined as property owners of the streets of a
neighborhood adjacent to the infrastructure--for the total
cost of their infrastructure investment. The division of the
cost between beneficiaries is evaluated on the basis of the
linear meter of frontage of the property (decree of 1942).
This decree also sets the maximum amount that the
municipalities are allowed to raise for sewerage
construction. This maximum amount is not only way out of
line with the present day costs, but it is also nominated in
francs, the currency used at the time but not used since
independence.
Based on this outdated legislation and on Article 132 of
the LODC, municipalities and other institutions involved in
the provision of infrastructure at the local level have
developed solutions on a case-by-case basis. One of these
consisted of establishing a new updated decree, that was
implemented without legalization.
In other cases, municipalities have relied on voluntary
contributions for the construction of sewerage infrastructure
and other social facilities--as in the case of the
municipality of El-Mida. As a general rule, however,
municipalities do not charge for the cost of their investment
75 The decrees of 31/01/1887 and 04/18/1890 modified and completed by
the following decrees: 10/23/1908, 10/08/1912, 07/30/1923, 11/07/1923,
01/15/1927, 03/09/1927, 12/30/1928, 02/19/1932, 11/05/1934, 04/09/1942,
03/31/1955, 01/19/1956.
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and most often they do not invest in sewerage infrastructure
due to lack of funds.
The second article of municipal legislation, which
refers to the recovery of costs of the sewerage services,
covers only the costs of maintenance of sewerage connections.
This provision is found in the 1976 decree which updates
municipalities' fee system (Article 33, Chapter III). It
imposes a standard fee per connection, with a maximum limit
of TD 3 per year. Other maintenance costs and investment
costs of connections are not covered by this legislation.
Municipalities have never had a sewerage tariff or fee to
cover their operating costs. It is therefore, not surprising
that municipalities did not have, and continue to lack even
today, the necessary revenues to provide the sewerage
service. Municipalities do not have an appropriate legal
base nor clear mechanisms to recover the costs of the
sewerage service.
By comparison, the reformers provided ONAS with a
clearly structured and well-defined cost-recovery system.
ONAS received technical assistance and ample guidance for its
implementation and sizeable subsidies from the GOT to
complement insufficient tariff revenues.
Resource Mobilization and
Appropriate Financial Management
To achieve what was called financial viability or
financial soundness, reformers made sure that ONAS had access
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to credits for the large amounts of investments required to
rehabilitate and extend the service. The World Bank was very
instrumental in setting the conditions necessary to attract
other creditors to complement its own lending and to insure
the important financial commitment of the GOT to the sector.
The World Bank organized some co-financing. Moreover,
independent lenders were attracted by the assistance, the
training, and the monitoring the World Bank provided to the
sector.
Could credits have been mobilized for the municipalities
as well? If ONAS was not required to finance its investment
from its own savings but was rather provided with the
necessary loans, municipalities could similarly have been
granted the necessary credits to rehabilitate the sector.
Municipalities, however, were not--and are still not--credit-
worthy for such loans. Their lack of credit worthiness is
not due to an excessive debt load, but rather to their
inappropriate cost-recovery mechanism and a revenue
structure, which make the financial sustainability of the
service and debt repayment infeasible. It is also due to
their lack of appropriate financial-management practices.
In ONAS' case, good financial management was an
important component of its institutional development and much
effort was put into providing ONAS with the necessary skills
and tools to achieve it. Good financial management started
by the financial autonomy requirement, one of the main
emphases of ONAS' institutional setting. It included an
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appropriate cost-recovery mechanism, to insure revenue for
sustainability of the service. It also meant the development
of tools and practices of good financial management.
Appropriate tools and practices for good financial
management meant primarily the development of an appropriate
accounting system, which includes the adoption of commercial
accounting. With technical assistance and training programs,
ONAS developed the necessary skills in accounting and
financial management. It required effort, guidance, and time
before ONAS was said to have acquired adequate financial
practices.
The GOT had the need to control the use of the large
amounts of funds channeled to the sector and evaluate ONAS'
financial position for credit worthiness purposes. As ONAS
contracted large debts, most of which came from external
sources, good financial management was necessary not only for
monitoring ONAS' financial performances, but it also became a
prerequisite for acquiring more loans.
Municipalities are lacking the basic elements for
effective financial management. They lack the necessary
legislation to set up an autonomous financial management for
the services they provide. Neither do they possess the
skills necessary for a commercial type of financial
management.
Municipal accounting does not extend beyond the
traditional unitary budget necessary for the provision of
public goods, which combines all revenues and allocates them
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unspecified to all expenditures. It is an accounting system
adapted to the provision of public goods and services
financed through taxation. It does not provide for an
independent accounting for each service, for the allocation
of revenues to specific expenditures or the calculation of
costs of service.
The present municipal legislation does not provide any
base to set up such an accounting system for its services,
and, in practice, no previous example of autonomous financial
accounting or commercial accounting was ever established at
the local level. Moreover, municipalities are totally
lacking in expertise for commercial financial management. It
took ONAS several years with a lot of assistance and guidance
to acquire such expertise.
CONCLUSION
Our objective in this chapter was to explain what has
motivated the creation of a new centralized institution for
the sewerage sector in the midst of a decentralization
reform, by highlighting the deficiencies of municipalities
that made them inappropriate candidates to provide sewerage
service.
Municipalities' Deficiencies
Municipalities had lost their responsibility over the
sewerage service allegedly because they lacked the financial
and human resources to provide the service. We have seen
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that municipalities did indeed lack both resources and were
incapable of efficiently providing the service as shown by
the state of the sector before the creation of ONAS. We also
found through this analysis, however, that the reason for
their incapacity to provide the service extended far beyond
these two issues. Municipalities' institutional
underdevelopment and their insufficient legal base have been,
and still are, major obstacles to the efficient provision of
services.
Municipalities lack the necessary legislation to provide
the service through an autonomous form of management. This
represents the most important element in ONAS' creation and
successful development. Municipalities continue until today
to provide all services in the most traditional efficiently
management of local service, that is on force account. Their
legislation does not provide for alternative arrangements for
more efficient provision of public services.
Municipalities also lack the necessary legislation to
raise revenues. They have no adequate tariff structure and
user charges to recover their costs. ONAS, on the other
hand, was provided with a complete system for cost recovery.
Municipalities also lack the basic tools and practice for
effective financial management; for example, their accounting
system remains solely based on the 19th century model of
public accounting. The absence of a cost-recovery mechanism
combined with inadequate financial practices have been
obstacles to providing municipalities with the credits that
248
would have been necessary to rehabilitate the sector in a
decentralized manner. ONAS, on the other hand, was given the
financial structure to receive the necessary credits.
The first conclusion to be drawn from the previous
analysis is that municipalities' deficiencies are primarily
institutional. Their lack of appropriate institutional
structure made them inappropriate candidates for the
provision of the service.
Why Centralization?
This case illustrates the failure of the 1975 reform to
provide municipalities with the necessary structure to
operate efficiently. It illustrates further the important
differences between the institutional development of ONAS
and that of the municipalities. The consistent efforts and
resources put into ONAS' development contrast with the
hesitant and incomplete municipal reform. What prevented the
GOT from enacting a local level reform that is as extensive
as the one at the national level for ONAS? Why was the
development of municipalities capacities to provide the
sewerage service never considered as an option?
There are several explanations that come from the
analysis of the motivation of ONAS' creation. The most
important is that the institutional development of the sector
is more easily achieved in one centralized institution as
illustrated by four factors. First, the reformers explicitly
set out to achieve a coherent sectoral policy by
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concentrating the authority for the sector in one
institution. Second, the GOT maintained a close and critical
relationship with ONAS to control, review, and approve all
financial and planning decisions. That is: the GOT
controlled the allocation of large amounts of credits
provided to the sector; controlled the tariffs and user
charges policy in order to keep them coherent with the wage
policy of the country and with the targeted investment
programs in the sector; and finally controlled the financial
management of the institution necessary because of the large
amounts of loans required for the renovation and extension of
the sector. Third, institution building and development are
long-term processes of individual and institutional learning,
which are optimized when concentrated in one institution.
Fourth, monitoring and assistance by the reformers, that
played an important role in the development of ONAS, are more
easily done in one single institution. These factors have
allowed, in the case of ONAS, a constant monitoring of the
development of the institution and continuous revision of the
objectives in order to correct the deficiencies of the
institution. This list, although not exhaustive, gives some
of the reasons why the reformers preferred to centralize the
service.
Also, we should not overlook the obvious attraction of
designing a new institution to meet set objectives, rather
than trying to reform imprecise local government legislation
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and weak institutional structure to fit the needs of the
sector.
Finally there are two other factors that might have
influence in the reformers' decision to centralize the
service, but for which solutions could have been found at the
local level. First is the incorrect perception that there is
no alternative managerial forms of provision of local service
other than on force account, that is in house, by
municipalities. We have already mentioned that in Tunisia as
in many countries options for alternative arrangements for
the provision of service are often overlooked because of the
lack of experience and examples to refer to.
By the same token, if local provision of services
implies provision in-house by each individual municipality,
the large number of small municipalities must have been a
great disincentive for keeping the service at the local
level. It is evidently inefficient to provide a sewerage
service from each single municipality. It would also
eliminate the potential of capturing the benefits of
economies of scale. Although there is no evidence about what
is the optimal size of a sewerage service institution, it is
clear that some concentration is necessary to provide the
service efficiently. 7 6 This does not require, however, such
an extreme concentration into one national institution. Most
76 After citing several studies, Bird (1978, p. 27) concludes on the
issue of optimal scale of production of services that ... "very little is
known about the relationship between the cost of producing a service and
the scale in which it is produced."
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economies of scale are achieved through population density
rather than geographical extent. Solutions could have been
found by creating autonomous local sewerage authorities in
each region or for each large agglomeration, each serving
several municipalities under some form of intermunicipal
cooperation.
The second conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is
that the centralization was the outcome of the search for the
easiest way to set the institutional structure necessary to
provide the service efficiently. Our analysis of the
motivation of ONAS' creation point to the fact that the
institutional development of the sector is more easily
achieved in one centralized institution. The most important
justification for centralization of the service is primarily
managerial.
Rationale for the Division of Responsibilities
None of the reasons presented above are sufficient
reasons to eliminate entirely the option of keeping the
service at the local level. Rather, they are strong
incentives for the GOT, which is in search of the fastest way
to provide the service efficiently, to create a new
centralized institution. A solution to provide the service
at the local level may have been found in some form of
autonomous local or regional institutions under inter-
municipal cooperation if there had been a strong motivation
to keep the service at the local level. Surprisingly, the
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decentralization policy objective which started to be
formulated in the same period, was not sufficient motivation.
Even more surprising is the fact that the decentralization
policy objective has never raised any controversy or obstacle
to the reformers' decision to centralize the service.77
Managerial improvement in the sector, which would insure the
effective provision of the service, was by far a more
important objective than the perceived potential benefits of
keeping the service at the local level. The decentralization
policy objective was, in the process, forgotten.
The third conclusion to be drawn from this case is that
the GOT's rationale for distribution of services between the
central and the local governments was motivated by what we
define as "a priority objective for an effective production
and delivery of service". The GOT's priority was to provide
the service as fast and efficiently as possible in order to
resolve the environmental problem created by the inadequate
sewerage service. The the desire for an "effective
production and delivery of service" override the advantages
of participation and adaptation to local preferences.
Centralization versus Decentralization
Can we claim from this case that centralization is the
best institutional arrangement for the provision of the
sewerage service? Our objective in this chapter was not to
77 Some government officials seemed surprised by the parallel drawn
between these policies and their obvious contradiction (in our interview
with them in January 1989.)
253
conduct a comparative analysis of the decentralized versus
the centralized form of provision of services. This would
have required a different type of analysis. Our case does
indicate, however, that if the objective is primarily to
provide a defined level of service as rapidly and technically
efficiently as possible then centralization presents obvious
advantages.
In countries like Tunisia that lack the necessary skills
and institutional structure to provide the service,
centralization helps make the best use of financial resources
and technical assistance to achieve this objective.
Centralization also gave ONAS the necessary proximity to the
central government for it to be responsive to its needs. The
replicability of this experience to other countries should be
evaluated with caution. The relatively small size of the
country makes a national sewerage authority a surprising, but
not a totally unconceivable, form of arrangement. Other
particularities of this case include, the commitment of the
GOT to act upon the environmental problem, the World Bank's
heavy involvement, which was key to mobilize resources,
technical assistance, and know how not otherwise available in
Tunisia and finally, the availability of large amounts of
financial resources to be invested in the sector. All of
these factors contributed to ONAS' success.
Centralization might not be the appropriate approach to
achieve other objectives that may be more valued by decision
makers. One such objective might be to establish good
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communication between service providers and the people served
and better responsiveness to local demand. Planning and
priorities would be defined at the local level. This in
itself does not necessarily insure more equal access to the
service, but it gives more opportunities to the local
population to make their claims. ONAS was known to be not
very responsive to local demand. Moreover, a better
adaptation of the level of service to local conditions and
local needs--by the use of alternative methods of sewerage
disposal--might be desired to better use of resources if less
costly systems are used whenever possible, and to extend the
service to areas that do not require a full sewerage system.
This would also, consequently, improve equity. We have seen
that in the case of ONAS a full sewerage system approach to
the service limited its capacity to reach less densely
populated areas of the country. Finally, higher levels of
economies of scale might be reached with more decentralized
systems because optimal cost efficiency is not necessarily
achieved with a national provision of the service.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
Our objectives for this research were to investigate the
paradox of over fifteen years of an alleged decentralization
policy with no apparent result and the simultaneous actions
that contradict this objective, i.e., the systematic
centralization of local public services. Our goal was to
explain the paradox of a systematic centralization of local
public services during the general commitment to decentralize
in Tunisia. Our research was broken down in two parts. In
the first part, we analyzed why the decentralization reform
failed to transform local governments in active participant
in the public and economic life of the country, and, in the
second part, we analyzed why the sewerage sector was
centralized while the decentralization policy was being
formulated and implemented and what the rationale was for
allocation of responsibilities between levels of governments
in Tunisia.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our analysis started with an overview of the context
from in which the reform and policies aimed at reinforcing
local governments were formulated and implemented (Chapter
2). From this overview, we concluded that the GOT does not
have a clear commitment to the decentralization initiative,
and that this lack of clear commitment is at the source of
the failure of the decentralization initiative. This lack of
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commitment is apparent in the GOT indirect motivations for
the decentralization reform and hesitation and fear of excess
decentralization. The assessment of the decentralization
efforts, in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, indicated that, although
the reform introduced many improvements to the local
government system, it fell far short of establishing
municipalities as decentralized units of government.
The analysis of the role and responsibilities of sub-
national governments, as defined by the new legislation set
forth by the reform indicated that despite the fact that this
legislation represents one of the major achievements of the
reform, it is still very ambiguous in its definition of the
new role of the local governments (Chapter 3). It provided
local governments with seemingly ambitious responsibilities
over the economic and social development activities in their
locality, but these functions were restricted to an advisory
role with no enforceable authority. Also, the new
legislation imprecisely defined the other functions of the
municipalities, leaving room for many interpretations.
Finally, no functions have been effectively decentralized to
the local government by the reform. The imprecise definition
of the role of the local governments reflects the GOT's
hesitation and ambiguous position about decentralization.
The result of this ambiguity has been an insufficient
legislative structure to support the transformation of local
governments in decentralized authorities capable of providing
local public services efficiently.
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Our analysis of the financial reform in Chapters 4 and 5
indicated that important improvements were introduced in the
local government financial system. The reform did improve
municipalities' revenues substantially and initiated
fundamental changes in municipalities' financial management.
These improvements were, however, insufficient to provide the
local governments with the level of revenues and the
financial practices compatible with decentralization.
The financial reform introduced two new taxes--the tax
on hotels and the tax on establishments--and increased
central government transfers. The reform of the transfers
system created a stable and rapidly growing source of
revenues for the local government. Both sources, the new
taxes and the reformed transfers, provided municipalities
with revenues indexed to economic activities. Finally, a
reformed budgetary procedures improved municipal financial
management.
These changes brought a sharp increase in revenues and
expenditures of municipalities. They were, however, a one-
time increase only and the ratio of municipalities' revenues
and expenditures to that of the central government and other
macro economic indicators remained very low. More
importantly, the reform was primarily focused on improving
external sources of revenues to the municipalities and did
not provide them with increased authority over revenue-
raising activities. The newly created taxes were entirely
managed by the central government, and the central government
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transfers grew to the point of representing close to half of
municipal revenues. Revenue sources controlled by the
municipalities received limited attention. Local taxes and
user fees remained, for the most part, outdated and yielded
very limited revenues. This inadequate user fee and tariff
structure represents one of the most important drawbacks of
municipalities' revenue. Finally, the central government
kept a heavy control over all financial decisions, which is
another limitation of the municipalities authority over their
financial activities.
We can conclude from this analysis of the
decentralization reform that the reform has successfully
improved some aspects of municipal operations and marginally
increased their capacities. The GOT's unwillingness to
commit itself to decentralization has been, however, an
inhibition to the formulation of a more radical reform that
would have been necessary to provide municipalities with the
authority and capacity to act as decentralized government
fully responsible for local public services.
To assess the effective role of the local governments so
poorly defined by the legislation, we reviewed the overall
institutional structure for the provision of local public
services (LPSs) of the country, and the relative position of
municipalities among the various institutions providing these
services (Chapter 6). We confirmed the restricted role of
local governments in the provision of LPSs. Among the most
ambitious of municipalities' activities are traffic
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management, garbage collection, and some environmental-
control responsibilities. These represent a very confined
area of intervention in the public affairs of their locality,
particularly in comparison with the ambitious roles defined
by the 1975 reform.
We demonstrated also that most LPSs are centralized in
Tunisia. Although some LPSs, provided by ministries, have
always been centralized, others were centralized more
recently to be provided by national authorities endowed with
a large degree of autonomy and power over their sector. The
centralization and creation of autonomous authorities was
generally motivated by the desire to provide the service more
efficiently. The institutional structure that resulted from
this approach to public service was characterized by
sectorization and autonomization of the provision process.
To arrive at a better understanding of the motivation of
the GOT in the allocation of responsibilities between levels
of government and of the paradoxical situation of a
simultaneous centralization of local services and
decentralization initiative, we analyzed the centralization
process of the sewerage service. This analysis clarified,
first, the actual deficiencies of municipalities that have
made them incapable of providing the service efficiently and
that has motivated the centralization of the service; and,
second, the government's rationale for the centralized
allocation of responsibilities between levels of governments.
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We have seen that municipalities have lost their
responsibility over the sewerage service primarily because of
their own institutional deficiencies. Their lack of
appropriate structure and necessary legislation makes them
unfit for the provision of the service. Their legislation
does not provide for autonomous management for the provision
of public services, nor does it provide for setting up an
appropriate cost-recovery mechanism or accounting procedures
necessary for good financial management.
The GOT's actions were motivated by what we have defined
to be "a priority objective for an effective production and
delivery of service". Its interest in the sector started
with the environmental problem caused by the lack of an
appropriate sanitation system. Its objective was to resolve
it and provide an adequate level of service. With these
objectives in mind, the GOT created a new institution. The
criteria used in establishing this institution were
institutional and financial soundness, which included
autonomous management, sound personal policies, good
financial management, and appropriate cost-recovery
mechanisms.
Reforming municipalities was never considered to be an
option for the rehabilitation of the sector despite the on-
going decentralization policy. In view of the GOT's single-
minded objective of providing an adequate level of service,
it was easier to achieve the desired institutional
development in one centralized institution. ONAS benefited
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tremendously from the proximity of the central government and
the constant monitoring of its development by the reformers.
We concluded that the GOT's technocratic approach to the
LPSs, which emphasis to the effective provision of services,
conflicted with its decentralization policy objective. The
GOT's priority to an effective provision of service over any
other objectives ruled out the importance of decentralization
and explains the dispossession of municipalities from their
responsibilities during the alleged decentralization reform.
CONCLUSION
The decentralization initiative failed for two broad
reasons, both related to the historical and ideological
background of the country: (i) the strong tradition of
centralization and the GOT's lack of clear commitment to
decentralization and (ii) the GOT's "effective-provision"
approach, or technocratic approach, to LPSs.
First, Tunisia's pre-independence legacy of
centralization combined with the choices, made after
independence, of a one-party state with high level of
centralization of resources and authority in the hand of the
central government, has given to the country a strong
momentum towards centralization which has evolved in this
extreme case of centralized government. Centralization has
been the only model of government for a very long time and
most government officials, as well as most of the population
of the country, think only within this institutional
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framework. The benefits of decentralization are not
apparent, or even known, to most people in Tunisia. It is
very difficult for decision-makers to consider solutions to
problems in any other terms.
At the time of the reform, there was no clear
understanding of the benefits of decentralization, of what
the country's interest was in decentralization, nor of how to
use it. The reform was initiated because the GOT recognized,
in principle, the excessive centralization and the need to
enhance participation at the local level. No more specific
motives existed in which the value of decentralization was
recognized and sought. Neither were there targeted
objectives around which to build the reform. This is
illustrated in the vaguely defined motivations of the reform
with no references to the benefits of decentralization and
the ambiguous role given the local governments by the new
legislation.
Second, the GOT's approach to public services emphasized
two elements: (i) the effective provision of the service, a
technical goal, and (ii) access to the service, a social
goal, which is to be achieved by providing subsidies to the
sector. In ONAS' case, we have seen that self financing was
part of the institutional development objective, primarily
under the World Bank guidance. This objective was never
reached because the GOT maintained tariffs and user charges
below cost to insure affordability. For the government, this
approach took care of the equity issue and eliminated the
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need to consider variations in demands and adaptation to
local needs. One level of service, technically determined as
adequate, has been imposed unanimously.
The emphasis on effective provision of the service is
motivated primarily by the fact that skills, resources, and
know-how, are not widely available in Tunisia. This makes
the effective provision of the service one of the most
difficult objectives to achieve. Other criteria, such as
least-cost production, equity, or better adaptation to local
needs are secondary to the service-efficiency objective.
Decentralization, whose benefits may include part or all of
these above criteria and other ones too, is for this reason
not valued. Our observation of the institutional structure
that was created in the last thirty years for the provision
of public services is consistent with this approach. It is
characterized by sectorization, and autonomous management
with emphasis on technical goals.
Although decentralization has not occurred, we can say
that in Tunisia a form of horizontal decentralization has
taken place as a consequence of this approach. The GOT has
transferred its authority over services to autonomous
national institutions to achieve the targeted service-
efficiency, instead of transferring its authority to a lower
unit of government, which would achieve other, less desirable
objectives from the view point of the state.
Our findings confirm that the economic theory model on
the division of functions between levels of government does
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not explain reality. We have seen that the GOT's actions in
the public service sector are not motivated by considerations
such as individual preferences and allocative efficiency as
suggested by the economic theory. There exist another
rationale by which the GOT allocates responsibilities between
levels of governments, which we have defined to be a priority
objective for an "effective provision of service" and which
consists of concentrating efforts on actually providing an
adequate level of the service. In the Tunisian experience,
the "effective-provision-of-service" objective substitutes
for the allocative-efficiency objective of the economic
theory. The government ignores individual preferences--or
any form of adaptation to local needs--by imposing one level
of service that it considers technically appropriate and by
partially subsidizing it to insure, theoretically,
affordability and accessibility.
Our analysis of the shortcomings of the Tunisian
municipalities confirms many of the previous findings on the
state of underdevelopment of local governments in developing
countries. These include the lack of a clear definition of
responsibilities, the limited involvement in the provision of
services, the insufficient revenue sources, and the
inadequate managerial practices. By looking at one specific
local public service, we have identified with some precision
the deficiencies of local governments that make them unfit
for the provision of services. One of the key elements
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identified is the lack of alternative forms of provision of
services at the local level.
There is a difference between provision and production
of services that is not always recognized or considered when
evaluating the role and capacities of local governments in
developing countries. Providing a service, that is having
responsibility over it, should be differentiated from the
actual production of it. The structure of local governments
are often not suited for efficient production of services.
There is a definite need for more research on alternative
forms of production of services at the local level in
developing countries and on specific recommendations on how
to provide the local governments with the capacity to choose
and set the best alternative forms of service production.
The difficulty of such an approach is to insure that local
governments will not be marginalized and that their public
role is preserved. Too often, in developing countries, local
governments lose their control over the service when these
are provided by alternative arrangements.
FUTURE RESEARCH
In our research, we focused on the process and
motivations of the decentralization policies and
centralization practices. Our objective was to explain the
rationale for the division of responsibilities between levels
of government. Consequently, our analysis does not provide a
definite answer to the question of whether the centralized
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form of provision of sewerage service is the most appropriate
one. Although we demonstrated that in the case of ONAS
technical capacity is one of the most important elements for
adequate provision of sewerage services, this finding does
not inform us on other issues such as equity, productivity,
and allocative efficiency. Different approaches are
necessary to answer these questions. They may be the focus
of further research not only in the case of ONAS, but in the
case of other countries that have a more decentralized form
of provision of sewerage services. From the diversity of
experiences throughout the world, there seems to be no clear
answer as to which form of provision is the most appropriate.
It is found that regional or state institutions as well as
national institutions are inefficient and unresponsive to
local needs, while local or metropolitan provision of
sewerage services can result in excessive fragmentation and
lack of a coherent approach towards the sector. There is,
however, a recent tendency in international development
institutions such as the World Bank, first, to decentralize
sewerage services in order to improve local accountability
and responsiveness to local needs, which is expected to
increase the efficiency of the sector, and second, to have
central or federal governments define national policies for
the sector including tariffs and subsidy policies and
environmental standards. Other proposed activities of the
central government include control of implementation of
environmental standards, technical assistance, and financial
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support such as access to national and international
credits.78
Country-case studies as well as cross-country
comparisons, evaluating the various issues cited above, are
necessary to arrive at a better understanding of the benefits
of the centralized and the decentralized forms of service
provision.
78 Interviews with sanitation engineers at the World Bank.
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